Should Democracy Be Exported to Other Countries?
Democracy is built upon the principle that people should have a meaningful voice in determining who governs them.
That principle immediately creates a paradox when one country attempts to introduce democracy into another.
If democracy means self-government, can it genuinely be imposed by outsiders?
Foreign governments have spent decades attempting to encourage democratic transitions through election assistance, development aid, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, support for civil society, constitutional advice and, in extreme cases, military intervention.
The results have been dramatically different.
Postwar Germany and Japan became stable democracies after foreign military occupation.
Democratic institutions expanded across much of Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War with substantial support and conditionality from European institutions.
International assistance has helped election commissions, independent media, civil-society organizations and judicial institutions in numerous countries.
Yet Afghanistan demonstrated how enormous foreign investment could construct democratic institutions that collapsed extraordinarily quickly once external military support disappeared.
Iraq showed how removing a dictatorship and holding elections does not automatically produce political trust, strong institutions or social stability.
Other countries have democratized substantially through internal struggle rather than foreign engineering: citizens, trade unions, opposition parties, religious organizations, lawyers, students, journalists and civic movements created enough pressure to transform their own political systems.
The evidence therefore suggests that the question should not simply be:
“Should democracy be exported?”
A better question is:
“What forms of international support can help people build their own democratic institutions without turning democracy into an externally imposed political project?”
That distinction changes the debate completely.
Democracy Is Not a Western Property
Before discussing democracy promotion, one misconception should be addressed.
Democracy should not automatically be equated with Western civilization.
Representative institutions certainly developed particular modern forms in Europe and North America, but ideas involving consultation, councils, collective decision-making, limits on rulers and community participation have existed in different societies across history.
More importantly, the basic principles associated with democracy are not inherently culturally Western:
Should rulers be accountable?
Should citizens be allowed to criticize government?
Should people be imprisoned without legal process?
Should rulers be able to steal public wealth without consequences?
Should citizens have some mechanism for replacing governments peacefully?
Should courts be capable of protecting individuals from arbitrary power?
These are not uniquely American or European questions.
African, Asian, Latin American, Middle Eastern and Pacific societies have generated their own democratic movements and traditions.
Indeed, democracy becomes politically dangerous when outsiders present it as:
“Our civilization teaching your civilization how to govern.”
That framing can convert universal political principles into geopolitical hierarchy.
Democratic legitimacy is much stronger when citizens say:
“We demand these rights.”
than when foreign governments say:
“You must adopt our system.”
There Is No Single Democracy to Export
Another problem with the phrase "exporting democracy" is that democracy itself has many institutional forms.
The United States uses a presidential federal system.
The United Kingdom uses parliamentary government.
Germany combines parliamentary democracy with federalism.
France uses a semi-presidential system.
Switzerland incorporates extensive direct-democratic mechanisms.
India operates a federal parliamentary democracy.
Nordic democracies combine representative institutions with distinctive welfare states and consensus traditions.
Other democracies use proportional representation, ranked-choice voting, mixed electoral systems or winner-take-all elections.
Which democracy should another country import?
American?
British?
German?
Swiss?
Indian?
The answer should generally be:
none of them wholesale.
A democratic constitution should fit the society it governs.
International IDEA explicitly describes constitution-building as a sovereign, nationally owned process, emphasizing that those living within a country's historical and political circumstances possess indispensable knowledge about the institutions they need.
Foreign expertise can provide options.
It should not substitute for domestic political ownership.
Democracy Is More Than Holding Elections
One of the greatest mistakes in democracy promotion has been treating elections as though they create democracy automatically.
An election can choose a government.
It cannot by itself create:
an independent judiciary,
professional police,
an impartial civil service,
credible political parties,
a functioning parliament,
independent journalism,
public trust,
anti-corruption institutions,
or acceptance of minority rights.
A country can therefore hold internationally observed elections while remaining institutionally fragile.
International IDEA's contemporary democracy framework treats democracy through four broad dimensions—Representation, Rights, Rule of Law and Participation—rather than elections alone. Its 2025 assessment found significant global pressure across all four, including serious deterioration in judicial independence, press freedom and electoral integrity.
This matters for democracy promotion.
Foreign governments can help print ballots within months.
Building legitimate institutions may require generations.
Germany and Japan: The Famous Success Stories
Defenders of externally driven democratization frequently point toward Germany and Japan after the Second World War.
Both were defeated authoritarian powers.
Both were occupied.
Both underwent extensive institutional reconstruction.
Both eventually developed extraordinarily stable democratic systems.
These cases demonstrate that externally initiated democratization can succeed.
But they should be interpreted carefully.
They occurred under exceptional historical circumstances.
Germany already possessed significant experience with representative institutions before Nazi rule. Its postwar democratic development also occurred alongside rapid economic reconstruction and integration into an increasingly democratic Western European institutional environment.
Japan retained and adapted important parts of its existing state rather than constructing an entirely new administration from nothing.
RAND's comparative study of nation-building emphasized both Germany's previous institutional experience and surrounding democratic environment, while noting that the occupation of Japan worked partly because existing Japanese governmental structures were retained and adapted.
Germany and Japan therefore do not prove:
“Military occupation creates democracy.”
They prove something narrower:
Under unusually favorable conditions, external powers can help reconstruct a defeated state into a durable democracy when functioning institutions, social capacity, security and long-term commitment align.
Those conditions are difficult to reproduce.
Afghanistan Demonstrates the Opposite Problem
Afghanistan offers one of the strongest warnings against assuming that institutional forms can simply be constructed from outside.
After 2001, the United States and its partners invested heavily in building Afghan governmental institutions, security forces, elections and public administration.
Yet in 2021 the internationally supported Afghan government collapsed with extraordinary speed as the Taliban advanced.
The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported that the collapse occurred despite nearly two decades of American support and approximately $145 billion made available for Afghanistan reconstruction. Its investigation examined longstanding weaknesses in Afghan governmental legitimacy and sustainability.
The lesson is not that Afghans were culturally incapable of democracy.
That explanation is far too simplistic.
The deeper problems included insecurity, corruption, institutional dependency, political fragmentation, externally designed systems, contested legitimacy and the difficulty of building sustainable state institutions while simultaneously fighting a prolonged war.
A government can possess ministries, elections and a constitution while remaining heavily dependent upon external military and financial support.
That is institutional construction.
It is not necessarily democratic consolidation.
Iraq Raises Similar Questions
The 2003 invasion of Iraq removed Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.
Subsequent governments introduced elections, constitutional institutions and multiparty competition.
But the collapse of the existing authoritarian state also created enormous security and institutional problems.
Sectarian politics intensified.
Insurgency and terrorism expanded.
State institutions struggled.
Foreign occupation itself became politically divisive.
Iraq eventually developed meaningful electoral competition, but the experience demonstrated that:
removing authoritarian government is much easier than building democratic government.
Democracy requires a state capable of enforcing law.
If the state collapses, citizens may prioritize survival and security over constitutional theory.
This reveals one of democracy promotion's central mistakes:
A democratic state requires both democracy and state capacity.
Destroying the second in order to create the first can produce disastrous consequences.
Military Intervention Is the Most Dangerous Form of Democracy Promotion
This distinction should therefore be explicit.
There is an enormous moral and strategic difference between:
supporting election observers,
training judges,
funding independent journalism,
supporting civil society,
helping legislatures,
and
invading another country to change its government.
All may sometimes be described as "democracy promotion."
They should not be treated as equivalent.
Military regime change carries extraordinary consequences:
civilian casualties,
state collapse,
nationalist resistance,
regional instability,
economic disruption,
insurgency,
and questions of international legitimacy.
Once democracy arrives alongside foreign soldiers, local opponents can portray democratic institutions themselves as instruments of occupation.
This can damage democracy's legitimacy for generations.
The presumption should therefore be strongly against war as a democracy-promotion instrument.
Military action may sometimes be debated for entirely different reasons—self-defense, prevention of mass atrocities or collective security—but "we will invade them so that they can become democratic" has a deeply problematic historical record.
Democracy Assistance Is Different
Supporting democracy does not necessarily mean imposing governments.
Foreign assistance can strengthen institutions citizens already demand.
Examples include support for:
election administration,
independent courts,
parliamentary capacity,
anti-corruption agencies,
independent journalism,
human-rights organizations,
local government,
civic education,
women's political participation,
and election observation.
Academic evidence on this kind of assistance is mixed but important.
An influential 2004 study examining broad foreign-aid flows found no general evidence that foreign aid itself promoted democratization.
But research that distinguished democracy-specific assistance from general foreign aid reached more positive conclusions. A World Politics study examining U.S. democracy assistance across 165 countries between 1990 and 2003 found a statistically significant positive effect from specifically targeted democracy programs.
Another study found that aid conditionality focusing on participation and governmental accountability was associated with democratization under certain circumstances.
The lesson is therefore not:
“Foreign aid creates democracy.”
It is:
The type of assistance, domestic political environment and incentives of both donors and recipients matter enormously.
External Support Works Best When There Are Internal Democratic Actors
Recent scholarship reinforces this point.
A 2024 Oxford Handbook review of international democracy promotion found that external assistance and pressure tend to work better in relatively open authoritarian environments, where opposition parties and civil society already possess political space. Such methods are considerably less effective in tightly controlled authoritarian systems. Election monitoring and assistance to election-management institutions can nevertheless have meaningful effects under some conditions.
This suggests a useful principle:
Foreign actors rarely manufacture democratic demand successfully. They can sometimes strengthen democratic demand that already exists.
That distinction should guide policy.
If lawyers inside a country are fighting for judicial independence, international organizations can provide training and institutional support.
If journalists are investigating corruption, outside assistance may help them remain financially viable.
If civil-society groups are demanding credible elections, election-monitoring organizations can help.
If citizens are attempting constitutional reform, international experts can present comparative options.
In each case the political movement remains domestic.
External assistance strengthens it rather than replacing it.
Local Ownership Is Essential
This may be the single most important principle in sustainable democratization.
International IDEA's citizen-led democracy framework explicitly puts citizens at the center because people living within a society understand its culture, history, political dynamics and institutional weaknesses better than external actors. Its approach emphasizes locally driven reform rather than outside judgment.
This does not mean every locally designed institution is automatically good.
Domestic elites can also create corrupt or authoritarian systems.
But externally designed institutions that lack domestic legitimacy face a major problem:
Citizens may obey them while foreigners remain present.
What happens after foreigners leave?
Sustainable democracy requires people to believe:
“These are our institutions.”
not:
“These are institutions foreigners created for us.”
Culture Matters—but Culture Should Not Become an Excuse for Dictatorship
Critics of democracy promotion sometimes argue that certain cultures simply are not compatible with democracy.
This argument should be treated cautiously.
Cultures change.
Political institutions change.
Countries once described as unsuitable for democracy have later become democratic.
Germany was once governed by Nazism.
Japan was imperial and militaristic.
South Korea experienced military authoritarianism.
Taiwan experienced decades of one-party authoritarian rule.
Portugal and Spain lived under dictatorships well into the twentieth century.
Many Latin American states experienced military government.
Democratic political cultures often develop partly after democratic institutions emerge, not entirely before them.
Therefore one should not conclude:
“This society has never been democratic, therefore it cannot become democratic.”
But the opposite error is equally serious.
Democracy cannot simply ignore culture.
Institutions must understand:
religion,
ethnicity,
traditional authority,
family structures,
historical grievances,
local decision-making practices,
and relationships between central and regional government.
The objective should therefore be neither cultural determinism nor institutional arrogance.
It should be contextual democracy.
Africa Demonstrates Why Institutional Adaptation Matters
Africa is especially relevant to this debate because many modern African states inherited political institutions designed during or immediately after colonial rule.
National borders often combined communities with dramatically different political histories.
European-style constitutions were sometimes adopted without corresponding local institutional development.
Postcolonial governments then faced enormous pressures:
nation-building,
poverty,
Cold War interference,
ethnic competition,
military coups,
weak bureaucracies,
and dependence on commodity exports.
The lesson should not be that democracy cannot work in Africa.
Countries across the continent have demonstrated competitive elections, peaceful transitions and constitutional resilience to varying degrees.
The deeper question is whether African democracies should simply reproduce institutional designs developed elsewhere.
There is considerable room for democratic systems that combine universal rights with indigenous traditions of:
consultation,
community deliberation,
local councils,
traditional institutions,
consensus-building,
and philosophies such as Ubuntu.
Democratic principles may be universal while democratic institutions remain locally adapted.
The European Union Shows Another Model: Democratic Conditionality
Central and Eastern Europe's post-Cold War transitions demonstrate another form of external influence.
The European Union did not conquer states such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania and order them to become democracies.
Instead, prospective membership provided enormous political and economic incentives to undertake reforms concerning:
electoral democracy,
market institutions,
rule of law,
minority protections,
administration,
and legal standards.
This represents conditionality rather than military imposition.
Countries wanted membership.
Membership required institutional reforms.
External incentives therefore reinforced internal political transitions.
This model achieved substantial successes, though later democratic backsliding in some member states also demonstrates that external conditionality cannot permanently guarantee democratic behavior after the incentive structure changes.
Democracy must eventually sustain itself domestically.
Foreign Governments Have a Credibility Problem
Democracy promotion also suffers from one enormous political weakness:
selectivity.
Powerful democracies often condemn authoritarian governments that are geopolitical adversaries while cooperating closely with authoritarian governments that are strategic partners.
One dictatorship may face sanctions.
Another sells oil, provides military bases or supports strategic objectives and receives diplomatic protection.
Citizens elsewhere notice the contradiction.
This can make "democracy promotion" appear to mean:
“Democracy when it serves our interests.”
That damages credibility enormously.
Democratic values become associated with geopolitics rather than principle.
If a powerful country supports democracy in one state while supplying weapons or diplomatic support to authoritarian partners elsewhere, critics can reasonably question whether democracy is truly the objective.
International assistance is therefore most legitimate when rules are applied consistently rather than opportunistically.
Democracy Promotion Can Become Cultural Imperialism
Another criticism deserves serious consideration.
Foreign democracy organizations sometimes arrive with predetermined assumptions about:
constitutional design,
civil society,
gender policy,
electoral systems,
political parties,
media structures,
and governance.
Local institutions may then adapt themselves to what international donors want because funding depends on it.
This can create what might be called a donor democracy.
Organizations learn the language of international funders.
They write proposals.
They conduct workshops.
They produce reports.
But ordinary citizens may remain disconnected from the process.
The institutions appear democratic to outsiders while possessing limited roots inside the society.
Democracy promotion therefore becomes counterproductive when it creates professional democracy organizations that are more accountable to foreign donors than to local communities.
Economic Conditions Matter
Citizens judge political systems partly according to whether those systems improve everyday life.
Imagine a newly democratic country where:
unemployment remains extremely high,
electricity fails,
corruption continues,
crime increases,
schools deteriorate,
and food becomes unaffordable.
Citizens may reasonably ask:
“What exactly did democracy deliver?”
Freedom House's recommendations for political transitions emphasize precisely this problem: strengthening rule of law should occur alongside tangible economic and social improvements, because new democratic institutions require both legitimacy and effective governance.
International IDEA's 2025 review similarly finds that democratic governance is associated, on average, with stronger welfare, equality and lower corruption, but those outcomes depend heavily on functioning rule of law and institutions.
Democracy promotion therefore cannot consist simply of:
“Hold elections every four years.”
Citizens require functioning government between elections.
Development Should Not Be Used to Justify Permanent Authoritarianism Either
The opposite argument says:
“Poor countries need development first and democracy later.”
There is some logic here.
Strong institutions, education, economic opportunity and state capacity can make democracy easier to sustain.
But "later" can become indefinite.
Authoritarian governments frequently claim:
“Our people are not ready for democracy.”
Who determines when they become ready?
Usually the authoritarian government itself.
Economic development cannot provide permanent justification for denying citizens political rights.
The more useful approach is to build economic and democratic institutions together:
effective government,
education,
local participation,
rule of law,
independent institutions,
and gradual political inclusion.
Democracy Cannot Survive Without Security
Another lesson from failed interventions is that political competition requires basic physical security.
People cannot participate freely if:
militias control neighborhoods,
candidates are assassinated,
voters fear terrorist attacks,
armed factions refuse election outcomes,
or the government cannot enforce law.
Foreign democracy assistance must therefore recognize state capacity and security.
But security creates its own danger.
Foreign governments sometimes support authoritarian regimes because those governments promise stability.
This creates a false binary:
dictatorship or chaos.
In reality, sustainable stability depends on legitimate institutions.
Repression may suppress conflict temporarily while preserving the grievances that later cause greater instability.
Sanctions Are Another Difficult Tool
Can economic sanctions force authoritarian governments to democratize?
Sometimes external pressure matters.
But broad sanctions can also hurt ordinary citizens while ruling elites protect themselves.
They may allow dictators to blame economic suffering on foreign enemies.
Targeted sanctions against specific officials, assets or networks may avoid some of these problems, though their effectiveness varies.
International democracy promotion should therefore ask:
Who actually bears the cost of our pressure?
If ordinary citizens suffer while political elites remain secure, the policy may undermine the population whose rights outsiders claim to support.
Election Observation Can Be Useful
One relatively less intrusive form of democracy support is international election observation.
Observers can:
monitor procedures,
identify irregularities,
assess media access,
examine voter registration,
observe counting,
and produce independent reports.
This can strengthen domestic institutions when governments genuinely seek credible elections.
But observers cannot magically transform a fundamentally authoritarian system.
An election can be technically well administered while opposition candidates were jailed six months earlier.
Democratic analysis must therefore examine the entire political environment, not simply election day.
Independent Media May Be More Important Than Ballot Boxes
A country preparing for its first competitive election might receive large amounts of international funding to purchase voting equipment.
But imagine that:
all major television channels support the government,
opposition politicians receive little coverage,
journalists fear prosecution,
and government corruption cannot be investigated.
Technically excellent ballots will not solve the problem.
Sustainable democracy promotion therefore often requires strengthening the broader information environment.
Independent journalism allows citizens to judge competing governments.
Foreign assistance can help journalism through training, legal defense, technology and financial support.
But again, the goal should be independent journalism—not media organizations perceived as foreign propaganda outlets.
Support Institutions, Not Preferred Politicians
One of the most damaging mistakes foreign powers can make is confusing democracy promotion with supporting politicians they prefer.
Suppose an external government says:
“We support democracy.”
But then funds or politically favors one particular candidate because that candidate supports its foreign policy.
Citizens may reasonably conclude that the outside power does not actually want democracy.
It wants a friendly government produced through elections.
Genuine democracy assistance should therefore focus on institutions:
credible elections,
independent courts,
pluralistic media,
civil society,
constitutional protections,
and political competition.
The objective should be:
“Whoever citizens freely choose should govern within constitutional limits.”
Not:
“Citizens should freely choose the person we want.”
Democracy Promotion Must Accept Democratic Outcomes
This principle becomes difficult when voters elect governments foreign powers dislike.
What if citizens choose:
nationalists,
socialists,
religious conservatives,
populists,
anti-Western parties,
or governments opposed to international economic policies?
A foreign power that supports democracy only when preferred candidates win is not really supporting democracy.
Democratic sovereignty means accepting the possibility that citizens will make choices outsiders dislike.
There are limits—elected governments should not be permitted to destroy constitutional rights with impunity—but policy disagreement alone cannot invalidate elections.
Democracy includes the right to choose differently from foreign donors.
What About Human Rights?
A strict sovereignty argument creates another problem.
Should the international community simply remain silent when governments torture dissidents, eliminate opposition parties or violently suppress peaceful citizens?
Probably not.
National sovereignty is important.
But human rights do not disappear at national borders.
International actors can legitimately:
document abuses,
offer refuge to persecuted activists,
support human-rights defenders,
apply diplomatic pressure,
support international legal mechanisms,
defend independent media,
and condemn political imprisonment.
Freedom House's 2026 recommendations argue that international support for democratic institutions, civil society and independent media has produced modest but meaningful gains in democratic governance, even though such assistance cannot independently overcome broader authoritarian forces.
Supporting people's ability to claim rights is different from choosing their government for them.
The Organic Democracy Argument Is Partly Right
The strongest critics of democracy exportation argue:
Democracy must grow organically.
There is considerable truth in this.
Sustainable democracy needs domestic:
political movements,
civic organizations,
leaders,
constitutional agreements,
social legitimacy,
and willingness to accept electoral defeat.
Foreign governments cannot manufacture these indefinitely.
But "organic" should not mean "completely isolated from external influence."
Almost no modern political system develops in isolation.
Ideas move across borders.
Constitutions borrow from one another.
Activists learn from other movements.
Judges study foreign legal systems.
Election commissions use international standards.
Governments join regional institutions.
Foreign investment changes societies.
Technology spreads political ideas.
External support can therefore influence democratization without controlling it.
A plant provides a useful analogy.
Outsiders cannot manufacture its roots.
But they may improve the soil.
A Better Model: Democracy Support Rather Than Democracy Export
The language itself should probably change.
Instead of exporting democracy, democratic states should think about supporting democratic capacity.
That means starting with what people within the society are already trying to build.
A legitimate approach would emphasize:
1. Local ownership
Domestic citizens and institutions should determine constitutional arrangements.
2. Rule of law
Courts and legal institutions matter as much as elections.
3. Independent media
Citizens need information to hold governments accountable.
4. Civil society
Democracy must extend beyond political parties.
5. Electoral integrity
Election authorities need professional capacity and independence.
6. Inclusive participation
Women, minorities, young people and marginalized communities need genuine political access.
7. Local government
Democratic habits can develop through participation close to citizens' everyday lives.
8. Economic capacity
Democratic institutions need governments capable of delivering public services.
9. Long-term commitment
Institution-building cannot operate effectively through short foreign-policy cycles.
10. Political neutrality
Foreign support should strengthen democratic rules rather than particular candidates.
Democracy Assistance Should Eventually Make Itself Unnecessary
This provides perhaps the best measure of successful foreign assistance.
Does the recipient society become increasingly capable of maintaining democratic institutions without the donor?
If election authorities still require foreign experts after 30 years, something is wrong.
If civil society collapses immediately when foreign grants disappear, local sustainability was never achieved.
If courts remain independent only because foreign governments threaten sanctions, institutional legitimacy remains fragile.
Successful democracy assistance should gradually produce:
less need for democracy assistance.
The ultimate objective is domestic independence.
Should Democracy Therefore Be Exported?
Not in the conventional sense.
Countries should be extremely cautious about attempting to transplant their own political systems wholesale into other societies.
Democracy imposed through military force has enormous risks and should not become a normal instrument of foreign policy.
Foreign governments should not choose political leaders for other societies.
They should not equate democracy with geopolitical alignment.
And they should not assume that institutions successful in Washington, London, Paris or Brussels can simply be copied into Abuja, Baghdad, Kabul, Nairobi or elsewhere without adaptation.
But this does not mean democratic societies should remain indifferent to authoritarianism.
International actors can legitimately support:
free elections,
independent courts,
freedom of expression,
anti-corruption reforms,
civil society,
constitutional government,
independent journalism,
human-rights defenders,
and citizens peacefully demanding political participation.
The distinction is fundamental.
Democracy should be supported from outside, but owned from inside.
You Can Support Democracy, but You Cannot Own Someone Else's Democracy
Democracy contains a principle that should govern democracy promotion itself:
people should exercise political agency over their own society.
That means democracy cannot simply be delivered like a product.
A constitution can be written by foreign lawyers.
Voting machines can be imported.
Election observers can arrive.
Political parties can receive training.
International donors can finance organizations.
But outsiders cannot manufacture the deepest foundations of democracy:
political legitimacy,
institutional trust,
civic responsibility,
constitutional restraint,
and willingness to accept peaceful transfers of power.
Those must ultimately develop within the society.
This is why the evidence on democracy assistance is mixed.
Broad foreign aid alone has not consistently produced democratization, while more targeted assistance to elections, accountability institutions and civil society has shown positive effects under some conditions.
The central lesson is therefore not that outsiders are powerless.
It is that external influence works best when it reinforces internal political agency rather than replacing it.
Germany and Japan demonstrate that extraordinary external intervention can contribute to successful democratization under exceptional conditions.
Afghanistan demonstrates that billions of dollars and decades of institutional construction cannot guarantee that externally supported political structures will survive.
Other democratic transitions demonstrate that domestic citizens, institutions and social movements are usually the indispensable actors.
Perhaps the most responsible international principle is therefore:
Do not export a government.
Do not export a political party.
Do not export a foreign constitution unchanged.
Do not export democracy at gunpoint.
Instead:
support citizens' ability to choose, organize, speak, investigate, vote and hold power accountable.
That distinction preserves both democracy and sovereignty.
The ultimate test of democracy promotion should not be whether another country begins to resemble the country providing assistance.
It should be whether the people of that society gain greater power to govern themselves.
And this leads to the deeper question:
If democracy means government by the people, can a democratic system ever be truly successful unless the people themselves believe that it is theirs?
The answer is probably no.
Democratic principles can cross borders.
Democratic knowledge can cross borders.
International assistance can cross borders.
Human-rights solidarity can cross borders.
But lasting democratic legitimacy cannot simply be imported.
It has to take root.
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