Minnesota Money Map — Phase 16: Comparative Lobbying & Funding Audit

 

Minnesota Money Map —   

 Comparative Lobbying & Funding Audit. 

This phase changes the unit of comparison. Instead of asking whether Somali organizations received substantial public money, we ask:

How did Somali, broader African immigrant, and historic African-American organizations perform under the same political-funding system?

That is a much stronger test because it controls for the fact that different organizations pursue fundamentally different objectives.

1. The first major finding: Minnesota's direct-grant system was much larger than the Somali question

In 2023, Minnesota legislators approved more than $1.1 billion in legislatively named grants to nonprofits across state government, according to reporting based on state records. The grants covered organizations dealing with violence prevention, homelessness, cultural programs, economic development, education, health and many other areas. 

That changes the analytical frame.

The relevant question is not:

"Why did Somali organizations get direct grants?"

but:

"Were Somali organizations disproportionately successful within Minnesota's broader system of legislatively named grants?"

We can now begin answering that.

2. The official audit confirms the mechanism

Minnesota's Office of the Legislative Auditor found that state agencies were required to provide legislatively named grantees the same level of oversight as other grants. The requirements include workplans, budgets, grant contracts, monitoring and closeout procedures. 

But the OLA's 2023 investigation found widespread compliance problems in state grant management.

The problem was not confined to Somali organizations.

The audit examined state-funded nonprofit grants broadly and identified problems involving:

• financial reconciliation;
• site visits;
• progress reports;
• payment controls;
• documentation.
• This matters because it identifies a systemic vulnerability rather than an ethnic-specific mechanism.

3. DEED provides an excellent controlled comparison

The OLA's 2025 audit of DEED grants gives us a useful apples-to-apples dataset.

For the Adult Career Pathways programs in FY2022–23:

Grant category	Funding	Grantees
Legislatively Named Grants	$19.22M	18
Pathways to Prosperity	$13.59M	32
Targeted Community Capital Project	$7.84M	9
African Immigrant Economic Relief	$1.90M	8
Internationally Trained Professionals	$1.90M	7
Southeast Asian Economic Relief	$1.84M	6
Jobs Bill Support Services	$1.56M	28
Women's Economic Security Act	$1.43M	8

This is extremely useful.

It shows that African Immigrant Economic Relief was one program among a much larger collection of targeted and general programs.

It does not look like a stand-alone Somali funding channel.

4. African immigrant funding was also not synonymous with Somali funding

The African Immigrant Economic Relief program included organizations serving African immigrant communities broadly.

That means the funding pool potentially covered:

• Somali;
• Ethiopian;
• Nigerian;
• Liberian;
• Kenyan;
• other African immigrant populations.

So when we find:

$1.9 million African Immigrant Economic Relief

we should not convert it into:

$1.9 million Somali funding.

That would be an analytical error.

5. Now compare the cultural-funding system

The 2024 cultural-festival legislation is particularly useful because several communities were funded in the same legislative provision.

The enacted amounts were:

Community/program	Amount
African-American cultural festivals — Stairstep	$1.2M
Somali cultural festivals — Ka Joog + Somali Museum	$800K
Latino cultural festivals — West Side Boosters	$1.2M
Hmong International Freedom Festival	$600K/year

This is probably the cleanest comparison we have found so far.

It demonstrates that Minnesota's legislature was funding multiple culturally specific communities simultaneously.

6. And the Somali figure changed during the legislative process

The initial legislative language contained:

$1.2 million

for Somali cultural festivals.

But the enacted version reduced that amount to:

$800,000

with:

• $400,000 to Ka Joog;
• $400,000 to the Somali Museum. 

The $400,000 initially associated with ESHARA did not survive in the final version.

This is a good example of why we must use enacted law rather than introduced bills when calculating actual public funding.

7. The African-American comparison is particularly important

The same legislation provided:

$1.2 million

to the Stairstep Foundation for African-American cultural festivals and events. 

Therefore, in this specific program:

African-American cultural funding was $400,000 greater than the final Somali cultural-festival allocation.

That does not tell us which program was more valuable or effective; it simply describes the enacted allocation.

It is strong evidence against the idea that cultural funding was automatically redirected from African-American institutions to Somali institutions.

8. The economic-development comparison is even more interesting

Now compare the major economic programs.

African immigrant

ADC

$5 million in 2024, including commercial real-estate lending, loan-loss reserves, organizational capacity and a community-resource center.

African immigrant

AEDS

$1 million/year for African immigrant economic development, including a loan fund and workforce/technical assistance.

African-American

Ujamaa Place

$1.5 million/year for programs primarily serving African-American men.

These programs are not identical, so direct dollar comparisons must be treated cautiously.

But the pattern is clear:

Minnesota was funding both African immigrant economic development and African-American economic/human-capital development.

9. The political advocacy evidence also exists on both sides

We have direct evidence of lobbying by African immigrant organizations.

For example, the 2024 Campaign Finance Board lobbying report lists:

African Economic Development Solutions

with:

$15,000

in legislative lobbying disbursements. 

African Community Economic Development also registered a lobbyist in 2024. 

So African immigrant organizations were not merely passive recipients of government programs.

They were participating in the political process.

10. African-American organizations also used the same political mechanism

The 2024 lobbying report lists:

Ujamaa Place

with:

$5,000

in legislative lobbying expenditures. 

That is a useful apples-to-apples comparison.

We now have:

Organization	Community	2024 legislative lobbying
African Economic Development Solutions	African immigrant	$15,000
Ujamaa Place	African-American	$5,000
Somali Museum	Somali	$20,000

The numbers are small relative to the appropriations involved.

And, importantly, they show that all three groups used lobbying as a normal mechanism of political advocacy.

11. The Somali Museum remains an unusually strong case

The Somali Museum spent approximately:

$20,000

on legislative lobbying in 2024.

It was also represented by professional lobbyists.

The museum subsequently received major legislative support, including the $3.9 million capital appropriation identified in earlier phases.

That is a real advocacy-to-appropriation sequence.

But we cannot interpret:

$20,000 lobbying → $3.9M appropriation

as a causal price tag.

The appropriation also depended on:

• legislation;
• committee consideration;
• capital-budget negotiations;
• legislative leadership;
• votes;
• executive approval;
• project eligibility.

12. The bigger comparison makes the lobbying relationship less unusual

The Minnesota Reformer identified three clients of lobbyist Nancy Hylden's firm:

• Somali Museum;
• American Indian OIC;
• Northside Achievement Zone.

Together they received nearly $8 million in legislatively named grants, according to the newspaper's review. 

This is revealing because the same lobbying firm represented organizations from different racial and community constituencies.

The apparent mechanism is therefore:

professional lobbying expertise → legislative access

rather than:

Somali identity → automatic government money.

13. The political system rewards organizational capacity

This may be one of the most important findings of the entire investigation.

An organization needs to be able to:

• formulate a legislative request;
• produce a credible project;
• identify legislators;
• hire or access lobbyists;
• testify;
• provide fiscal documentation;
• mobilize supporters;
• maintain relationships across sessions.

Communities that develop those capabilities can become more successful in the appropriations process.

That mechanism is available to:

Somali organizations

but also:

African-American organizations

and:

Latino, Hmong, Native American, Asian, disability, labor and other organizations.

14. Minnesota's grant system has an important structural weakness

The OLA found that state agencies did not always apply the same oversight to legislatively named grants as to competitively awarded grants.

The 2023 OLA report specifically states that agencies should manage legislatively named grants with the same level of oversight as other grants. 

Subsequent reporting based on the audit says the Department of Education documented less fiscal and programmatic oversight of legislatively named grants than competitive grants. 

This is a significant governance finding.

But it is a system-level issue, not evidence that Somali organizations were uniquely favored.

15. The $1.1 billion itself needs careful interpretation

The widely cited:

$1.1 billion

was the total amount of legislatively named nonprofit grants across Minnesota's government in 2023.

It was not:

• Somali funding;
• African immigrant funding;
• money going to one political party's allies;
• household wealth;
• campaign contributions.

It covered hundreds of nonprofit recipients across many sectors. 

This is exactly why our earlier “billions to Somalis” hypothesis needs to be rejected as a description of the available evidence.

The billion-dollar number belongs to the statewide legislatively named grant system.

16. A particularly useful comparison: requested vs enacted

The Somali Museum provides several examples.

2023

HF1072 proposed:

$200K FY2024 + $200K FY2025

for heritage arts and cultural vitality. 

2024

A capital bill proposed:

$12.7 million

for a new facility. 

Final enacted capital funding

Approximately:

$3.9 million

for the capital project.

This demonstrates how much the original request can differ from the eventual appropriation.

17. There is also continuing Somali cultural funding

The 2025–26 legislation provides:

$125,000 each year

for the Somali Museum's heritage arts and cultural vitality programs.

It also provides:

$250,000 each year

for Ka Joog/Fanka statewide Somali-based collaborative programs. 

Again, this is legitimate evidence of continuing public support.

But it is a much smaller amount than the earlier $12.7 million proposal.

18. A 2026 proposal shows continued advocacy—but it is only a proposal

In 2026, HF4370 proposed:

$1.5 million

for a new Somali Museum facility.

SF4579 contained the same proposed amount. 

This is important for tracking political advocacy.

But unless enacted and disbursed, it must not be added to our public-money totals.

The same rule applies to every organization.

19. The comparative funding map

Here is the picture we can now construct:

Organization/program	Community	Political advocacy	Public funding evidence	Primary purpose
Somali Museum	Somali	Professional lobbying + legislation	Major capital + cultural grants	Culture / institutional asset
Ka Joog/Fanka	Somali	Legislative advocacy	Cultural grants	Culture / youth
ADC	African immigrant	Legislative advocacy	$5M state economic-development appropriation + federal CDFI funding	Business/property capital
AEDS	African immigrant	$15K 2024 lobbying	State + federal economic-development funding	Business lending
African Community Economic Development	African immigrant	Lobbyist registered	State program participation	Economic development
Ujamaa Place	African-American	$5K 2024 lobbying	$1.5M/year program support	Workforce/housing/human capital
Stairstep	African-American	Legislative advocacy	$1.2M cultural funding	Culture
Phyllis Wheatley	African-American	Legislative advocacy	Capital/program support	Institutional infrastructure

This is the first reasonably useful comparative institutional map we've built.

20. What the comparison tells us

Finding 1

Somali organizations did develop substantial political access.

Established.

Finding 2

African immigrant organizations also developed significant economic-development capacity.

Established.

Finding 3

African-American organizations continued receiving substantial public funding.

Established.

Finding 4

African-American organizations also lobbied the legislature.

Established.

Finding 5

The same legislative funding system was used for many racial/ethnic communities.

Established.

Finding 6

Minnesota's direct-grant system had documented oversight weaknesses.

Established.

Finding 7

Those weaknesses were not shown to be uniquely associated with Somali organizations.

Established.

21. The more defensible hypothesis has now changed

After 16 phases, the evidence no longer strongly supports:

"Democrats brought Somalis in and transferred African-American resources to them."

The evidence is considerably more consistent with:

Minnesota's political system increasingly accommodates multiple Black and immigrant constituencies, and organizations with sufficient political organization can obtain targeted public funding.

That is a materially different proposition.

It also produces a better research question:

Does political organizational capacity predict public funding more strongly than community size or economic need?

That can actually be tested.

22. A second testable hypothesis has emerged

The next question should be:

Do organizations with stronger lobbying networks receive more legislatively named grants than similarly situated organizations without professional political networks?

We could measure:

Lobbying expenditure

number of lobbyists

years lobbying

legislative sponsors

committee access

amount requested

amount enacted

actual expenditure

organizational budget

community served.

That would let us calculate something like:

Funding obtained per $1,000 of lobbying expenditure

But we must treat that as a descriptive ratio, not proof of causation.

23. The most important governance finding

The biggest institutional vulnerability uncovered so far is not Somali political influence.

It is:

Minnesota's use of legislatively named grants.

The OLA has been warning about the practice for years.

The 2023 audit documented weaknesses in grant oversight, and later legislative debate continued over whether direct legislative grants should be restricted. 

Supporters of the practice argue that direct grants can be useful when a particular organization is uniquely positioned to perform a service or when smaller grassroots organizations would struggle in a competitive process. 

Critics argue that the process can favor politically connected nonprofits.

Both positions are part of the documented policy debate.

24. Phase 16 verdict — analytically, not politically

The comparative audit produces four strong findings:

A. Somali organizations have become politically sophisticated.

They use:

• elected representatives;
• lobbying;
• coalition-building;
• nonprofit advocacy;
• cultural organizations;
• economic-development organizations.

B. African-American organizations remain politically active.

They continue to obtain:

• workforce funding;
• cultural funding;
• capital funding;
• housing-related funding;
• legislative sponsorship.

C. Minnesota's system favors organizations capable of navigating the political process.

This applies across communities.

D. The available evidence does not demonstrate a Somali-versus-African-American transfer of political money.

There is evidence of competition, coalition-building and diversification, but not evidence establishing an intentional Democratic strategy to replace native-born African Americans.

Phase 17 — The next and potentially decisive phase

We can now move from organizations to individual legislators and legislative networks.

Phase 17: The Sponsor Network Analysis

For each major Somali/African immigrant and African-American appropriation, we would map:

Organization

→ bill

→ author

→ co-authors

→ committee

→ chair

→ companion bill

→ amendments

→ final vote

→ governor

→ agency

→ actual recipient.

Then overlay:

legislator

→ campaign contributions

→ PAC relationships

→ lobbying relationships

→ district demographics

→ previous appropriations.

The goal is not to assume corruption.

It is to determine whether the same small network of legislators, lobbyists and organizations repeatedly appears across the funding decisions.

That would give us the strongest institutional picture yet of how Minnesota's public money actually moves through its political system.

By Jugo Ikeji-Uju. 

admin@ubuntusafa.com 

sappertekinc@gmail.com

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Why Doesn't the Commonwealth Have a Stronger Collective Voice at the UN? 

56 countries, 2.7 billion people — yet the Commonwealth rarely behaves at the United Nations like a coordinated geopolitical bloc. Why? 

This is one of the Commonwealth's most revealing contradictions.

The organization has a remarkable potential voting and diplomatic network. Its 56 members span Africa, Asia, Europe, the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Americas, and include some of the world's largest countries as well as some of its smallest. All members are formally equal within the Commonwealth, regardless of size or wealth. 

The Commonwealth Charter explicitly says members will support international peace and security, contribute to international consensus and work individually and collectively under the authority of the United Nations. It even aspires to be a "strong and respected voice in the world." 

Yet the Commonwealth does not operate at the UN like the EU, the African Union or some other coordinated diplomatic group.

The reason is fundamental:

The Commonwealth has the numbers of a bloc, but not the institutional machinery of a bloc.

1. The Commonwealth Is Not a UN Voting Bloc

The first distinction is essential.

The Commonwealth does not have a single seat at the United Nations representing all 56 members.

Every Commonwealth country retains its own:

• UN membership;
• diplomatic mission;
• foreign policy;
• voting instructions;
• national interests;
• alliances;
• regional commitments.

The Commonwealth Secretariat cannot order India, Nigeria, Britain, Canada, Australia or Fiji to vote in a particular way.

This is consistent with the organization's constitutional foundation: the Commonwealth is a voluntary association of independent and equal sovereign states, with each government responsible for its own policies. 

That principle is simultaneously the Commonwealth's strength — and a major limitation on collective diplomatic power.

2. Fifty-Six Countries Do Not Automatically Produce Fifty-Six Coordinated Votes

Imagine a UN General Assembly resolution concerning:

• Ukraine;
• Gaza;
• Taiwan;
• sanctions;
• climate finance;
• nuclear disarmament;
• reform of the Security Council;
• development finance;
• human rights;
• intervention in another sovereign state.

The 56 Commonwealth governments may have very different interests.

Consider the diversity involved.

The Commonwealth includes:

India

United Kingdom

Canada

Australia

Nigeria

South Africa

Pakistan

Malaysia

Singapore

Bangladesh

Ghana

Kenya

Caribbean states

Pacific island states

and many others.

They do not have identical strategic priorities.

The Commonwealth deliberately permits members to be non-aligned or members of other alliances and organizations. 

So a Commonwealth foreign-policy bloc would sometimes collide with the foreign-policy commitments of its own members.

3. The Commonwealth's Diversity Is Both Its Asset and Its Problem

This is perhaps the central paradox.

The Commonwealth represents:

• developed economies;
• emerging economies;
• least-developed countries;
• nuclear powers;
• small island states;
• major commodity exporters;
• financial centres;
• large democracies;
• countries with very different political systems;
• countries located in competing geopolitical regions.

That diversity gives the Commonwealth unusual diplomatic reach.

But it makes consensus difficult.

The Commonwealth's preferred method is consultation and consensus, not majority voting on foreign policy. The Charter explicitly identifies consensus and common action as core principles. 

That means the organization often has to search for the smallest area of common agreement.

The result can be diplomatic language that is acceptable to everyone but stronger than the position of no individual member.

4. There Is No Commonwealth Foreign Policy

This is probably the single biggest missing institution.

There is no:

Commonwealth Foreign Minister

with authority comparable to a national foreign minister.

There is no:

Commonwealth Foreign Ministry

that instructs 56 diplomatic missions.

There is no:

Commonwealth Security Council

that determines collective positions.

There is no:

Commonwealth diplomatic caucus

with mandatory voting instructions.

There is no:

Commonwealth ambassador to the UN

who speaks on behalf of all 56 countries.

The Secretary-General can represent the organization within the mandate given by member governments, but the Secretariat does not possess sovereign authority over member states.

5. The Commonwealth Secretariat Is Much Smaller Than Its Potential Diplomatic Network

This matters.

The Commonwealth Secretariat's role is primarily to support governments, build consensus, provide technical assistance and coordinate agreed Commonwealth priorities.

It is not a supranational government.

The Secretariat itself describes the Commonwealth as a voluntary association of 56 independent and equal countries. 

This means the Commonwealth has a classic coordination problem:

The membership is enormous.

The Secretariat is comparatively small.

The governments retain the actual diplomatic power.

Consequently, collective diplomacy depends heavily on whether national governments choose to coordinate.

6. The Commonwealth Already Does Some UN Coordination

It would therefore be wrong to say the Commonwealth has no collective UN voice.

It does.

Commonwealth ministers and officials regularly meet around UN processes.

For example, in September 2026, Commonwealth foreign ministers met at UN headquarters during the 80th UN General Assembly and reaffirmed collective positions around:

• multilateralism;
• peace;
• climate;
• debt;
• trade;
• small-state representation;
• international cooperation.

The meeting explicitly sought to strengthen the Commonwealth's collective action and advocacy. 

The Commonwealth also operates support mechanisms for small states at UN centres such as New York and Geneva, where limited financial and human resources can otherwise make sustained diplomatic participation difficult. 

So the problem isn't absence.

It is scale, consistency and political coordination.

7. The Small States Have the Most to Gain

This is where a stronger Commonwealth UN strategy could have enormous significance.

The Commonwealth includes 33 small states, according to the Commonwealth's current membership information.

For many of these countries, UN diplomacy is extremely resource-intensive.

A small state may need diplomats simultaneously working on:

• climate negotiations;
• development;
• oceans;
• fisheries;
• human rights;
• trade;
• debt;
• security;
• international law;
• disaster resilience.

A major country can maintain large diplomatic teams across several UN institutions.

A tiny island state cannot.

The Commonwealth can therefore provide something extremely valuable:

diplomatic scale without requiring small states to surrender sovereignty.

8. Climate Change Is Perhaps the Clearest Example

Commonwealth small states frequently have interests that are disproportionately affected by:

• sea-level rise;
• extreme weather;
• ocean degradation;
• climate finance;
• disaster recovery;
• loss and damage;
• debt vulnerability.

The Commonwealth Charter specifically recognizes the particular vulnerabilities of small and developing states. 

This creates an obvious opportunity for coordinated UN diplomacy.

Imagine 56 countries consistently coordinating around:

Climate finance

Small-state debt

Ocean governance

Disaster financing

Development finance

Resilience infrastructure

The Commonwealth could become a major diplomatic amplifier for small states.

But that requires governments to agree on common negotiating priorities before the votes and negotiations occur.

9. Africa Could Provide Another Major Source of Commonwealth Diplomatic Weight

Twenty-one Commonwealth members are African countries. 

Africa itself has substantial diplomatic weight at the UN.

A stronger connection between:

African Union positions

and

Commonwealth positions

could potentially create a powerful bridge between African priorities and Commonwealth-wide diplomacy.

But the Commonwealth must be careful here.

It should not attempt to speak for Africa.

The African Union already has its own institutions and continental mandates.

Instead, the Commonwealth could help amplify areas of overlapping interest:

• development finance;
• climate finance;
• debt restructuring;
• trade;
• food security;
• reform of international financial institutions;
• Security Council reform;
• technology access;
• youth employment.

That would be complementary rather than competitive.

10. India Changes the Equation

India is especially important.

It is by far the Commonwealth's largest country by population and one of the world's major economies.

India also has its own independent strategic relationships and foreign-policy priorities.

The Commonwealth therefore cannot realistically expect India to subordinate its foreign policy to a Commonwealth position.

But it could create something more practical:

Commonwealth diplomatic coordination before major UN negotiations.

India could retain its sovereign position while participating in discussions designed to identify areas where Commonwealth countries can jointly advocate.

The same principle applies to Britain, Canada, Australia, Nigeria, South Africa and other major members.

11. The Commonwealth's Great Powers Are Also Its Diplomatic Problem

The organization contains countries with relationships with different geopolitical centres.

Some have close ties to:

• the United States;
• China;
• the European Union;
• Russia;
• India;
• Gulf states;
• regional organizations.

Those relationships influence national foreign policy.

Therefore, on highly contested geopolitical questions, Commonwealth consensus can become extremely difficult.

The Commonwealth may find agreement easier on:

climate

development

small-state concerns

trade

debt

youth

international law

than on highly polarized security questions.

That suggests an important strategic lesson:

The Commonwealth does not need to agree on everything to become more influential.

It needs to identify where agreement is sufficiently broad to make collective diplomacy credible.

12. The Commonwealth Could Build a "Commonwealth UN Caucus"

One practical reform would be to establish a permanent Commonwealth UN Coordination Mechanism.

It would not dictate national votes.

Instead, it could operate in four stages.

Stage 1 — Early intelligence

Before major UN sessions, Commonwealth diplomats identify upcoming issues affecting members.

Stage 2 — Policy coordination

Officials compare national positions.

Stage 3 — Common positions

Where consensus exists, members agree on a Commonwealth position.

Stage 4 — Coordinated diplomacy

Member missions then promote that position independently but consistently.

This would preserve sovereignty.

But it would convert:

56 separate diplomatic voices

into:

56 coordinated voices when common ground exists.

That is a very different level of influence.

13. It Could Also Coordinate UN Candidates

This is an underappreciated source of influence.

Countries compete for positions in:

• UN bodies;
• specialized agencies;
• committees;
• councils;
• international judicial institutions;
• senior international posts.

Historically, observers have pointed to the Commonwealth's difficulty in consistently coordinating support for common candidates and positions. A Commonwealth publication previously noted that the organization commanded a substantial share of UN General Assembly votes but often struggled to put forward common candidates and significant common positions. 

A coordinated approach could involve:

"You support our candidate here; we support yours there."

Not as a rigid political bloc, but as structured diplomatic cooperation.

This could substantially increase bargaining power.

14. The Commonwealth Could Become a Coalition Builder

Perhaps the most interesting role is not to become another voting bloc.

It could become a bridge-builder.

Imagine a negotiation involving:

Africa + Asia + Caribbean + Pacific + Europe.

The Commonwealth already contains representatives from all those regions.

It could therefore identify common ground between countries that might otherwise negotiate separately.

That is particularly valuable in a fragmented international system.

The Commonwealth's Charter already describes its diversity as a source of strength and identifies the organization as a catalyst for international cooperation.

The question is whether that potential is being converted into systematic diplomatic practice.

15. The Commonwealth Has a "Soft Power" Advantage

The Commonwealth's influence does not have to come from coercion.

It can come from:

numbers + relationships + credibility + coordination + diplomatic networks.

The organization has longstanding relationships among countries that might otherwise have limited institutional contact.

That makes it potentially useful as a diplomatic "middle layer":

UN

Commonwealth

56 sovereign governments

This could help translate global issues into coordinated regional positions.

16. But There Is a Dangerous Temptation: Speaking When Members Do Not Agree

A stronger Commonwealth voice cannot mean that the Secretariat simply declares positions on controversial issues.

That would undermine the organization's sovereign character.

The more realistic principle is:

No artificial consensus.

Where 56 countries agree, speak collectively.

Where 45 agree, identify the common position while acknowledging differences.

Where members fundamentally disagree, do not pretend that the Commonwealth has a unified foreign policy.

That transparency would actually make collective statements more credible.

17. What Would a Stronger UN Strategy Look Like?

A serious Commonwealth diplomatic strategy could have eight pillars:

1. Commonwealth UN Caucus

Permanent coordination among member missions.

2. Annual Commonwealth UN Foreign Ministers Meeting

Held immediately before or during the General Assembly.

3. Common Candidate Strategy

Coordinate support for candidates for international positions.

4. Small-State Diplomatic Support

Shared research, legal expertise, policy analysis and negotiating support.

5. Issue-Based Coalitions

Focus on areas where consensus is strongest:

• climate;
• debt;
• oceans;
• development;
• trade;
• food security;
• youth;
• international law.

6. Africa–Asia–Caribbean–Pacific Coordination

Use the Commonwealth's geographic diversity to connect regional positions.

7. Rapid Diplomatic Response Network

When a major international crisis occurs, Commonwealth foreign ministries could rapidly consult and identify areas of common concern.

8. Annual Commonwealth UN Voting & Coordination Report

Not to rank countries, but to transparently show:

• where members agreed;
• where they differed;
• which common initiatives succeeded;
• which failed;
• where coordination could improve.

That would turn diplomatic coordination into something measurable.

18. The Commonwealth's Real Problem Is Not Lack of Influence

This distinction matters.

The Commonwealth already possesses potential diplomatic influence.

Its problem is converting potential into organized collective influence.

It has:

56 governments

but no common foreign policy.

2.7 billion people

but no unified diplomatic mandate.

33 small states

but limited diplomatic resources.

Global geographic reach

but fragmented strategic priorities.

Common values

but different national interests.

UN engagement

but insufficient systematic coordination.

That is the contradiction.

19. The Commonwealth's UN Opportunity

The Commonwealth does not need to become a formal voting bloc.

It could become something arguably more useful:

A diplomatic coordination network.

Its model could be:

Consult → Coordinate → Agree where possible → Support implementation → Measure results.

That fits much better with the Commonwealth's existing constitutional identity.

The Charter already commits members to contributing to international consensus and supporting peace and multilateralism through the UN. 

The missing step is institutionalizing the coordination.

The Bigger Question

The Commonwealth possesses something many international organizations would envy:

a ready-made diplomatic network spanning six continents and 56 sovereign states.

But it has not fully converted that network into collective geopolitical influence.

The fundamental dilemma is this:

How do you create collective diplomatic power without turning a voluntary association of sovereign states into something its members never agreed to become?

The answer may not be a Commonwealth foreign policy.

It may instead be a Commonwealth foreign-policy coordination system.

That would preserve national sovereignty while allowing members to discover where their interests overlap and then act together.

And the next question becomes even more fundamental:

Can the Commonwealth Become a Geopolitical Power Without Becoming a Political Union?

By Jugo Ikeji-Uju. 

admin@ubuntusafa.com 

sappertekinc@gmail.com

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THE BIG PICTURE — Understanding Africa’s Pressure Points. No. 9:- Why Does Political Change So Often Produce Economic Continuity?

 

THE BIG PICTURE — Understanding Africa’s Pressure Points. 

Why Does Political Change So Often Produce Economic Continuity? 

New Governments, New Leaders — But the Same Economic Structure?

Africa has experienced enormous political change.

Presidents have been elected and defeated.

Parties have replaced other parties.

Military governments have taken power and promised a new beginning.

Constitutions have been rewritten.

Governments have announced economic revolutions.

New administrations have arrived promising industrialisation, jobs, economic independence, poverty reduction and a break with the past.

Yet beneath these political changes, something often remains remarkably persistent:

the underlying economic structure.

Countries may continue exporting raw commodities rather than processed products.

Governments may remain dependent on narrow sources of revenue.

Young people may continue entering low-productivity informal employment.

Manufacturing may remain relatively small.

Foreign capital may continue financing critical infrastructure.

Imported manufactured goods may continue dominating domestic markets.

And economies may remain highly vulnerable to fluctuations in oil, minerals, agricultural commodities, exchange rates and global financial conditions.

This raises a fundamental question:

Why can political power change without the economic structure changing with it?

The answer is not that political change is meaningless.

Political change can alter institutions, public spending, regulation, taxation, foreign policy and economic priorities.

But structural economic transformation is much harder than changing political leadership.

And this distinction may be one of the most important questions in Africa's development story.

1. Political Change Is Not the Same as Economic Transformation

There are at least three different types of change.

Political change

Who governs?

• Who occupies the presidency?

• Which party controls Parliament?

• Is the government civilian or military?

• Who controls ministries?

• What political coalition is in power?

Policy change

What does the government intend to do?

• Raise or reduce taxes?

• Subsidise agriculture?

• Build infrastructure?

• Attract foreign investment?

• Privatise state enterprises?

• Support manufacturing?

• Expand social programmes?

Structural economic change

What does the economy actually produce?

• Where do people work?

• What does the country export?

• What does it import?

• Where does investment flow?

• How productive are firms?

• How much value is added domestically?

• How much of the economy is formal?

• How diversified are government revenues?

• How integrated are domestic firms into global value chains?

The first can happen quickly.

The second can happen within a political term.

The third may take decades.

That is why a government can be genuinely different while the economy underneath it remains surprisingly similar.

2. The Structure Beneath the Government

Consider an imaginary African country.

Its government changes.

The new administration announces:

"We will industrialise."

But the country still has:

• unreliable electricity;

• expensive transport;

• limited industrial finance;

• weak technical skills;

• inadequate logistics;

• small domestic manufacturing capacity;

• limited regional market integration;

• dependence on imported machinery;

• weak local supply chains.

The political leadership has changed.

But the production system has not.

And industrialisation is fundamentally a production-system problem.

It requires factories, skills, electricity, finance, logistics, technology, standards, markets, suppliers and capable institutions.

Changing the minister of industry does not automatically create any of those things.

3. Africa's Commodity Structure Shows the Problem

The persistence of commodity dependence is one of the clearest examples.

UNECA's Economic Report on Africa 2025 found that during 2019–2023, fuels represented about 38% of Africa's total exports and ores and metals another 15%, while manufactured goods represented 24%.

The African Development Bank's 2025 Industrialisation Index similarly finds that manufacturing value added increased from approximately $285 billion in 2020 to $351 billion in 2025, but Africa still accounted for less than 2% of global manufacturing output and only 1.4% of global manufacturing exports.

These numbers describe a structural issue.

A country can change governments several times while remaining fundamentally dependent on:

oil → minerals → agricultural commodities → imported manufactured goods.

The political leadership changes.

The economic architecture does not.

4. Why Does This Happen?

Because economic structures have inertia.

An economy is not simply a collection of government policies.

It is a network of:

• companies;

• workers;

• banks;

• infrastructure;

• universities;

• factories;

• ports;

• transport systems;

• energy networks;

• supply chains;

• regulations;

• trade relationships;

• consumer markets;

• financial institutions;

• skills;

• technologies.

These systems accumulate over time.

A new government inherits them.

It can influence them.

But it cannot rebuild them overnight.

5. Governments Inherit Economic Geography

Political leaders also inherit geography.

A landlocked country cannot simply decide to become a maritime trading power.

A country with oil reserves cannot instantly replace oil exports with advanced manufacturing.

A country with a large rural population cannot immediately transform millions of farmers into industrial workers.

A country located far from major markets faces transportation costs that policy alone cannot eliminate.

Geography does not determine economic destiny.

But it affects the cost and feasibility of different development strategies.

This is why economic transformation requires long-term adaptation to national circumstances, rather than simply copying another country's model.

6. Natural Resources Can Create Political Continuity

Resource wealth creates another form of continuity.

Suppose a government receives substantial revenue from:

• oil;

• gas;

• copper;

• cobalt;

• gold;

• diamonds;

• uranium;

• bauxite;

• iron ore.

The government has an immediate source of foreign exchange and public revenue.

That can reduce the urgency of building a broad productive economy.

Why?

Because extracting and exporting a commodity can generate substantial revenue without requiring the state to develop a huge domestic manufacturing ecosystem.

But the long-term problem is that commodity income can become the foundation of the political economy.

The government collects revenue.

The revenue finances public spending.

Public spending sustains political coalitions.

Political coalitions defend the existing system.

The economy remains dependent on the commodity.

And the cycle continues.

7. The Resource Curse Is Not Automatic

It is important not to turn this into a simplistic argument that natural resources are inherently harmful.

They are not.

Natural resources can finance:

• infrastructure;

• education;

• healthcare;

• industrialisation;

• sovereign investment;

• technology;

• agriculture;

• transport;

• energy.

The question is what a country does with resource income.

A resource-rich economy can either consume the rent or use it to build productive capacity.

That distinction matters enormously.

The African Development Bank has repeatedly highlighted the need to move from raw-resource dependence toward value addition, manufacturing and diversified productive sectors.

The question therefore becomes:

Does resource wealth finance the future economy, or merely finance the existing one?

8. The Political Economy of Continuity

There is another explanation.

Economic systems create beneficiaries.

An existing economic structure may benefit:

• political elites;

• established companies;

• importers;

• commodity exporters;

• intermediaries;

• state-owned enterprises;

• foreign investors;

• politically connected contractors;

• financial institutions.

A government seeking structural reform may therefore encounter resistance from groups that benefit from the existing system.

This is one reason economic reform is political.

Changing the structure of an economy means changing who receives opportunities, contracts, subsidies, credit, licences and access to markets.

That can create powerful opposition.

9. Reform Can Threaten Existing Winners

Imagine a country where the economy depends heavily on importing finished goods.

A new government decides to support domestic manufacturing.

That sounds straightforward.

But industrial policy might require:

• tariffs;

• local-content rules;

• industrial finance;

• infrastructure investment;

• preferential procurement;

• tax incentives;

• skills programmes.

Importers may oppose some of these policies.

Consumers may worry about higher prices.

Foreign companies may object to certain local-content requirements.

Domestic manufacturers may demand protection for longer than necessary.

Government officials may have to decide which industries receive support.

The reform therefore creates winners and losers.

And once those interests become organised, changing the system becomes harder.

10. The Import-Export Trap

Another structural problem is the relationship between what Africa sells and what it buys.

A simplified model looks like this:

Africa exports

• crude oil;

• minerals;

• cocoa;

• coffee;

• cotton;

• gold;

• timber;

• agricultural commodities.

Africa imports

• machinery;

• vehicles;

• pharmaceuticals;

• electronics;

• industrial equipment;

• processed foods;

• chemicals;

• advanced technology.

The problem is not trade itself.

Trade can be extremely beneficial.

The deeper issue is where value is created.

If cocoa is exported as a raw commodity while chocolate is imported, much of the value associated with processing, branding, packaging, logistics and distribution is created elsewhere.

If minerals are exported before substantial processing, opportunities for refining and manufacturing may occur elsewhere.

This is why structural transformation is about moving from:

Extraction → Processing → Manufacturing → Technology → Higher-value services

rather than remaining concentrated at the extraction stage.

11. The Manufacturing Problem

Industrialisation has historically been one of the major routes through which countries moved workers from low-productivity activities into higher-productivity employment.

Africa has made industrial progress in some countries and sectors.

But the continental transformation remains incomplete.

The African Development Bank's 2026 development review points to persistent constraints including infrastructure gaps, limited access to finance, skills shortages and the dominance of informal and low-value activities.

The World Bank's 2026 Africa Economic Update similarly argues that Africa's growth challenge is structural, involving low investment, weak productivity and limited job creation, while noting that previous industrial-policy efforts often suffered from implementation and institutional constraints.

This explains why political promises of industrialisation often encounter reality.

Industrialisation is not a speech.

It is an ecosystem.

12. Economic Growth Can Happen Without Structural Transformation

This distinction is crucial.

A country's GDP can rise while its economic structure remains largely unchanged.

For example:

Commodity prices rise → export revenues increase → GDP rises.

But if the country does not develop:

• manufacturing;

• higher-productivity agriculture;

• technology;

• competitive services;

• domestic supply chains;

then the economy may remain vulnerable.

This is sometimes called growth without transformation.

The economy becomes bigger.

But not necessarily more diversified.

13. The Employment Test

Perhaps the most important test is employment.

Ask:

Where are young people actually finding productive work?

If economic growth produces limited numbers of productive jobs, something is wrong with the structure of the economy.

This is particularly important in Africa because demographic pressures are increasing the need for employment at scale.

The World Bank's 2026 regional outlook notes that structural weaknesses continue to constrain growth and job creation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The challenge therefore isn't simply:

"How fast is GDP growing?"

It is:

"How many productive livelihoods is the economy creating?"

14. The Informal Economy Is Part of the Continuity

Millions of Africans work in informal activities.

These businesses and workers are not simply a problem to be eliminated.

They provide livelihoods, goods and services and often absorb workers who cannot find formal employment.

But a large informal economy can also indicate that formal productive sectors are not expanding fast enough.

A new government can announce:

"We will create millions of jobs."

But if the underlying economy continues to generate mostly low-productivity activities, political promises will repeatedly collide with economic reality.

Structural transformation means increasing the number and productivity of firms capable of creating sustainable, scalable employment.

15. Why Governments Often Prefer Short-Term Solutions

Political leaders operate under electoral and political time horizons.

Structural transformation operates under economic time horizons.

A politician may have four or five years.

A railway may take several years.

An industrial cluster may take a decade.

A skilled workforce may take a generation.

A domestic technology ecosystem may require decades.

This creates a fundamental mismatch.

Political timetable

Election → Budget → Project → Visible result

Economic transformation timetable

Infrastructure → Skills → Investment → Firms → Supply chains → Productivity → Exports → Industrial depth

The second process is much slower.

That makes long-term transformation politically difficult.

16. The Politics of Visible Projects

Governments naturally like projects that citizens can see.

A new:

• airport;

• bridge;

• stadium;

• government building;

• highway;

• railway;

creates visible evidence of government activity.

But structural transformation often requires less visible investments:

• technical education;

• industrial standards;

• research institutions;

• customs reform;

• electricity reliability;

• port efficiency;

• land registries;

• commercial courts;

• business financing;

• statistical systems.

These may not produce spectacular ribbon-cutting ceremonies.

But they can be more important to long-term productivity.

The challenge is political:

How do governments invest today in institutions whose greatest benefits may appear after the current administration has left office?

17. The Foreign Capital Question

Foreign investment is not inherently a problem.

Africa needs substantial investment in:

• energy;

• manufacturing;

• transport;

• telecommunications;

• mining;

• agriculture;

• logistics;

• technology.

The issue is whether foreign investment creates domestic economic linkages.

A mining project might employ workers and pay taxes.

But a deeper transformation occurs when it also creates:

• local suppliers;

• processing facilities;

• engineering capabilities;

• research;

• technical skills;

• domestic financing;

• downstream manufacturing.

The question is therefore not simply:

"How much foreign investment did we attract?"

It is:

"What capabilities did that investment leave behind?"

18. From Foreign Investment to Domestic Capability

This is one of the most important shifts Africa could make.

A foreign company enters.

It builds a facility.

Local workers are trained.

Local suppliers emerge.

Domestic firms learn.

Technology and standards spread.

Processing expands.

Exports become more sophisticated.

Domestic companies eventually compete internationally.

That is how foreign capital can become part of structural transformation.

Without those linkages, an economy may receive large investment while remaining structurally dependent.

19. Regional Integration Could Change the Equation

One country alone may not have a large enough market to support every industry.

But Africa has a continental market of more than a billion people.

The African Continental Free Trade Area creates the framework for deeper integration.

The challenge now is implementation.

The World Bank's August 2026 report argues that the next stage of African integration requires more than tariff reduction: customs, transport, standards, payments, services, energy, finance and data systems must work together to create regional production hubs.

That is significant.

Instead of asking:

"Can Nigeria manufacture everything?"

or:

"Can Kenya manufacture everything?"

or:

"Can Ghana manufacture everything?"

the more strategic question becomes:

"Can African countries build interconnected production systems?"

One country can produce components.

Another can process materials.

Another can provide logistics.

Another can provide finance.

Another can assemble finished products.

That is how a continental market becomes an industrial platform.

20. Political Change Can Still Matter Enormously

None of this means political change is irrelevant.

A new government can change the economic trajectory.

It can:

• reform taxation;

• improve public finance;

• liberalise or regulate markets;

• build infrastructure;

• change trade policy;

• strengthen competition;

• support industrial policy;

• invest in education;

• reform state-owned enterprises;

• improve electricity;

• negotiate better resource agreements;

• strengthen institutions.

Political leadership matters.

But the important question is whether the new government changes the mechanisms that reproduce the old economy.

If it changes only personnel, the structure may remain.

If it changes incentives, institutions, infrastructure and productive capabilities, the economy can gradually change.

21. The Difference Between Changing Leaders and Changing Systems

Consider three hypothetical transitions.

Scenario A — Change of leadership

New president.

New ministers.

New slogans.

Same tax system.

Same infrastructure constraints.

Same export structure.

Same bureaucracy.

Same industrial weakness.

Political change: substantial.

Economic transformation: limited.

Scenario B — Policy change

New government.

New industrial strategy.

New tax incentives.

New infrastructure programme.

Some improvement in investment.

But weak implementation.

Political change: substantial.

Policy change: substantial.

Structural transformation: partial.

Scenario C — Institutional transformation

New government.

New policies.

Improved electricity.

Better ports.

Industrial finance.

Skills development.

Transparent procurement.

Regional market integration.

Competitive domestic firms.

Local supply chains.

Technology transfer.

Export diversification.

Political change becomes economic transformation.

This third scenario is the difficult one.

22. Why Economic Continuity Can Survive Political Revolutions

There is a deeper historical lesson.

Political systems can change relatively quickly.

Economic institutions are more persistent.

A new government inherits:

• roads;

• ports;

• mines;

• farms;

• factories;

• banks;

• contracts;

• debt;

• trade agreements;

• civil-service structures;

• education systems;

• energy systems;

• business networks.

It cannot simply erase them.

This creates path dependence.

Yesterday's decisions shape today's possibilities.

Today's investments shape tomorrow's choices.

That is why structural transformation requires sustained policy consistency.

23. The Danger of Starting From Zero

Every new government may be tempted to announce:

"Everything before us failed. We are starting again."

But repeated policy resets can themselves become a structural problem.

A government launches an industrial policy.

The next government cancels it.

A new administration launches another strategy.

Another government changes direction.

Investors become uncertain.

Officials stop thinking long-term.

Projects are abandoned.

Institutions lose institutional memory.

This is one reason successful economic transformation often requires policy continuity across political transitions.

Continuity does not mean refusing to reform.

It means maintaining long-term national objectives while allowing governments to improve how those objectives are achieved.

24. Africa Needs a Developmental State — But an Accountable One

The concept of a developmental state is relevant here.

A developmental state does not simply leave economic transformation entirely to market forces.

It strategically coordinates:

• infrastructure;

• industrial policy;

• finance;

• education;

• technology;

• trade;

• investment;

• research.

But there is a critical condition.

State intervention must be accompanied by:

• transparency;

• performance requirements;

• competition;

• accountability;

• measurable outcomes;

• institutional checks.

Otherwise, industrial policy can become a mechanism for distributing privileges to politically connected firms.

The objective is not:

Government chooses winners.

It is:

Government builds the conditions under which productive firms can emerge, compete and scale.

25. The State Must Learn to Reward Production

A structural transformation strategy should ask a simple question:

What economic behaviour does government policy reward?

Does the system reward:

• importing?

• speculation?

• political connections?

• raw commodity exports?

• rent seeking?

Or does it increasingly reward:

• productivity?

• manufacturing?

• value addition?

• exports?

• innovation?

• skills?

• research?

• local supply chains?

• competitive firms?

Economic policy is ultimately about incentives.

If the incentive structure remains unchanged, political leadership can change repeatedly without transforming the economy.

26. The Natural-Resource Opportunity

Africa's resource base could actually become a foundation for structural transformation.

Consider critical minerals.

Instead of:

Mine → Export

the longer-term chain could become:

Mine → Refine → Process → Manufacture components → Manufacture finished products → Export technology

The same principle applies to agriculture:

Farm → Raw export

can potentially become:

Farm → Processing → Packaging → Branding → Logistics → Regional distribution → Global export

This is value addition.

The objective is not to stop exporting commodities.

It is to capture more value before the product leaves the continent.

27. The Same Principle Applies to Energy

Energy is another structural issue.

A country cannot industrialise efficiently if electricity is:

• unreliable;

• expensive;

• insufficient;

• poorly transmitted.

Energy therefore becomes more than an infrastructure question.

It becomes an industrial-policy question.

Reliable energy enables:

• factories;

• cold storage;

• data centres;

• mines;

• transport systems;

• irrigation;

• digital businesses;

• manufacturing.

This is why structural transformation requires coordinated systems rather than isolated projects.

28. Why Continuity Can Sometimes Be Good

There is an important nuance.

Economic continuity is not automatically bad.

Some economic institutions should remain stable when governments change.

Investors need predictable rules.

Businesses need stable contracts.

Central banks need institutional credibility.

Property rights require continuity.

Trade agreements require consistency.

Infrastructure plans should not be abandoned simply because political leadership changes.

The problem is not continuity itself.

The problem is continuity of structures that produce poor outcomes.

The challenge is therefore to distinguish:

Good continuity

• institutional stability;

• long-term infrastructure plans;

• predictable regulations;

• professional public administration;

• sustained education investment.

from:

Bad continuity

• commodity dependence;

• rent seeking;

• inefficient state enterprises;

• weak competition;

• politically connected monopolies;

• chronic infrastructure deficits;

• low-productivity employment.

Africa needs the first while transforming the second.

29. What Would Genuine Economic Transformation Look Like?

A transformed economy would gradually display measurable changes.

Exports

Less dependence on unprocessed commodities.

Manufacturing

Greater domestic processing and production.

Agriculture

Higher productivity and stronger agro-processing.

Services

Expansion into sophisticated digital, financial, professional and logistics services.

Employment

More formal and productive jobs.

Firms

Growth of competitive domestic companies.

Finance

More capital reaching productive businesses.

Infrastructure

Lower logistics and energy costs.

Skills

More technical and professional capabilities.

Regional trade

Greater integration into African supply chains.

Government revenue

A broader and more resilient domestic tax base.

Technology

Increasing ability to develop, adapt and deploy technology locally.

This is what structural transformation means in practice.

30. The Ultimate Test: Can the Next Government Build on the Previous One?

Perhaps the strongest test of economic transformation is what happens when political power changes again.

If a new government can inherit:

• functioning institutions;

• productive industries;

• skilled workers;

• reliable infrastructure;

• competitive firms;

• diversified exports;

• stronger regional supply chains;

and build on them, then the country has begun to move beyond political cycles.

But if every political transition returns the country to:

new slogans → new projects → new committees → new promises

while the underlying economic structure remains unchanged, political change becomes largely cosmetic from the perspective of economic transformation.

Changing Who Governs Is Easier Than Changing How an Economy Works

Political change matters.

Elections matter.

Leadership matters.

Government policy matters.

But none of these automatically transforms an economy.

A country can change presidents without changing its production system.

It can change political parties without changing its export structure.

It can change ministers without changing its industrial capabilities.

It can change constitutions without changing the incentives facing businesses.

That is why the deeper question is not:

"Who is governing?"

It is:

"What is the economy capable of producing?"

And even that is not enough.

The ultimate question is:

"Is each generation inheriting a more productive, diversified and technologically capable economy than the previous one?"

Africa's structural challenge is enormous.

The continent's total manufacturing value has grown, and some countries and sectors are making significant progress. But the continental manufacturing share remains small, and commodity dependence remains substantial.

The answer therefore cannot be another political slogan.

It requires long-term work on:

energy + infrastructure + skills + finance + institutions + technology + industrial policy + regional integration + private-sector capability.

Political change can open the door.

But structural transformation is what determines whether the economy actually walks through it.

A new government can change the people sitting around the table.

A transformed economy changes what is produced, who produces it, where value is created, and how prosperity is distributed.

That transformation takes longer than an election cycle.

And perhaps that is one of Africa's greatest political-economic challenges:

How can countries create economic strategies that are bigger than individual presidents, parties and governments?

THE NEXT PRESSURE POINT

10. Who Really Owns Africa's Economy?

If political governments change but economic structures often persist, another question follows:

Who actually controls the productive assets?

Who owns the mines?

Who controls the banks?

Who owns telecommunications?

Who finances infrastructure?

Who controls agricultural value chains?

Who owns major manufacturing companies?

Who captures the profits from Africa's natural resources?

How much wealth remains within African economies?

And what happens when ownership is formally African but capital, technology, management and markets remain externally controlled?

By Jugo Ikeji-Uju. 

admin@ubuntusafa.com 

sappertekinc@gmail.com

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Who Will Control the Global AI Economy? America, China, or a New Network of Technological Powers?

 

Who Will Control the Global AI Economy?

America, China, or a New Network of Technological Powers?

Geopolitical analysis • Industrial power • Digital sovereignty • Africa and the Global South

The global AI economy is becoming a contest over much more than who builds the most intelligent chatbot. It is a struggle over who owns the computing infrastructure, manufactures the chips, controls the platforms, sets the technical standards, attracts the talent, and captures the economic value generated by artificial intelligence.

The central issue is whether AI power will remain concentrated in American technology giants, expand through Chinese technology ecosystems, or spread across a wider network of countries that control different parts of the value chain.

The answer depends on what we mean by control.

A country may develop a competitive AI model without manufacturing its chips. It may host a data centre without owning the cloud platform. It may use AI throughout its economy without owning the technology or retaining most of the profits.

That distinction matters particularly for Africa: adopting AI is not the same as owning AI capability.

My assessment is that the global AI economy is likely to develop into a layered, interconnected system in which American and Chinese ecosystems remain highly influential, while other countries seek control over selected strategic layers. Whether that becomes genuine multipolarity or merely a broader market dominated by two major powers will depend on investment, industrial policy, infrastructure and bargaining power.

1. The global AI economy has five layers of power

The first mistake in this debate is treating AI as a single product. It is an entire economic system.

Layer 1 — Semiconductors and computing hardware

Who can design, manufacture and supply the chips and equipment that power AI?

Key players include Nvidia, AMD, TSMC, Samsung Electronics and ASML.

Layer 2 — Cloud computing and data centres

Who owns the infrastructure needed to train, host and operate AI at scale?

Major US providers include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud. Chinese providers include Alibaba Cloud and Huawei Cloud.

Layer 3 — Models and AI research

Who develops the models that can reason, code, create and automate?

American developers include OpenAI, Anthropic and Google DeepMind. Chinese developers include DeepSeek, Alibaba and Moonshot AI.

Layer 4 — Applications and industrial integration

Who turns AI into working products, factories, financial services, logistics and robotics?

This layer is more widely distributed. China has substantial manufacturing and industrial deployment capacity; the US has powerful software and cloud ecosystems. Other countries can compete in specialized industries.

Layer 5 — Capital, standards and governance

Who finances development, establishes rules, controls procurement and influences international standards?

Governments, investors, regulators and international institutions all shape this layer. The EU, for example, can influence market access through its regulatory framework even without producing the largest number of frontier models.

The Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence's 2026 AI Index documents this concentration across different layers: the US remains a major centre of frontier-model development and investment, China is highly competitive in research and industrial deployment, and leading-edge chip fabrication depends heavily on Taiwan.

The implication: no country needs to dominate all five layers to possess significant power. But countries that control several critical layers can exercise much greater influence over the whole system.

2. The American model: Control through platforms, capital and computing

The American ecosystem combines private investment, advanced chip design, cloud platforms, research institutions and large commercial markets.

The scale of investment is significant. Stanford's 2026 AI Index estimates US private AI investment at approximately $285.9 billion in 2025, compared with $12.4 billion in China. Those figures measure private investment, not total national AI expenditure; China's state-backed financing means the comparison does not capture all Chinese investment.

The American ecosystem can reinforce its position through a cycle:

1. Investors fund ambitious AI companies.

2. Those companies purchase chips and cloud capacity.

3. Cloud providers and model developers improve their services.

4. Developers build applications around those platforms.

5. Customers become integrated into the ecosystem, generating further revenue and demand.

This creates powerful network effects.

Where the US could retain leverage

• Frontier AI research and high-performance computing.

• Cloud services used by global businesses.

• Enterprise software and developer ecosystems.

• Access to investment capital and international talent.

• Critical technologies subject to US export controls.

But there are vulnerabilities. Advanced AI infrastructure is expensive, companies face pressure to demonstrate commercial returns, and reliance on foreign chip manufacturing creates supply-chain exposure. A large investment lead does not guarantee that every investment will generate sustainable profits.

A particularly important question is whether the economic value from AI infrastructure spreads throughout the wider economy or remains concentrated among a small number of firms and investors. Reuters reported on 13 October 2026 that concerns about AI spending, debt costs and the eventual returns on infrastructure investment were contributing to market uncertainty.

3. The Chinese model: Scale, manufacturing and affordable deployment

China's strategy combines private-sector competition with state-directed priorities, domestic technology development, industrial policy and a large manufacturing base.

One of its most consequential approaches has been to make capable AI models available through open-weight releases and comparatively inexpensive services.

A March 2026 report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission described how Chinese open-weight models, including Alibaba's Qwen family, had attracted extensive adoption and derivative development. Its analysis argued that widespread distribution helps Chinese developers improve models through broader use and feedback.

This creates a different competitive cycle:

1. Developers release accessible models.

2. Businesses, researchers and independent developers adopt or adapt them.

3. New applications and improvements emerge.

4. Wider deployment creates additional commercial and technical opportunities.

5. Domestic manufacturing and industrial integration can help turn those advances into physical products and services.

China also faces constraints, particularly in access to the most advanced semiconductor technologies. Yet those constraints have encouraged domestic alternatives. Reuters reported on 13 October 2026 that Huawei was gaining ground in China's AI accelerator market as US export controls affected access to some advanced Nvidia products.

Where China could gain leverage

• Affordable AI models and open-weight ecosystems.

• Industrial automation, robotics and manufacturing integration.

• Domestic alternatives to restricted foreign technologies.

• Commercial relationships with countries seeking lower-cost digital infrastructure.

• Integration of AI into physical supply chains and production systems.

But low prices and broad adoption do not automatically translate into global control. Customers may use Chinese models while hosting them locally, modifying them or switching to competitors. Model availability, licence terms, hardware requirements, security and trust all influence how much lasting leverage a provider obtains.

The important distinction is that distributing AI technology can create influence, even when the distributor does not retain exclusive control of the technology.

4. The third force: Countries that control critical pieces of the system

The future is not necessarily a simple US-versus-China contest. Other countries can acquire considerable bargaining power by controlling technologies, resources or markets that neither superpower can easily replace.

Taiwan — advanced chip manufacturing

Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing capabilities give it an exceptionally important position in the AI supply chain. Stanford's 2026 AI Index notes that a single Taiwanese foundry, TSMC, fabricates almost every leading-edge AI chip. That concentration creates both economic influence and significant geopolitical exposure.

South Korea — memory and semiconductor innovation

Korean firms contribute essential memory technologies and semiconductor manufacturing. South Korea can capture value from AI infrastructure even when the models running on that infrastructure are American or Chinese.

European Union — regulation and market access

Europe's influence includes regulation, industrial research, enterprise applications and access to a large consumer market. Rules governing privacy, competition and AI deployment can influence how international providers operate.

India — engineering, services and domestic adoption

India's software industry, technical workforce and large domestic market offer opportunities to build AI applications and services. Converting those advantages into deeper control will require continued investment in computing, research and original technology.

Gulf states — capital, energy and infrastructure

Countries with substantial investment capital and energy resources can finance data centres and AI infrastructure, partner with foreign developers and build domestic capacity. Their long-term influence will depend on how much expertise, intellectual property and operational control they retain.

This illustrates an important geopolitical principle: a country does not need to invent the world's leading AI model to become indispensable to the AI economy.

However, owning a strategically important component does not guarantee complete independence. Taiwan's chip-manufacturing importance, for example, coexists with dependence on international equipment, materials, energy and customers.

5. Three possible futures for the global AI economy

These are analytical scenarios, not predictions with assigned probabilities.

Scenario A — Concentrated platform power

High concentration

A small number of US and Chinese companies control the most important models, infrastructure and developer platforms. Most other countries become customers, with limited capacity to negotiate or switch suppliers.

What drives it: enormous capital requirements, proprietary infrastructure, network effects, scarce computing resources and acquisitions of emerging competitors.

Who is vulnerable: countries and companies that adopt AI without building technical skills, alternatives or bargaining power.

Scenario B — Two competing AI ecosystems

Strategic fragmentation

The US and its partners develop one set of infrastructure, standards and supply chains, while China and its partners build another. Some countries operate both, while others face pressure to align with one ecosystem for security or commercial reasons.

What drives it: export controls, national-security concerns, technology restrictions, domestic industrial policies and competing technical standards.

The trade-off: stronger control within each ecosystem, but potentially higher costs and reduced interoperability across them.

Scenario C — A wider, distributed AI economy

Broader participation

US and Chinese firms remain influential, but open-weight models, regional data centres, local AI developers and interoperable tools allow more countries to build competitive industries.

What drives it: lower inference costs, accessible models, international research, regional computing infrastructure, skills development and effective competition policy.

The condition for success: countries must develop real capabilities and retain economic value, rather than merely consuming imported AI products.

These scenarios can coexist. Frontier training may remain concentrated among a handful of companies, while inference, application development and specialised models become widely distributed.

That is why the future should be assessed layer by layer rather than declared a single winner-takes-all contest.

6. Africa: Will the continent be a customer or an owner?

For Africa, the central question is not simply whether American or Chinese AI companies become more powerful. It is whether African countries develop the ability to create, adapt and own technology—and retain more of the resulting economic value.

Africa could follow two very different paths.

Path 1 — Digital dependency

African businesses pay foreign providers for AI services, governments depend on imported infrastructure, and local firms remain primarily distributors or end users.

• Foreign firms capture a large share of software and infrastructure revenue.

• Sensitive data and critical workflows may become difficult to move.

• Domestic companies struggle to develop proprietary technology.

• AI adoption grows without a comparable expansion in local ownership.

Path 2 — African technological sovereignty

African countries use foreign technology where it makes sense while building regional infrastructure, domestic engineering capabilities and locally owned AI businesses.

• Regional data centres and reliable electricity support local deployment.

• African-language models serve users underserved by global products.

• Universities and companies develop intellectual property and specialised applications.

• African firms provide AI services across borders through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

• Governments and businesses retain the ability to change providers and protect sensitive data.

The second path does not require Africa to build a complete alternative to every American or Chinese technology. It requires strategic ownership of the layers that matter most to African development.

The Institute for Security Studies has highlighted the importance of investment in power, connectivity and computing for African AI sovereignty. These are not secondary infrastructure questions: they determine whether AI strategies can become functioning industries.

Five priorities for Africa

Priority	Strategic purpose
Reliable electricity and connectivity	Make computing and AI deployment commercially viable
Regional computing capacity	Reduce dependence on a single foreign cloud provider
Skills and research	Develop local engineers, researchers and AI entrepreneurs
African data and intellectual property	Retain more economic value and support locally relevant systems
Regional markets and interoperability	Give African AI companies enough scale to compete internationally

Consider maritime intelligence as an example. An African company could use an American or Chinese foundation model while owning its maritime datasets, port analytics, customer relationships, specialist software and intellectual property. That company would still rely on foreign technology, but it could retain substantial value and switch models if necessary.

The same logic applies to agriculture, healthcare, education, financial services, energy and logistics.

The objective is not technological isolation. It is the ability to choose, adapt, negotiate and create.

7. How will we know who is actually winning?

AI headlines tend to focus on model benchmarks, chip announcements and corporate valuations. These are useful indicators, but they do not establish who ultimately controls the economic system.

A more complete assessment should track six measures:

• Value capture: Which countries and companies earn the revenue and profits generated by AI?

• Infrastructure ownership: Who owns the chips, data centres, networks and computing capacity?

• Technical independence: Who can maintain and improve critical systems without a single foreign supplier?

• Industrial productivity: Where does AI measurably improve manufacturing, services, logistics and public administration?

• Intellectual property: Who develops and owns commercially valuable models, software and inventions?

• Bargaining power: Can customers change suppliers, negotiate fair terms and maintain operations during a geopolitical dispute?

A country can lead in AI research but lose economic value to foreign platforms. Another can develop few frontier models yet capture substantial value through semiconductor manufacturing, specialised applications or industrial integration.

These are different forms of power, and they should not be confused.

Final assessment: Who will control the global AI economy?

The evidence points toward a world in which US and Chinese companies remain central, but neither country's leadership in one layer guarantees control over every other layer.

The United States has substantial advantages in private AI investment, cloud platforms and frontier-model development. China has developed a competitive AI ecosystem combining research, open-weight models, domestic technology development and industrial deployment. Other countries hold critical positions in semiconductor manufacturing, memory, equipment, regulation, capital and specialised applications.

The greatest uncertainty is whether these advantages remain concentrated among a few powerful firms or become more widely distributed through open technologies, competition, regional infrastructure and domestic innovation.

My central conclusion is this:

The future of AI power will be determined not only by who invents the technology, but by who owns the infrastructure, controls access, captures the profits and gives other countries meaningful alternatives.

For Africa and the wider Global South, the strategic objective should be to use competition among technology powers to build domestic capability, regional markets and greater negotiating power. Otherwise, a multipolar AI economy could still leave most countries dependent on a small number of foreign suppliers.

The decisive question is not simply who controls AI? It is who controls the value created by AI—and who has the power to say no when that technology is used to exert political or economic pressure.

By Jugo Ikeji-Uju. 

admin@ubuntusafa.com 

sappertekinc@gmail.com

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