Permanent Advert Space and content sponsorship Available. Contact Admin:- sappertekinc@gmail.com, admin@ubuntusafa.com

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

(36) WHY JAPAN MAY BE BETTER PREPARED FOR AN AGEING WORLD

 


WHY JAPAN MAY BE BETTER PREPARED FOR AN AGEING WORLD. 

What Can the World's Most Aged Major Society Teach Countries Preparing for a Demographic Transformation?


The world is getting older.

For much of modern history, governments planned their economies around expanding populations, growing workforces and large numbers of young people entering employment. That model is changing.

People are living longer. Birth rates are falling in many countries. Families are becoming smaller, and the number of people available to support older relatives is declining in some societies.

This transformation will affect almost everything: healthcare, pensions, housing, employment, transport, technology, public finances and the organisation of families.

Japan has already been living through this future for decades.

In 2025, people aged 65 and over represented 29.4% of Japan's population—approximately 36.22 million people. More than 21 million were aged 75 or older. The Japanese government's 2026 Ageing Society White Paper projects that the proportion aged 65 and over could reach 38.7% by 2070.

Japan is therefore more than a country with an ageing population. It is an important real-world case study in how an advanced economy attempts to reorganise itself around longer lives and a smaller working-age population.

But there is a distinction worth making:

Japan is not necessarily solving every problem associated with ageing. It is developing institutions, technologies and social practices from which other countries can learn.

The question is whether the rest of the world can learn from Japan before demographic pressures become overwhelming.

The ageing world is no longer a Japanese problem

The demographic transformation is global.

According to the World Health Organization, the number of people aged 60 and over is expected to rise from approximately 1 billion in 2020 to 1.4 billion by 2030, and 2.1 billion by 2050.

Even more important, by 2050, approximately 80% of the world's older population will live in low- and middle-income countries.

This changes the international conversation.

Ageing is often presented as a challenge facing wealthy countries such as Japan, Germany, Italy and South Korea. But developing economies are also approaching major demographic transitions, sometimes without the pension systems, healthcare infrastructure or financial resources needed to support older citizens.

Africa, for example, has a relatively young population today. Yet its countries must prepare for longer life expectancy, changing family structures and future growth in older populations.

The lesson is clear: a country does not need to be old today to need an ageing strategy tomorrow.

Japan's demographic reality: A society already living in the future

Japan's demographic transformation is particularly advanced.

The country's 2025 figures show:

Indicator

Japan, 2025

Total population

123.22 million

Population aged 65+

36.22 million

Share aged 65+

29.4%

Population aged 75+

21.27 million

Share aged 75+

17.3%

Working-age population, 15–64

73.53 million

One particularly important development is that the population aged 75 and over is now larger than the population aged 65–74.

This matters because the likelihood of needing assistance with daily activities, complex healthcare and long-term care generally increases with age, although individual health and ability vary considerably.

Japan is also experiencing population decline. Preliminary 2025 census figures show a decrease of approximately 3.1 million people compared with 2020. The population declined in more than 90% of Japanese municipalities.

Statistics Bureau of Japan

The challenge is therefore not simply that Japan has more older people.

It is that many communities must provide services with fewer working-age residents, fewer local businesses and a shrinking tax base.

Japan's first major lesson: Ageing requires an institutional response

One of Japan's most significant policy decisions was the introduction of its Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) system in 2000.

Before a society develops extensive long-term care arrangements, families often carry much of the responsibility for looking after older relatives.

This can place enormous pressure on adult children, particularly women, who may have to reduce working hours or leave employment to provide care.

Japan's long-term care insurance system was designed to make care a broader social responsibility.

The system covers eligible people who need long-term care, with municipalities acting as the insurers. It is financed through insurance contributions and public funding. People aged 40 and above contribute to the system, while older people are among those most likely to receive benefits.

WHO Kobe Centre

The system supports services such as:

  • Home-based care.

  • Day-care services.

  • Residential care.

  • Rehabilitation.

  • Assistance with daily living.

  • Support for people with dementia.

  • Care management and individual care planning.

This is an important shift in social organisation.

Care is no longer treated exclusively as a private family responsibility. It is recognised as a public policy issue requiring financing, institutions, professional workers and long-term planning.

However, Japan's system faces rising costs and pressure to maintain sufficient care workers. It is a model to study, not a system that can simply be copied without considering each country's financial capacity.

The community-based care model: Helping people age in familiar surroundings

Japan's next important lesson is that ageing policy cannot be limited to hospitals and nursing homes.

Many older people want to remain in their own homes, neighbourhoods and communities for as long as possible.

Japan has been developing what it calls the Community-Based Integrated Care System.

The idea is to coordinate five essential elements:

  1. Housing.

  2. Medical care.

  3. Long-term nursing and personal care.

  4. Preventive healthcare.

  5. Daily-life support and social participation.

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare wants these services to be available in ways that allow older people to continue living in familiar surroundings, with dignity and appropriate assistance.

This approach recognises that an older person may need more than a doctor.

They may also need:

  • Accessible housing.

  • Help with shopping and cooking.

  • Transport to medical appointments.

  • Social activities to reduce isolation.

  • Rehabilitation and mobility support.

  • Assistance with medication and daily routines.

A hospital cannot solve all these problems.

An effective ageing society must connect healthcare with housing, transport, local government, families and community organisations.

The lesson for other countries is that ageing is not just a medical issue. It is a community-design issue.

Japan's older workers: Retirement does not have to mean economic withdrawal

One of Japan's most interesting responses to demographic pressure is the continued participation of older people in employment.

Rather than treating everyone over 65 as economically inactive, Japan has increasingly encouraged longer working lives.

According to Japan's 2026 Ageing Society White Paper, the 2025 employment rate was:

  • 54.5% among people aged 65–69.

  • 36.2% among people aged 70–74.

  • 12.6% among people aged 75 and over.

The country's employment policies also require employers to secure employment opportunities for workers up to age 65, through measures such as raising retirement ages, continuing employment systems or abolishing mandatory retirement. Employment opportunities up to age 70 are an effort-based obligation.

The OECD has also highlighted Japan's comparatively high employment participation among older workers. Its 2025 employment outlook reported that the employment ratio among people aged 55–64 rose by 10.5 percentage points between 2014 and 2024, reaching 79.2%.

This has several implications.

Older workers can contribute:

  • Technical experience.

  • Mentoring and professional training.

  • Institutional knowledge.

  • Customer service.

  • Small-business expertise.

  • Skilled supervision.

A 68-year-old engineer may have decades of knowledge that a younger employee has not yet acquired.

A 72-year-old entrepreneur may still have the experience and motivation to run a business.

But there is a necessary qualification: working longer must be a genuine choice, not an economic necessity imposed on people who cannot afford to retire. Governments must also address age discrimination, physically demanding jobs and unequal access to decent employment.

Japan's experience raises an important question for the global economy:

Should societies measure economic contribution only by the number of people aged 15–64, or should they recognise the productive potential of healthy older adults as well?

Robotics and AI: Can technology compensate for a shrinking workforce?

This is where Japan's ageing challenge intersects directly with its technological strengths.

Japan has decades of experience in industrial automation, robotics, precision engineering and electronics.

These capabilities are increasingly relevant to an economy in which the demand for care and support is growing while the supply of available workers is under pressure.

Potential applications include:

Technology

Possible contribution

Care-assistance robots

Help with transfers and physically demanding tasks

AI health monitoring

Identify changes in health and support early intervention

Autonomous delivery robots

Move food, medicines and supplies

Smart home systems

Detect falls and unusual activity

Rehabilitation robotics

Support mobility and physical recovery

AI administration

Reduce paperwork for healthcare professionals

Mobility technologies

Help older people remain independent

Japan's government has established priority areas for care technology, including mobility assistance, monitoring, rehabilitation, nutrition and dementia-related support.

But there is an important distinction between technological capability and successful deployment.

A robot that works in a laboratory may not work reliably in a crowded care facility. An AI monitoring system may generate false alarms. A digital service may exclude older people who are uncomfortable with smartphones.

Technology must therefore be evaluated according to whether it actually improves care, reduces staff workload, protects privacy and preserves human dignity.

The objective should be to make care workers more capable—not to pretend that machines can replace every human relationship.

Japan's longevity economy: Older people are also consumers, investors and entrepreneurs

An ageing population is often discussed as a financial burden.

But that is only one side of the story.

Older people are also consumers with needs, preferences, savings, skills and purchasing power.

This creates opportunities in what is commonly called the longevity economy.

It includes businesses serving people who want to live longer, healthier and more independent lives.

Potential industries include:

  • Accessible housing and home renovation.

  • Medical devices and preventive healthcare.

  • Nutrition and specialised food products.

  • Tourism and leisure.

  • Mobility services.

  • Financial planning and retirement services.

  • Assistive technologies.

  • Education and lifelong learning.

  • Personal care and home support.

Businesses that understand older consumers may discover markets that traditional youth-focused marketing has overlooked.

However, older people are not one uniform market. A healthy 66-year-old professional and an 88-year-old person needing daily assistance have very different needs.

Companies must understand differences in income, health, mobility, digital literacy and personal preferences.

Japan's experience shows why demographic change can create new markets as well as new costs.

Housing and transport: Designing cities for longer lives

A society can have excellent hospitals and still fail older people if they cannot safely move around their communities.

Consider the everyday challenges:

  • Climbing stairs.

  • Accessing public transport.

  • Crossing busy roads.

  • Reaching shops and pharmacies.

  • Living in homes with narrow doorways and difficult bathrooms.

  • Travelling from rural communities to medical facilities.

Japan's 2026 ageing policy includes measures to improve housing access, support older people in the rental market, address transport gaps and develop safer walking environments.

This is an important policy direction because independence is not simply a matter of medical health.

It also depends on whether people can leave their homes, meet others, buy necessities and participate in society.

The next generation of age-friendly cities will need to integrate:

  • Step-free buildings and stations.

  • Reliable public transport.

  • Safe pedestrian infrastructure.

  • Accessible public toilets.

  • Age-friendly housing.

  • Digital mobility services.

  • Community-based transport in areas where conventional services are limited.

This has lessons for rapidly urbanising economies across Asia and Africa, where cities can incorporate accessibility into new infrastructure rather than attempting expensive retrofits decades later.

The hidden challenge: Loneliness, dementia and changing family structures

Longer life expectancy does not automatically guarantee a better quality of life.

Some older people experience loneliness, social isolation, reduced mobility, dementia or financial insecurity.

Japan's changing household structure also matters. More people are living alone, and traditional assumptions about adult children caring for ageing parents are becoming less reliable.

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare identifies the increasing numbers of older people living alone, people with dementia and people aged 85 and above as major challenges for its community-based care planning towards 2040.

This means ageing policy must consider more than the provision of medical treatment.

It must also ask:

  • Who checks on an older person living alone?

  • How can people with dementia remain included in community life?

  • How can family caregivers receive practical and emotional support?

  • How can communities identify neglect and abuse?

  • How can older people remain socially connected?

  • How can digital technology support rather than isolate people?

A robot may deliver food, but it cannot automatically provide friendship.

A digital monitoring system may identify a fall, but it cannot replace a caring community.

The future of ageing must be about human connection as much as healthcare and technology.

Japan's weaknesses: What the world should not copy blindly

Japan has developed substantial experience, but it has not escaped the consequences of demographic change.

Its challenges include:

A. Pressure on public finances

Pensions, healthcare and long-term care require significant and recurring funding. An ageing population creates difficult decisions about taxation, insurance contributions, benefits and intergenerational fairness.

B. Labour shortages

The number of available workers is declining. Healthcare, care services, construction, transport and regional businesses face recruitment difficulties.

C. Rural depopulation

Many smaller communities are losing residents, including younger people. Maintaining hospitals, schools, shops and public transport becomes more difficult as populations shrink.

D. Care-worker shortages

Expanding demand for care does not automatically create enough trained professionals to provide it. Better pay, working conditions, training and career progression are essential.

E. Unequal retirement security

Not everyone enters old age with the same savings, pension entitlements, housing security or family support.

F. Gender inequality in unpaid care

Women have historically carried a disproportionate share of family care responsibilities. A successful ageing strategy must avoid transferring more unpaid work onto women.

G. Immigration and workforce policy

Japan has expanded foreign-worker pathways, including in care-related occupations, but questions remain about integration, training, working conditions and the scale of migration needed.

The OECD has argued that Japan needs a combination of greater labour-force participation, productivity improvements and carefully designed migration policy to support future growth.

These difficulties are not evidence that Japan's experience has no value. They demonstrate that no single policy or technology can solve demographic change on its own.

 Japan, China, South Korea and Europe: Different societies, similar pressures

Japan is not the only country facing an ageing population. Other major economies are confronting similar demographic pressures, but from different starting points.

Country or region

Demographic challenge

Important policy question

Japan

Very high proportion of older people and declining population

How can care, employment and productivity be sustained?

South Korea

Rapid ageing and very low fertility

How can institutions adapt quickly enough?

China

Large ageing population alongside a changing workforce

How can pensions, healthcare and economic growth be balanced?

Germany

Ageing workforce and demand for skilled labour

How can migration, automation and employment participation support the economy?

Italy

Long-standing low fertility and population ageing

How can smaller communities and public services remain viable?

Taiwan

Low fertility, longer life expectancy and a shrinking workforce

How can technology, care systems and labour policy adapt?

The United Nations' World Population Prospects 2024 projects continued growth in the proportion of older people across countries whose populations have already peaked. In this group, the share aged 65 and over is projected to rise from 17% in 2024 to 33% in 2054.

There is no universal solution. Countries have different pension systems, labour markets, migration policies, family structures and fiscal capacities.

Japan's experience is particularly relevant because it has already spent years adjusting to conditions that other economies are only beginning to confront.

What can Africa learn from Japan?

This is perhaps the most important international question.

Africa is often described as the world's youngest continent. Its demographic profile is very different from Japan's.

But being young today does not remove the need to prepare for an ageing population tomorrow.

The World Health Organization estimates that by 2050, 80% of the world's older people will live in low- and middle-income countries.

Many African countries could therefore face a difficult combination: growing numbers of older citizens, limited pension coverage, informal employment, inadequate healthcare infrastructure and families that may no longer be able to provide all the care traditionally expected of them.

Japan offers at least seven lessons.

1. Build long-term care systems before the crisis becomes severe.

African governments should begin designing affordable arrangements that combine family support, community care, public health services and insurance.

2. Recognise older people as economic contributors.

Older citizens should not be excluded from employment, entrepreneurship, professional mentoring and community leadership simply because they have passed a conventional retirement age.

3. Invest in preventive healthcare.

Preventing or delaying chronic illness and disability can improve quality of life and reduce pressure on hospitals and families.

4. Develop age-friendly cities.

Accessible transport, housing, roads and public facilities benefit older people, people with disabilities, pregnant women and families with young children.

5. Build local care industries.

There are opportunities in nursing education, home-care services, rehabilitation, assistive devices, medical equipment and community health services.

6. Use technology to strengthen care.

Affordable monitoring systems, telemedicine, mobile health services and appropriate robotics could help extend the reach of limited healthcare workforces.

7. Protect family caregivers.

Government policy should recognise unpaid care as a real economic contribution and provide support, training and respite services where possible.

Africa–Asia cooperation: A new opportunity?

Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan have different capabilities in healthcare technology, robotics, electronics and manufacturing.

African countries could explore partnerships involving:

  • Training African nurses and care professionals.

  • Manufacturing affordable assistive devices.

  • Developing local medical-equipment supply chains.

  • Establishing rehabilitation and elderly-care facilities.

  • Sharing expertise in age-friendly housing and transport.

  • Building AI-assisted healthcare systems.

  • Supporting African research into healthy ageing.

The objective should be more than importing equipment.

It should be developing African industries, professional skills and institutions that can serve an ageing population sustainably.

The economic opportunity: Could ageing become a new global industry?

For decades, global business has concentrated heavily on young consumers: fashion, entertainment, smartphones, social media and lifestyle products.

But demographic change is creating another major economic market.

The longevity economy could become an important source of demand across multiple sectors.

Industry

Emerging opportunity

Healthcare

Preventive medicine, diagnostics and home healthcare

Robotics

Care assistance and rehabilitation

Housing

Accessible homes and age-friendly construction

Financial services

Retirement planning and long-term savings

Food

Nutrition and specialised dietary products

Transport

Accessible mobility and community transport

Technology

Digital health, monitoring and assistive AI

Tourism

Senior-friendly travel and longer-stay tourism

Education

Lifelong learning and professional reskilling

Japan could play a major role in this market because its demographic experience creates demand for practical solutions.

But other countries may become equally important suppliers of specialised products, software, services and affordable healthcare systems.

The longevity economy should not be viewed merely as a market for selling products to older people. Its real potential is to support longer, healthier and more independent lives.

Three possible futures for an ageing world by 2050

Scenario A — The healthy longevity economy

Countries invest in preventive healthcare, accessible cities, lifelong education, flexible employment and assistive technology. Older citizens remain active for longer, and businesses develop products and services around longer lives.

Scenario B — The unequal ageing society

Wealthier citizens enjoy longer, healthier lives with access to private care and advanced technology. Poorer households face inadequate pensions, limited healthcare and the burden of unpaid family care.

Scenario C — The automated ageing society

Robotics, AI and digital healthcare help compensate for labour shortages. However, countries that lack infrastructure, investment and technical skills fall behind.

The outcome will depend on public policy, economic development, institutional capacity and the distribution of technological benefits.

Japan's experience suggests that demographic preparation must begin long before a society reaches its highest levels of ageing.

Final editorial assessment: Japan's greatest lesson is preparation

Japan may be better prepared for an ageing world because it has spent decades confronting demographic change and building responses across healthcare, employment, technology, housing and community services.

Its long-term care insurance system, community-based care model, older-worker participation and investment in assistive technologies provide valuable examples for other societies.

But Japan also demonstrates the cost of waiting too long to address declining fertility, shrinking workforces, rural depopulation and the financial sustainability of care.

There is no reason to romanticise its experience. Its difficulties are real, and its policies cannot simply be transplanted into countries with different economic and social conditions.

Nevertheless, the strategic lesson is powerful:

Ageing should not be treated as a national emergency that begins when a country has too many older people. It should be treated as a long-term transformation that governments, businesses and communities must prepare for together.

The countries that adapt successfully will not necessarily be those with the youngest populations or the most advanced robots.

They will be those that learn how to combine human experience, healthcare, technology, productive employment and social protection.

And perhaps the most important measure of a successful society will be this:

How well does it treat its citizens when they grow old?

By Jugo Ikeji Uju

Content Sponsorship available-

With links on ubuntusafa.com

Contact admin:

sappertekinc@gmail.com

admin@ubuntusafa.com

Episode (15):- What Lessons Has Taiwan Drawn from Hong Kong?

 


What Lessons Has Taiwan Drawn from Hong Kong?

Hong Kong has become a central reference point in Taiwan’s debate over whether Beijing’s promise of autonomy under “One Country, Two Systems” could protect Taiwan’s political institutions, civil liberties and democratic choices.

The debate is not simply about whether Beijing would promise Taiwan a high degree of autonomy. It concerns the legal structure of that promise: who would hold ultimate authority over the arrangement, who could interpret its terms, and what remedies would exist if the central government changed how it was applied?

Hong Kong provides a real-world case study because it operated under “One Country, Two Systems” after the 1997 handover, yet experienced major disputes over political autonomy, civil liberties and national security. Taiwan’s political circumstances are different, so the comparison cannot settle Taiwan’s future. It does, however, give Taiwanese voters and policymakers concrete evidence to consider.

What was “One Country, Two Systems” supposed to guarantee?

The framework was developed under Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and applied to Hong Kong when British sovereignty ended on 1 July 1997.

Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the territory became a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. The arrangement promised a high degree of autonomy, with exceptions including defence and foreign affairs, and the continuation of its existing capitalist system and way of life for 50 years after the handover.

Beijing later proposed the same broad framework for Taiwan. In its August 2022 white paper, the PRC government said that after peaceful reunification Taiwan could retain its current social system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy, while allowing for differences between the two sides to continue for an extended period.

Beijing presents the proposal as a way to achieve reunification peacefully while accommodating Taiwan’s existing institutions. Critics focus on whether those institutions would remain protected if the central government and Taiwan’s elected authorities disagreed over the meaning of autonomy.

The distinction is fundamental: a promise of autonomy is not the same thing as an independently enforceable guarantee of autonomy.

Hong Kong’s experience: from the 2019 protests to national security legislation



2019 — Protests begin over extradition legislation

The proposed extradition amendments raised fears that people in Hong Kong could be transferred to mainland China’s legal system. The protests grew into a wider movement over democratic representation, police conduct, civil liberties and the future of Hong Kong’s autonomy. The government formally withdrew the bill in September 2019, but demonstrations continued.



2020 — Beijing imposes the National Security Law

On 30 June 2020, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress adopted the Hong Kong National Security Law. It criminalized secession, subversion, terrorist activities and collusion with foreign forces in ways defined by the law. The legislation was introduced through the central authorities rather than enacted through Hong Kong’s ordinary local legislative process.



2021 onward — Changes to political participation

Beijing introduced electoral reforms that changed the composition and eligibility rules for Hong Kong’s governing institutions. The Chinese government described these changes as necessary to ensure governance by patriots and protect national security. Critics argued that they substantially narrowed the space for opposition politics and meaningful electoral competition.

2024 — Hong Kong enacts additional national security legislation

Hong Kong enacted its Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law. The legislation expanded the local national security framework. Supporters said it addressed security gaps; critics raised concerns about the breadth of offences and their implications for expression, association and public debate.

The events are interpreted differently by the parties involved. Beijing says the measures restored order, addressed national security threats and preserved the conditions necessary for Hong Kong’s stability. Critics—including international human rights observers—argue that the legal and political changes significantly restricted civil liberties and opposition activity.

A balanced assessment should distinguish the documented legal changes from the competing explanations of why they were necessary and whether their effects were proportionate.

The constitutional question: who has the final word?

This is arguably the most important lesson Taiwan can draw from Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's Basic Law establishes local institutions and protects a high degree of autonomy. But it also places the region within the constitutional order of the PRC.

Under Article 158 of the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) has the power to interpret the Basic Law. Article 159 gives the National People's Congress the power to amend it, subject to the stated restriction concerning China's established basic policies regarding Hong Kong.

The 2020 National Security Law added another layer. Article 65 assigns interpretation of that law to the NPCSC. The law also gives central authorities specific national security responsibilities and provides for a central-government office in Hong Kong.

The institutional issue can be summarized as follows:

Question

Hong Kong's legal arrangement

Who administers ordinary local affairs?

Hong Kong's own executive, legislature and courts, within the Basic Law and applicable national laws.

Who interprets the Basic Law?

The NPCSC holds the ultimate statutory interpretation power, with local courts exercising interpretive authority within the framework of Article 158.

Who can amend the Basic Law?

The National People's Congress, under Article 159.

Who has ultimate authority over national sovereignty and central government responsibilities?

The central authorities of the PRC.

This does not mean that Hong Kong has no legal autonomy or that every local decision is made in Beijing. It means that Hong Kong's autonomy operates within a constitutional hierarchy in which central institutions retain powers that can affect the boundaries of that autonomy.

The lesson for Taiwan is that the scope of autonomy matters, but so does the distribution of authority to interpret, amend and enforce its protections.

Why Taiwan cannot simply assume that a Hong Kong arrangement would be identical

There are important differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Hong Kong was transferred from British to Chinese sovereignty under an international agreement and subsequently governed as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. Taiwan, by contrast, has its own elected government, armed forces, constitutional institutions and extensive self-government; the PRC has never administered it.

A Taiwan-specific “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement would therefore require negotiations over questions that do not have direct equivalents in Hong Kong's transition.

These would include:

  • Whether Taiwan would retain its armed forces and how responsibility for defence would be allocated.

  • Whether Taiwan's elected president and legislature could continue to operate independently of Beijing.

  • Whether Taiwan's courts could protect constitutional rights against actions by central authorities.

  • Whether Taiwan could maintain its existing economic and international relationships.

  • Whether the terms of an agreement could be amended unilaterally by Beijing.

  • What legal or political remedies would be available if the two sides disagreed about compliance.

Beijing's 2022 white paper offers a broad proposal rather than a complete, mutually negotiated constitutional settlement specifying every one of these matters. It says that the details of implementation would take account of Taiwan's realities and views, but it does not establish an independent enforcement mechanism acceptable to both sides.

Consequently, the Hong Kong experience provides evidence about the existing framework, but it cannot prove in advance precisely how every possible Taiwan arrangement would operate.

What do Taiwanese people think of “One Country, Two Systems”?

Public opinion provides an important measure of the political context.

According to a survey commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and conducted by National Chengchi University's Election Study Center from 14–18 August 2025, 83.7% of respondents disagreed with the Chinese Communist Party's “One Country, Two Systems” framework. The telephone survey included 1,075 valid samples of adults aged 20 and older, with a reported sampling error of ±2.99 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

Taiwan public opinion survey · August 2025

83.7%

Disagreed with the PRC's “One Country, Two Systems” framework.

Source: Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council / National Chengchi University Election Study Center. This is a dated survey result, not a measure of every Taiwanese person's views today.

This result indicates substantial opposition to the proposed framework among respondents in that survey. It does not, by itself, establish that all respondents agree on Taiwan's ultimate legal status, the desirability of formal independence, or the best way to maintain peace.

Some people may reject “One Country, Two Systems” while favouring continued dialogue with Beijing. Others may oppose the framework because they favour Taiwan's formal independence. Still others may prioritize security and the preservation of existing institutions without wishing to make a final decision on Taiwan's constitutional future.

These distinctions matter: rejection of one proposed settlement does not necessarily imply agreement on every alternative.

Beijing's counterargument: why it continues to promote the framework

Beijing presents “One Country, Two Systems” as a way to achieve peaceful reunification while allowing Taiwan to retain a different social and economic system.

In its 2022 white paper, the PRC government argued that the arrangement could accommodate Taiwan's circumstances, provide a high degree of autonomy and preserve its existing system after reunification. It also argued that the experience of Hong Kong and Macao demonstrated the framework's capacity to support stability and development.

From Beijing's perspective, national unity and sovereignty establish the boundaries within which autonomy can operate. National security is treated as a responsibility of the central state, and the central authorities argue that the framework must protect the country's territorial integrity.

Critics question whether the central government could use those same powers to narrow autonomy when political disagreement arises. They point to the national security legislation, the changes to Hong Kong's electoral arrangements and the NPCSC's interpretation powers as evidence that local autonomy can be substantially affected by central decisions.

The disagreement is therefore not only about whether Beijing would initially offer Taiwan autonomy. It is about whether the promised autonomy would remain secure when the central authorities and Taiwan's elected institutions disagreed.

What would a credible autonomy guarantee need to address?

A serious evaluation of any future proposal would need to examine its actual legal terms rather than rely on a slogan.

Independent adjudication

Could a court or tribunal resolve disputes between Taiwan's authorities and the central government without either side having unilateral control over the outcome?

Limits on unilateral amendment

Could Beijing change the arrangement without Taiwan's consent? Would any constitutional or treaty-based safeguards make unilateral changes legally contestable?

Democratic consent

What process would allow Taiwan's population to approve or reject the terms? Would its elected institutions retain meaningful authority after implementation?

Civil and political rights

Would freedom of expression, the press, association, peaceful protest and political opposition be protected by enforceable provisions? What limits could be imposed on national security grounds?

Security and external relations

Who would control defence, law enforcement and international economic relations? Could Taiwan preserve the practical arrangements needed to protect its population and economy?

These are analytical tests, not claims that a future agreement would necessarily succeed or fail. Their purpose is to identify the institutional details that determine whether autonomy is durable, how disputes can be resolved, and what happens when political interests diverge.

The central lesson from Hong Kong

Taiwan's debate over “One Country, Two Systems” is shaped by the gap between a promise of autonomy and the legal powers that govern that promise.

Hong Kong demonstrates that a special administrative region can possess its own institutions and a distinct legal system while remaining subject to the constitutional authority of the PRC's central institutions. The events since 2019—especially the 2020 National Security Law and subsequent political and legal changes—have intensified questions about how autonomy is interpreted and protected. Beijing argues that these measures restored order and safeguarded national security; critics argue that they substantially narrowed the space for civil liberties and political opposition.

Taiwan is not Hong Kong, and the two situations should not be treated as identical. Taiwan has its own history of self-government, democratic institutions and unresolved international status. Nevertheless, Hong Kong provides concrete evidence that any autonomy proposal must be assessed in terms of legal authority, enforceability and the ability of local institutions to withstand political disagreement.

The decisive question is therefore:

If Taiwan accepted “One Country, Two Systems,” what would prevent the terms of autonomy from being reinterpreted or changed by the same central authorities that hold ultimate constitutional power?

Until that question is addressed by specific, credible and mutually accepted legal guarantees, assurances about autonomy remain a proposal to be evaluated—not a guarantee whose future operation can simply be assumed.

By Jugo Ikeji Uju

Content Sponsorship available-

With links on ubuntusafa.com

Contact admin:

sappertekinc@gmail.com

admin@ubuntusafa.com

France Student Protest Monitor

 


France Student Protest Monitor — 

Assessment

There are meaningful developments since the previous check. Tuesday's nationwide education strike took place, but participation was relatively limited compared with the major demonstrations of October and 5 November.

Five developments stand out:

  1. The 10 November mobilisation: Students, university representatives and teachers demonstrated in Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille and Rennes.

  2. Chelles: A regional councillor and deputy mayor was struck in the chest by a bottle containing petrol outside Lycée Gaston-Bachelard. A criminal investigation for attempted murder has been opened.

  3. Aix-en-Provence: A serious fire damaged Lycée Émile-Zola. Authorities suspect deliberate arson, but investigators have not established a connection with the student movement.

  4. Education disruption is declining: The Education Ministry counted 49 blocked high schools out of approximately 3,700, while reporting that 99% of high-school pupils had returned to classes.

  5. The movement is preparing another phase: Youth organisations intend to demonstrate on Saturday, 14 November, and join the wider national mobilisation on Tuesday, 17 November.

My assessment: The movement is losing its ability to disrupt the national education system on a large scale, but the underlying political dispute remains unresolved. The government's negotiating strategy has not persuaded the principal student organisations to suspend mobilisation.

Tuesday, 10 November: what happened?






Education disruption: official figures

49

High schools blocked

1.6%

Education personnel on strike

25%

Higher-education institutions disrupted

99%

High-school pupils reportedly back in class

Education Ministry figures reported by Reuters and AFP on 10 November.

The 49 blocked schools represented approximately 1.3% of France's 3,700 high schools.

The 1.6% strike figure refers to education personnel, not the proportion of students participating in demonstrations.

No reliable consolidated national attendance total for 10 November was established in the sources reviewed. It would be misleading to substitute the previous Saturday's 146,000 figure or the 5 November figure of 575,000.

City-by-city developments

Location

Reported developments

Paris

5,900 according to police; 10,000 according to Interfac student organisers. March largely peaceful.

Lyon

Approximately 3,500 according to the prefecture; clashes and tear-gas dispersal of a separate group.

Toulouse

Approximately 3,500 according to the prefecture.

Marseille

Several hundred demonstrators; march largely peaceful.

Rennes

Young demonstrators marched peacefully; police prevented the procession from completing its intended route.

Aix-en-Provence

Serious school fire, investigated separately from the demonstrations.

The overall picture is mixed: peaceful organised marches in several cities, but more serious confrontations around certain school entrances.

Serious incident in Chelles: elected official attacked

Criminal investigation opened-


Date: Tuesday, 10 November.

Location: Lycée Gaston-Bachelard, Chelles, Seine-et-Marne, outside Paris.

A local elected official, who serves as a deputy mayor of Chelles and regional councillor, was struck in the chest by a full, closed bottle containing petrol.

She was attempting to intervene in tensions surrounding the resumption of classes and burning rubbish bins outside the school.

The victim filed a complaint, and an investigation for attempted intentional homicide was opened.

Official responses

President Emmanuel Macron condemned the incident, describing it as an act of brutality and intimidation.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez said the incident was no longer simply a student protest but constituted urban violence requiring a firm response.

Education Minister Édouard Geffray appealed to parents to help distinguish legitimate student demands from criminal behaviour.

Importantly, the Union Syndicale Lycéenne (USL) also firmly condemned the violence, while arguing that unresolved government grievances were contributing to the wider tensions.

Evidence distinction: The bottle attack and criminal investigation are confirmed. The identity and individual responsibility of the perpetrator must be established through the investigation. The attack cannot be attributed to the student unions collectively.

Aix-en-Provence: serious fire at Lycée Émile-Zola

A separate serious incident occurred at Lycée Émile-Zola in Aix-en-Provence.

A fire partially devastated the school's interior overnight.

The regional authority reported damage affecting approximately 40 classrooms, including:

  • Burnt corridors.

  • Damaged electrical equipment.

  • A fire-safety system rendered unusable.

The prosecutor opened an investigation into deliberate damage by dangerous means and endangering human life.

The school remained closed.

Crucially, AFP reported that investigators had not established any connection between the fire and the wider protest movement. It would therefore be premature to describe this as a student-protest arson attack.

Lyon: another confrontation between students and police



Lyon experienced a combination of peaceful marches and confrontations.

The prefecture counted approximately 3,500 demonstrators.

After the main march, an unauthorised group of approximately 400 people moved towards Part-Dieu. Police caught up with the group and dispersed it using tear gas around Saxe-Gambetta.

Earlier, outside Lycée Saint-Exupéry, fireworks mortars were reportedly fired towards police.

Two pupils were injured, including a female student struck in the head. Two people were arrested in connection with the mortar incident.

Thirteen educational establishments in the metropolitan area moved to remote teaching, alongside Lyon 2 University. Some public transport services were also disrupted.

This is evidence of continuing local instability, but not evidence that all demonstrators were involved in violent activity.

Government response: Macron increases pressure for order

The government is now emphasising two parallel priorities:

First: restore normal education.

Education Minister Geffray says approximately 99% of high-school pupils have returned to classes.

The government wants schools reopened and pupils able to prepare for examinations and university applications.

Second: punish violence against education personnel and elected representatives.

Macron's condemnation of the Chelles attack represents a particularly strong political response.

Government spokesman Mathieu Lefèvre reported that nearly 300 education personnel had been injured since the beginning of the protests, while an AFP update on 10 November cited a government figure of 240. The difference has not been adequately explained in the reports, so neither should be treated as a definitive reconciled total.

The government is also maintaining its previously announced education commitments:

  • Transformation of Parcoursup beginning in 2027.

  • Replacement of Parcoursup in 2028.

  • 15,000 additional university places by 2028.

  • Additional teachers and support personnel.

  • Investment in deteriorating school and university buildings.

The student organisations continue to argue that these promises are insufficiently funded and too slow.

The political dispute following Monday's Matignon walkout

The failed Parcoursup reform committee meeting on Monday, 9 November, remains the central political obstacle.

Representatives of UNEF, Union Étudiante, USL and other organisations walked out over the presence of RN and UDR politicians and right-wing student representatives.

The government defended the inclusion of representatives from different parliamentary groups.

The student organisations argued that the meeting's composition undermined the legitimacy of the reform process.

On Tuesday, these organisations demonstrated again rather than accepting the breakdown of talks as a reason to suspend their campaign.

Ryad Rani, president of USL, and representatives of UNEF and FAGE were among the prominent youth figures involved in the mobilisation.

My assessment: The government's negotiation strategy has encountered a political legitimacy problem. The dispute is now partly about who has the authority to participate in shaping education reform, not just what the reform should contain.

What are the student organisations demanding?

The principal coalition includes:

  • Union Syndicale Lycéenne (USL).

  • UNEF.

  • Union Étudiante.

  • FAGE.

  • FSE.

  • Solidaires étudiant-e-s.

They are coordinating with the education-sector unions, including CGT, FSU, Force Ouvrière and Solidaires.

Their main demands remain:

Area

Demands

School conditions

More teachers, smaller classes, improved buildings

University access

Additional funded places

Admissions

Abolition or fundamental reform of Parcoursup

Higher education

More permanent teaching and research positions

Public employment

Better salaries and employment conditions

Student welfare

Improved financial support and access to education

Institutional accountability

Greater transparency and protection against excessive police intervention

The coalition's broader message is that education inequality and deteriorating public services are connected to the economic insecurity facing young people.

Next major development: Saturday 14 November and Tuesday 17 November

Next mobilisation dates confirmed by organisers

The youth inter-union coalition has announced that it wants to continue demonstrations on Saturday, 14 November, before joining the wider national mobilisation on Tuesday, 17 November.

This is important because the student movement is increasingly connecting itself to a larger public-sector wage dispute.

Tuesday, 17 November

Six public-sector union organisations have called for a national strike:

  • CGT.

  • UNSA.

  • FSU.

  • Solidaires.

  • CFE-CGC.

  • FA-FP.

Their principal demands include an immediate increase in the public-sector salary index, an end to the prolonged salary freeze and wage adjustments linked to inflation.

The CGT has also called on private-sector employees, pensioners and young people to participate.

The CFDT and Force Ouvrière have not signed this particular public-sector strike call.

This is potentially the most important development for the future of the student movement.

If student organisations, teachers and public-sector employees sustain a common mobilisation, the dispute could become substantially broader than the original school protest.

Confirmed facts versus disputed claims

Issue

Evidential position

Tuesday's demonstrations

Confirmed across several French cities

49 blocked high schools

Official Education Ministry figure

Paris attendance

5,900 police estimate; 10,000 organiser estimate

Chelles bottle attack

Confirmed incident; criminal investigation opened

Bègles school principal injured on 9 November

Confirmed by Reuters

Aix-en-Provence school fire

Confirmed; connection to protest not established

Lyon mortar incident

Reported; two pupils injured and two arrests

Police excessive force

Allegations remain subject to investigation

Foreign actors directing the protests

No established evidence

Student union control of violent incidents

Not established

Tuesday's national strike

Confirmed as having taken place

Saturday 14 November demonstration

Announced by youth coalition

Tuesday 17 November strike

Confirmed union call

A particularly important distinction: the government has documented violence against education personnel, but this does not establish that the student movement as a whole is violent. Equally, the legitimacy of educational grievances does not excuse attacks on school personnel, elected representatives or police officers.

My assessment: three possible directions

Scenario A — Gradual de-escalation

The government offers more specific education funding and a credible consultation process. Student organisations agree to reduce blockades while continuing peaceful demonstrations.

Possible

Scenario B — Wider social mobilisation

Students and teachers join the 17 November public-sector strike, bringing education grievances into a wider dispute over salaries, purchasing power and public services.

Significant possibility

Scenario C — Fragmentation and local confrontations

National participation continues to fall, but a smaller number of schools and universities experience recurring blockades, confrontations and isolated violent incidents.

Significant possibility

The third scenario is particularly important: declining national participation does not necessarily mean the disappearance of local instability.

Five investigative questions for our continuing France coverage

1. Political influence: Which political organisations are supporting the movement, and is there verifiable evidence of operational control over student groups?

2. Outside agitators: Are individuals who do not attend the affected schools participating in violent incidents? What do police records, judicial proceedings and independently verified footage establish?

3. Police accountability: What is the status of complaints arising from interventions at Noisy-le-Sec, Rennes and other schools?

4. Institutional trust: Why have the government, school management and student representatives failed to agree on a credible negotiation process?

5. Education inequality: Will the government's promises actually improve classroom conditions and university access, particularly in disadvantaged suburbs?

These questions require evidence from judicial investigations, school records, union statements, independently verified video and interviews with students, parents and teachers.

Final conclusion — 

The Tuesday mobilisation confirms that the French student protest movement remains active, but its capacity to disrupt the national education system has declined considerably.

The most serious new development is the attack on the elected official in Chelles, alongside the fire at Aix-en-Provence and the continuing confrontations in Lyon.

These incidents are increasing political pressure on the government to restore public order. At the same time, the student organisations remain dissatisfied with the Parcoursup negotiations and want broader education reforms.

The next decisive test is whether the movement can transform itself into a wider, coordinated social mobilisation on 17 November.

The most important distinction to maintain in our investigation is between legitimate educational grievances, peaceful political mobilisation, criminal acts by individuals and any demonstrable organised political influence. They must not be conflated.

By Jugo Ikeji Uju

Content Sponsorship available-

With links on ubuntusafa.com

Contact admin:

sappertekinc@gmail.com

admin@ubuntusafa.com

Daily Market Briefing: Macro, Commodities, Tech, AI Infrastructure & Crypto

 


Daily Market Briefing: Macro, Commodities, Tech, AI Infrastructure & Crypto- 

Macroeconomic Indicators, Commodities & Fed Policy.

  • FOMC Target Rate & Fed Odds: Benchmark target rate holds at 3.75%–4.00%. Kalshi prediction markets and CME FedWatch data indicate an ~78%–81% probability of a 25 bps rate hike (to 4.00%–4.25%) at the upcoming December 9, 2026 FOMC meeting, driven by persistent core PCE inflation and resilient GDP momentum. The 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield ($TNX) remains firm near 5.01%.

  • Precious & Industrial Metals:

    • Gold Futures ($GC / COMEX): Consolidating near $4,025.65–$4,058.50/oz (-2.16% session pullback after touching mid-week highs above $4,150/oz), as traders lock in gains amid firm real Treasury yields.

    • Silver Futures ($SI / COMEX): Range-bound near $52.02/oz, following gold's macro tailwinds.

  • Energy Futures:

    • WTI Crude Oil Futures ($CL): Trading near $101.79/bbl (settling near $85.80–$86.85/bbl across secondary back-month contracts), reflecting tight global inventory draws balanced against geopolitical volatility.

    • Natural Gas Futures ($NG): Holding near $3.21/MMBtu, supported by robust baseline LNG export feed gas demand (~18.5 bcfd).

  • Agricultural Commodities ($W, $C,$ZS):

    • Corn ($C / CBOT): December Corn trading near $4.38–$4.42/bushel, supported by steady domestic ethanol demand.

    • Soybeans ($ZS / CBOT): January Soybeans trading near $11.89–$12.01/bushel, navigating pressure from final U.S. harvest completion and favorable South American crop outlooks.

    • Wheat ($W / CBOT): December Chicago Wheat settled near $5.88–$5.99/bushel, balancing Black Sea export friction against global production volumes.

US-China AI Dynamics & Policy Guardrails

  • China AI Export Restrictions (Announcement No. 48): MOFCOM and MOST export licensing rules strictly enforce registration guardrails across 23 artificial intelligence technology categories, targeting outbound open-weights models and AI platform software IP.

  • U.S. Capital Flow Controls: U.S. Treasury oversight under the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act restricts U.S. private equity and VC flows into Chinese AI models, advanced packaging, and quantum computing infrastructure.

AI Infrastructure & Supply Chain (NVDA, AMD, SMCI, TSM, ASML, AVGO)

  • Super Micro Computer ($SMCI): Consolidating gains following its Q1 FY2027 print—posting $19.90B–$19.95B in revenue (up 298% YoY) and non-GAAP EPS of $1.81. AI-related rack-scale liquid-cooled architectures reached 70%+ of sales, driving FY2027 full-year revenue guidance up to $72B–$82B.

  • AMD ($AMD): Benefiting from accelerating Data Center accelerator adoption and expanding hyperscaler server rack deployments alongside SMCI.

  • Nvidia ($NVDA): Trading with solid momentum near $200.13–$207.04, supported by Blackwell cluster rollouts ahead of its November earnings catalysts.

  • Taiwan Semiconductor ($TSM): Supported by 68% HPC revenue contribution and advancing N2P process nodes.

  • ASML Holding ($ASML): Supported by €11.7B quarterly net sales and committed EUV tool production capacity for 2027–2028.

  • Broadcom ($AVGO): Outperforming on custom AI XPU ASIC co-design momentum and Tomahawk 6 switching deployments.

Broad Tech Earnings & Guidance

  • Big Tech Momentum: Amazon ($AMZN) and Microsoft ($MSFT at $545.18) pushed higher as total aggregate hyper scaler CapEx projections point toward $720B–$740B annually.

  • Intel ($INTC): Supported by Data Center and AI segment growth (+78% YoY) driven by ongoing enterprise server refresh cycles.

 Crypto Futures: Open Interest (OI), Funding Rates & 24-Hr Liquidations

  • Total Crypto Market 24-Hr Liquidations: ~$356.16 Million in forced closures cleared over the past 24 hours (80,898 traders liquidated). Long positions absorbed $280.40 Million (78.7% of total), while short liquidations accounted for $75.77 Million.

  • Bitcoin ($BTC):

    • Perpetuals Price: Testing technical support around $73,850 – $74,200.

    • Global Open Interest (OI): CME open interest contracted ~15% as offshore derivative leverage reset.

    • 24-Hour Liquidations: ~$86.14 Million total (Longs: 82.3% / ~$70.89M, Shorts: 17.7% / ~$15.25M), with the single largest liquidation being a $14.31M BTC long position wiped on Hyper liquid.

    • Funding Rate: Neutral to slightly negative at +0.0012% to -0.0024% / 8-hr, reflecting short-term spot cost-basis capitulation.

  • Ethereum ($ETH):

    • Perpetuals Price: Trading near $2,060 – $2,180.

    • 24-Hour Liquidations: ~$117.61 Million total (Longs: 88.4% / ~$103.96M, Shorts: 11.6% / ~$13.65M).

    • Funding Rate: Balanced near -0.0042% / 8-hr.

  • Solana ($SOL):

    • Perpetuals Price: Testing multi-month support around $85.00 – $88.50.

    • 24-Hour Liquidations: ~$23.45 Million total (Longs: ~$18.90M / 80.6%, Shorts: ~$4.55M / 19.4%).

    • Funding Rate: Moderate at +0.0018% / 8-hr.

By Jugo Ikeji Uju

Content Sponsorship available-

With links on ubuntusafa.com

Contact admin:

sappertekinc@gmail.com

admin@ubuntusafa.com

New Posts

(4) Which Elements of the Asian Development Experience Can Be Adapted to African Conditions, and Which Cannot?

  Which Elements of the Asian Development Experience Can Be Adapted to African Conditions, and Which Cannot? THE DEVELOPMENT MODEL | AFRICA...

Recent Post