The Risks and Opportunities of Sanae Takaichi’s Big Triumph in Japan

 

Takaichi’s broad support and growing military could make Japan a stronger US ally, but also threaten its other relationships in the Asia-Pacific region.

Earlier this month, the new Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi scored a major election victory, solidifying her party’s control in Japan’s national parliament. This win has given her an impressive mandate for change and will inevitably impact regional security in the Asia-Pacific.

Takaichi has shown an inclination to challenge China directly. This, along with her perceived effectiveness in partnering with President Donald Trump, constitute key parts of her foreign policy program, which appealed to the Japanese electorate.

From the US point of view, it’s good to have a strong, unified ally in Japan. But there are also risks to consider as Tokyo aims to shed some of its traditional caution in the realm of national defense.

Washington should steer Tokyo in the right direction by urging Takaichi to double down on arms and doctrines that are defensive, encouraging her to move away from ideological grandstanding and facilitating bold diplomatic initiatives by Japan and greater foreign policy realism.

Takaichi has succeeded in bringing up Japanese defense spending to 2 percent of GDP even faster than expected (as recently as 2024, the number still languished at 1.4 percent). 

The most significant defense initiative advocated by the popular prime minister concerns constitutional reform. At present, Japan’s “peace constitution” not only prohibits the Japanese government from participating in wars, but forbids the country from training armed forces. To get around that latter prohibition, Japan over time has developed quite formidable “self-defense forces.” A constitutional revision could resolve this rather obvious contradiction.

The United States stands to benefit from Japanese defense reforms. For example, increased resources will enable the completion of a new Japanese air base on Mageshima Island. It’s advantageous for Japan to have more air bases, enabling greater dispersal of military assets. As one analysis points out, “Battle damage to land bases can also be repaired much more quickly than a complex war machine like an aircraft carrier.”

A strong Japan is essential given the present situation in the Asia-Pacific. As China’s military power rises quickly, Japan serves as a logical point of balance. The large island archipelago also has favorable geography, including impressive strategic depth that would make it difficult to coerce, let alone conquer.

Yet even with these evident advantages, US decision-makers need to be apprised of the risks of a rising Japanese military, which are considerable, too. It’s not just that China has reacted badly to Takaichi’s more assertive approach. Japan’s delicate relationship with South Korea, one that Washington has sought to nurture over the last decade, could also be endangered by a brazen lurch away from Tokyo’s previously more pacifist approach to foreign and defense policy. After all, Koreans were also victims of Japanese aggression and this has not been forgotten on the peninsula.

But, as always, the biggest risk is Taiwan. Tensions across the Strait increased quite steadily in 2025. The situation was not helped by Takaichi’s injudicious statement that Japan would intervene in a Taiwan scenario. Such a seeming move toward “strategic clarity” in Taiwan’s corner formed a contrast with the Trump administration’s much more cautious approach and even drew a rebuke from Trump himself. Taiwan was not mentioned in the recently published US national defense strategy and Washington has been breathing new life into “strategic ambiguity” over the last year.

The United States will welcome a Japan that is more self-reliant, but not one that is leaning in to regional conflicts or further stoking tensions. In short, America needs a stalwart ally that pursues a genuinely defensive strategy.

Of late, quite a bit of attention has focused on Japan’s development of long-range strike missiles, expeditionary amphibious forces, deck aviation, and even the possibility of nuclear submarines. Yet there are more defense-oriented tasks that have long been neglected by the Japanese, including base hardening. Thus, it is reported that most air bases in Japan still lack hardened aircraft shelters, a contrast with the situation in South Korea.

There are risks to an emboldened Japanese foreign policy, but there are also opportunities. For example, it is well known that traditional conservatives like Takaichi have wider latitude to negotiate deals with adversaries. In that respect, one need only consider the examples of US presidents Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan. This phenomenon of perceived hawks successfully tamping down tensions occurs because these leaders are often in a stronger political position to take risks for detente, having a better position to withstand criticism from other hawks.

A similarly bold maneuver might seek to improve Japan’s relationship with Russia, which would be wholly consistent with the strategy of Takaichi’s mentor, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Not only would a friendlier Japanese approach to Russia accord with the Trump administration’s attempt to broker détente with the Kremlin, but Japan could benefit substantially from shipping along the developing Arctic transit route.

If Tokyo steers its long overdue military upgrade in a defensive direction, it will benefit both the United States and stability in the Asia-Pacific. Takaichi has reaped rewards from adopting certain Trump-like political stances. She may yet seek to emulate his obvious ambition to be seen as a peacemaker with major benefits for East Asia and the world.