Turkey’s Cabinet Reshuffle Sets the Stage for Its Next President

By

 


Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is laying the groundwork for a dynastic succession—and disposing of democratic institutions that might obstruct it.

On February 11, Turkish lawmakers came to blows on the parliament floor over President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to appoint new justice and interior ministers. Cabinet reshuffles are routine in Erdogan’s Turkey, serving as a calculated mechanism to purge insufficiently loyal officials and replace them with figures willing to faithfully execute his increasingly authoritarian agenda.

This latest reshuffle, however, carries far greater significance: it appears to reflect Erdogan’s deliberate effort to facilitate a seamless transfer of power to his son, Bilal Erdogan. The professional histories and loyalties of the newly appointed ministers suggest they were selected not for technocratic competence, but for their proven willingness to weaponize state institutions against political challengers—most notably the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

By consolidating control over the justice and interior ministries, Erdogan is tightening his grip over the mechanisms that oversee elections, law enforcement, and judicial proceedings. In doing so, he is not merely governing, but shaping the conditions under which his successor will be determined. The objective of these machinations is clear: weaken the opposition, eliminate meaningful electoral independence, and ensure that Bilal Erdogan’s eventual ascent to the presidency occurs without resistance or democratic interruption.

The Anatomy of a Government Takeover

On February 11, Erdogan’s propaganda-media outlets announced the appointment of two new cabinet members, Justice Minister Akin Gurlek and Interior Minister Mustafa Ciftci. While Ankara has not yet made official comments on the reason for replacing two sitting cabinet ministers, the change has come at a crucial juncture in what is expected to be Erdogan’s final presidential term. As questions of constitutional changes and even an early election circulate through Turkish public discourse, the cabinet shift sets in motion Erdogan’s plan to install his intended successor.

Between Erdogan’s two new cabinet picks, Justice Minister Akin Gurlek stands out as the greater threat to Turkey’s liberal opposition and the country’s last vestiges of democracy. CHP politicians have long referred to Gurlek as the “mobile guillotine” for his reputation of handing exceptionally heavy sentences to anti-Erdogan politicians and journalists. Before assuming his current office, Gurlek began his 18-month tenure as Chief Prosecutor for Istanbul—and almost immediately made clear his aim to use that office to burn the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) to the ground. In March 2025, his office arrested the popular CHP mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, on transparently bogus espionage charges. Recognizing that Imamoglu, the CHP’s presidential nominee, was the greatest threat to Erdogan and his successor, Gurlek demanded in November that Imamoglu be sentenced to more than 2,000 years in prison. Beyond Imamoglu, Gurlek’s long-term campaign against CHP leaders initiated an aggressive crackdown, in which Ankara attempted to replace the opposition’s Istanbul provincial leader and sent in police to storm the party’s headquarters in September.

With expanded powers and command over the Turkish justice system, Gurlek’s war against the CHP is no longer limited to Istanbul. Turkey’s justice minister now presides over the Judges and Prosecutors Council (HSK), the supreme body responsible for appointing, assigning, promoting, and suspending all of Turkey’s judges and prosecutors. In short, Gurlek holds the keys to the kingdom, ensuring that Ankara’s already-compromised judiciary is packed with Erdogan loyalists and acolytes.

The first days of Gurlek’s tenure as Justice Minister already signal bad times coming for the CHP and for Turkey’s declining democracy. On February 11, Istanbul prosecutors swiftly arrested Ramazan Yildiz, a local-level CHP Youth Branch leader, for a social media post criticizing Gurlek. And considering the furor raised in Turkey’s parliament over the new justice minister—resulting in a CHP-AKP fistfight—arresting CHP politicians is unlikely to stop with district organizers jailed over free speech.

Erdogan Is Laying the Groundwork for Dynastic Succession

Since the end of 2025, Bilal Erdogan has risen in the public spotlight to assume the role of Turkey’s crown prince, appearing to garner his father’s favor more than other potential successors. As the likelihood of Bilal’s ascendancy to AKP leadership and a presidential nomination grows, the elder Erdogan’s cabinet reshuffle is even more telling. Handing Bilal the reins of the courts and the police, especially if he comes to succeed his father as the AKP’s leader in 2026, is a recipe for dynastic autocracy.

Appointing Gurlek to head the Justice Ministry speaks to the president’s desire to arm Bilal with family friends in his “strong suits.” Bilal does not yet hold public office, although he has many connections within Turkey’s judiciary and has previously weaponized them to jail his critics. Replacing former Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunc, whom AKP leadership purportedly viewed as weak, with Erdogan’s political hatchet man plays right into Bilal’s hands, giving him a legally immune aide to shut down his opponents nationwide.

Gurlek has also been known to target powerful individuals tied to AKP factions for questioning and prosecution. Despite his indictments of influential AKP-affiliated businessmen, media moguls, and other movers and shakers, Gurlek was careful never to lay a finger on Bilal Erdogan or his private-sector interests. Should intra-AKP tensions and presidential challengers, like Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, begin to pose a threat, Bilal can count on a loyal judiciary to target his foes and their friends regardless of party.

Installing the less-known Mustafa Ciftci, formerly Governor of Erzurum, as Interior Minister brings a fresh autocratic flavor to the agency responsible for Turkey’s police and homeland security. Ciftci has long been affiliated with the Turkish Youth Foundation (TUGVA), an Islamist NGO with politically powerful members—including Bilal Erdogan—on its board of directors. As such, Turkish media have already identified Ciftci as a sycophant for Bilal, less hesitant than ministers past to put force behind the younger Erdogan’s strongman aspirations. The new Interior Minister, reputed to be a “harsher” man than his predecessor Ali Yerlikaya, will likely hesitate less to restructure his agency as a tool of state violence and fear. The aggressive police response to Istanbul’s September protests under Yerlikaya was but a prelude to what violence may come under Ciftci, as the increasingly unpopular Erdogan family faces louder calls to release Imamoglu and cease their lawfare campaign against the CHP. The costs attached to resisting Erdogan’s authoritarian will are likely to increase.

All of these maneuvers appear rooted in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intention to elevate his son to AKP leadership, potentially as early as this year. Securing the party helm would allow Bilal to consolidate authority within Turkey’s fused party-state apparatus, build loyalty among key political and bureaucratic actors, and position himself as the natural successor to the presidency.

Turkish Democracy Isn’t Dead Yet

Such an outcome, however, ultimately hinges on electoral timing. Whether Bilal assumes the presidency will depend on when the next election is held—particularly if Erdogan seeks to call an early vote before the scheduled May 2028 date. At present, neither Erdogan nor his governing coalition appear inclined to pursue early elections. Public dissatisfaction, driven largely by Turkey’s worsening economic conditions, has eroded Erdogan’s popularity, making an early contest politically risky. The only major political force advocating for early elections is the CHP.

This reluctance suggests a more deliberate strategy. Erdogan is likely relying on his newly appointed justice and interior ministers to weaken and neutralize opposition forces ahead of any electoral contest. This approach would buy critical time to cultivate Bilal’s leadership credentials, consolidate institutional loyalty, and shape a more favorable political environment. Should Bilal formally assume a senior leadership role within the AKP by late 2026, and depending on the effectiveness of institutional pressure against opposition figures, Erdogan could then engineer electoral conditions that enable a controlled and predictable transfer of power.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular Posts

Quantum computing, decentralized energy and Ai-driven autonomous weapons will in control.

By
Image
  1. Whether quantum computing destabilizes all current deterrence models.   2. Whether decentralized energy microgrids undermine state-level energy leverage.   3. whether AI-driven autonomous weapons lower the threshold for global conflict.                Could Quantum Computing Destabilize All Current Deterrence Models? A. Quantum Computing’s Strategic Potential Quantum computing (QC) promises: Breaking current encryption (RSA, ECC) Ultra-fast optimization of logistics and supply chains Simulation of complex systems (e.g., nuclear reactions) Enhanced AI training efficiency Immediate strategic implications : Cryptography : Current nuclear command-and-control relies heavily on secure communications. QC could make conventional encryption obsolete. Missile Defense : Quantum-enhanced optimization could allow more precise interception simulations, potentially undermining confidence in current missile det...
Read more

Would Great Powers Accept Relational Accountability Over Strategic Dominance?

By
Image
  At the core of international politics lies a persistent tension: are great powers primarily guardians of order or maximizers of advantage? The modern state system, especially since 1945, has been structured around strategic dominance—military deterrence, economic leverage, technological supremacy, and geopolitical positioning. Relational accountability, by contrast, demands that powerful actors accept responsibility for how their actions affect weaker states and the broader global community. It requires constraint, reciprocity, and moral transparency. The critical question is not whether relational accountability is ethically desirable. It is whether great powers—given structural incentives—would rationally accept it over dominance. 1. The Logic of Strategic Dominance Great powers operate within an anarchic international system. There is no global sovereign capable of enforcing universal rules. Institutions such as the United Nations exist, but enforcement ultimately depends...
Read more

Why Petrol Cars Still Dominate in Most of the World—Despite EV Hype

By
Image
The global narrative around electric vehicles (EVs) suggests an unstoppable march toward an all-electric future. Headlines highlight rising EV sales in wealthy countries, bold government bans on petrol cars, and ambitious climate pledges from automakers. Yet step outside a few high-income markets and the picture changes dramatically. In most of the world—across Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and large parts of Eastern Europe—petrol (and diesel) cars continue to dominate roads, sales, and consumer preferences. This persistence is not simply due to resistance to change or lack of awareness. It reflects deep structural realities: economics, infrastructure, energy systems, industrial capacity, and social behavior. Understanding why petrol cars remain dominant requires moving beyond hype and examining how mobility actually works for the majority of the global population. 1. Cost: The Decisive Barrier The most immediate and decisive factor is price . EVs remain significantl...
Read more

China and the United States approach income and wealth differently, especially when considering how the rich, middle class, and poor are affected.

By
Image
                                        1. United States (U.S.) Tax Approach a. High-Income / Ultra-Rich: Income Taxes: The U.S. uses a progressive federal income tax system; the highest marginal rate is 37% (as of 2026) for individuals earning above roughly $600,000 per year. Capital Gains Taxes: Wealthy Americans often earn more from investments than wages, which are taxed at lower rates (0–23.8% depending on income and type of gain). Wealth Inequality Factor: Many rich people use tax deductions, offshore accounts, trusts, and business structures to reduce effective tax rates, sometimes far below the statutory rate. Estate Taxes: The U.S. has an estate tax, but it applies only to very large estates (over $13.6 million for individuals), so most inheritances are untaxed. b. Middle Class / Hard-Working: Income Taxes: Progressive but lower brackets; they pay between ...
Read more

Is Democracy Being Universalized as a Value—or Selectively Applied as a Foreign Policy Tool by the United States and the European Union?

By
Image
The promotion of democracy has become a defining feature of Western foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Both the United States and the European Union consistently articulate democracy, rule of law, and human rights as universal values. Official documents, strategic doctrines, development programs, and diplomatic engagements frame democratic governance not merely as a political system but as a normative global standard. Yet critics argue that democracy promotion is not applied consistently. They contend that democratic principles are often subordinated to strategic interests—security alliances, energy access, trade partnerships, or geopolitical competition. This tension raises a central question: Is democracy genuinely being universalized as a value, or is it selectively instrumentalized as a foreign policy tool? The answer is not binary. It involves both normative commitment and geopolitical calculation. 1. Democracy as a Universal Normative Framework Following the Col...
Read more