Sahel 2035 Scenario Watch — Meaningful Shift

 

Sahel 2035 Scenario Watch — Meaningful Shift

Assessment: the Sahel has moved modestly toward the fragmentation scenario, while simultaneously strengthening the new regional power scenario. The stabilization scenario has weakened.

1.  Niger's military mutiny is the most important new warning signal

The attempted mutiny in Niamey on August 29–30, 2026 is more consequential than an ordinary coup-related incident.

Discontented soldiers attacked strategic military positions around Diori Hamani International Airport and the presidential area. The rebellion was suppressed with significant assistance from Russia's Africa Corps. AP reports that many of the mutineers came from frontline areas suffering heavily from jihadist violence and were reportedly motivated in part by worsening security and military conditions. 

This creates a dangerous contradiction for Niger's political model:

The military government justified its rise partly on the promise of restoring security, but continuing jihadist pressure is now contributing to dissatisfaction inside the military itself.

That is a potentially important 2035 indicator.

Scenario impact:  Fragmentation 

If military governments cannot translate military sovereignty into improved security for soldiers and civilians, internal cohesion could become a greater threat than external intervention.

2. 🇷🇺 Russia's role has crossed another threshold

The Niger crisis also demonstrated something strategically significant: Russia is increasingly functioning not merely as an external military partner but as a security guarantor for AES regimes.

Russian Africa Corps personnel helped Niger's government regain control of the strategic airbase. AP described the intervention as evidence of Moscow's growing role as a security guarantor for Sahel military governments. 

This follows the broader July 2026 Russia-AES agreement to continue strengthening the operational capabilities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger's armed forces. 

This strengthens the new regional power scenario because the AES states are building a geopolitical identity outside the traditional France/ECOWAS/U.S.-aligned architecture.

But there is an important paradox:

Strategic autonomy is increasing, while dependence on a new external security patron may also be increasing.

That means the AES experiment is not yet demonstrating complete strategic autonomy. It is demonstrating strategic realignment.

Scenario impact:  New regional power  / dependency risk ↑

3.  Jihadist pressure remains the fundamental weakness

There is no evidence yet that the AES security architecture has reversed the insurgency.

Recent reporting continues to show JNIM activity across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, while ISSP remains an important threat in the wider tri-border environment. A September 8 incident report recorded another JNIM ambush against Nigerien forces in Tillabéri. 

More importantly, the conflict is evolving beyond conventional attacks.

JNIM is increasingly attempting to undermine state authority through economic pressure, taxation, control of roads, coercion and parallel governance, according to recent regional security analysis. 

This matters enormously for 2035.

A government can survive terrorist attacks.

It becomes much harder to survive if insurgents progressively become capable of controlling:

• roads,

• fuel supplies,

• agricultural markets,

• rural taxation,

• local dispute resolution,

• trade corridors,

• population movement.

That would transform the conflict from terrorism versus government into competition over who actually governs territory.

Scenario impact:  Fragmentation 

4.  Climate pressure is becoming a security multiplier

A particularly important development this week is the deterioration of pastoral conditions.

Regional AGRHYMET/CILSS data reported on September 9 indicate that more than 60% of the Sahelian zone is currently exposed to forage deficits for the 2026–27 pastoral season. Particularly affected areas include northern Mali, parts of Niger and Chad, and sections of Burkina Faso and neighboring countries. 

This should not be treated simply as an agricultural story.

For the Sahel, livestock movement is connected directly to:

water → pasture → migration → land competition → farmer-herder conflict → displacement → recruitment opportunities for armed groups.

The emerging climate stress therefore potentially reinforces the jihadist and political-security problems simultaneously.

There is also an additional global climate risk developing: the UN and WMO are warning of an exceptionally strong El Niño event that could intensify drought and rainfall disruptions into 2027. 

Scenario impact:  Fragmentation 

5. ECOWAS is beginning to adapt rather than simply confront the AES

There is, however, one important stabilizing development.

The new ECOWAS leadership under General Birame Diop has emphasized renewed regional cooperation and engagement. ECOWAS has explicitly argued that geographical proximity and shared security and socioeconomic challenges make cooperation with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger necessary. 

This is significant because the strategic question is no longer simply:

“Will the AES return to ECOWAS?”

The more realistic question is:

“Can AES and ECOWAS develop a functional coexistence without requiring political reunification?”

That could eventually produce a hybrid regional architecture in which AES states remain politically separate while continuing to depend upon West African trade corridors, financial markets, migration networks and coastal ports.

That would be considerably more stable than complete economic separation.

Scenario impact:  Stabilization ↑ modestly

6. Economic sovereignty remains incomplete

The economic picture is therefore mixed.

The AES countries are continuing to construct independent political and security institutions, but their economies remain deeply connected to the wider West African system.

The latest AES reporting indicates that Mali plans to mobilize 1.45 trillion CFA francs through the regional securities market in 2026, with roughly 840 billion CFA already raised by September 1. 

This is an important reminder:

Political separation from ECOWAS does not automatically produce economic separation from West Africa.

For the 2035 scenario, this may actually be healthy.

A successful AES does not necessarily need economic autarky. It needs greater bargaining power, diversified trade routes, stronger domestic production and control over strategic resources.

That distinction will be crucial.

2035 Scenario Scorecard

Scenario		Assessment
Stabilized Sahel		Strong
Fragmented Sahel		Strongest current trend
New Regional Power		Strengthening
Hybrid outcome		Increasingly plausible

My current assessment

Fragmentation: 45%
Hybrid stabilization + regional power: 35%
New consolidated regional power: 15%
Major stabilization under existing security model: 5%

These are scenario weights, not statistical forecasts. The biggest reason for the high fragmentation weighting is that the AES governments are gaining institutional independence faster than they are demonstrating the ability to restore territorial security.

The critical question for the next phase

The most important indicator to watch is no longer simply whether Russia gains influence or whether France loses influence.

It is:

Can the AES states convert sovereignty into state capacity?

That means five measurable things:

1. Can they hold territory against JNIM and ISSP?

2. Can they protect major trade and fuel corridors?

3. Can they prevent internal military fractures?

4. Can AES institutions deliver infrastructure, energy and investment?

5. Can they build economic relationships with ECOWAS, China, Russia, Turkey, Algeria and coastal states without becoming dependent on any one external power?

If the answer becomes increasingly yes, the New Regional Power scenario becomes much more likely.

If the answer remains no, the region could enter a cycle where governments control capitals, insurgents control rural economic networks, and external powers guarantee regime survival without resolving the underlying conflict.

That would be the most dangerous path toward Sahel fragmentation by 2035.

The latest evidence is a warning rather than a breakthrough.

The AES is becoming more institutionally and geopolitically coherent, while ECOWAS is moving toward pragmatic engagement. That supports the emergence of a distinct Sahelian power center.

But the Niger mutiny, continuing JNIM pressure and worsening pastoral conditions expose the fundamental weakness: political sovereignty is advancing faster than security and state capacity.

For now, therefore, the trajectory has shifted away from straightforward stabilization and toward a contest between fragmentation and the emergence of a genuinely autonomous regional power. 

Watch next: internal military cohesion in Niger and Mali, JNIM pressure on major transport corridors, whether the AES joint force becomes operationally effective, and whether ECOWAS-AES talks produce practical arrangements on trade, transit and security.

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