China, Confucius Institutes, Christianity and Islam: Is Beijing Applying a Double Standard?

The question raises a fundamental issue in international relations: Why does China defend the right to promote its culture and philosophy abroad while restricting religious activities at home, particularly Christianity and Islam?

The answer lies in the way the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands political power, national sovereignty, ideology and social control.

There is, however, an important distinction to make at the outset: China does not officially oppose every criticism of Confucius Institutes, and it does not prohibit Christianity or Islam outright. It permits officially recognised religious activity under state supervision, while imposing substantial restrictions on religious organisations, practices and institutions that it considers insufficiently controlled by the state.

The central tension is that Beijing presents Chinese cultural outreach as legitimate international exchange while treating certain forms of independent religious activity at home as potential challenges to political authority.

Let's examine the issue from several angles.

The immediate trigger: China's reaction on 26 October 2026

On 26 October 2026, China's Foreign Ministry opposed what it described as the “vilification and smears” of Confucius Institutes. The response followed a US Department of Defense designation of the Chinese-funded centres as a national security threat. Washington alleged that some organisations had reappeared under different names.

Beijing's position was that educational exchanges benefit both countries and should not be disrupted.

This is not simply a dispute about Chinese language classes. It concerns who controls cultural exchange, how foreign influence is defined, and whether a government can promote its national narrative abroad while limiting competing sources of influence at home.

The fundamental contradiction: cultural freedom abroad, political control at home

Consider the contrast.

China's position abroad

Chinese language, philosophy, calligraphy and cultural programmes should be welcomed as legitimate forms of international exchange. Beijing objects when host governments characterise these institutions as instruments of hostile influence.

China's approach at home

Christian churches and Muslim communities may operate within the officially recognised religious system, but religious organisations face state supervision, political loyalty requirements and restrictions on activities outside approved arrangements.

The inconsistency becomes apparent when we ask a simple question:

If Chinese culture deserves protection from unfair stereotyping, why should Christianity and Islam not receive equivalent protection from political suspicion and discriminatory treatment in China?

The answer is not that the Chinese state considers all belief systems equally dangerous. Rather, it distinguishes between cultural activities it can manage and independent institutions whose authority it cannot fully control.

Five reasons behind Beijing's position

A. Soft power is an instrument of national influence

Confucius Institutes help China build familiarity with its language, history and cultural traditions. In international relations, this is called soft power: influencing perceptions through culture, education and attraction rather than coercion.

China is not alone in doing this. France has the Alliance Française, Germany has the Goethe-Institut, and other countries support language and cultural programmes abroad.

The critical distinction is not whether a government promotes its culture. It is whether the programme respects the independence of its host institution.

The US Government Accountability Office recognised that Confucius Institutes provided educational and cultural benefits while also documenting concerns about funding arrangements, governance and possible effects on academic freedom.

Beijing has a clear interest in defending these institutes because they serve its cultural diplomacy and international image.

B. The Communist Party does not want an independent centre of authority

This is arguably the most important domestic explanation.

The CCP's political system places the party at the centre of public life. Religious organisations, like other institutions, are expected to operate within boundaries established by the state.

Christianity has religious authorities and traditions that do not originate with the Chinese state. Islam has its own religious teachings, transnational connections and obligations. Neither religion is inherently opposed to the Chinese government, but either can become a source of independent community organisation.

That independence is what can create political friction.

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom reports that China's officially recognised religious organisations are required to maintain political loyalty to the CCP and cooperate with state policies.

In effect, Beijing is more comfortable with religion that operates within its institutional framework than with religious activity that establishes its own independent authority.

C. Beijing interprets religion through the lens of national security

Chinese officials frequently connect religious governance to national unity, social stability and opposition to foreign interference.

These concerns are not identical across religious communities.

• Christianity: The state regulates registered churches and has also restricted unregistered congregations. Relations between Chinese authorities and parts of the Catholic Church have involved questions of church appointments and the role of the Vatican.

• Islam: The government's treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang has involved particularly severe restrictions, mass detention and extensive state interference in religious and cultural life, as documented by international human rights bodies.

• Other religious communities: Tibetan Buddhists and other groups also face restrictions under state policies designed to bring religious practice into conformity with party priorities.

Beijing presents its policies as necessary for national security and social cohesion. Critics argue that the breadth of the restrictions suppresses legitimate religious freedom and cultural identity.

There is a crucial distinction here: legitimate security concerns can exist, but they do not automatically justify collective suspicion of an entire religious population.

D. China sees foreign criticism as an attempt to contain its rise

Beijing often interprets Western criticism through the wider history of China's relations with foreign powers, including colonialism, unequal treaties and foreign intervention.

From the Chinese government's perspective, criticism of its cultural institutions can form part of a broader effort to limit China's international influence.

That perception helps explain its strong language about “smearing” and “stigmatisation.”

However, two things can be true simultaneously:

• Western governments can use national security arguments for strategic or political purposes.

• Universities and governments can have legitimate reasons to scrutinise foreign-funded institutions, particularly where academic independence, transparency or political pressure is concerned.

The European Parliament's 2025 Academic Freedom Monitor discusses concerns about censorship, foreign influence and academic freedom associated with Confucius Institutes. These are substantive questions, not automatically evidence of hostility towards Chinese people or Chinese culture.

E. The principle of reciprocity is not applied consistently

This brings us closest to your original question.

Imagine the situation were reversed.

A Chinese university hosts a foreign-funded cultural centre that teaches Christianity, discusses the history of the Catholic Church, organises independent religious meetings and receives funding from a foreign religious organisation.

Would Beijing allow it to operate with the same institutional independence that it expects Confucius Institutes to enjoy abroad?

China's regulatory system makes that independence unlikely. Foreign religious activities and organisations face controls, and religious activity generally must conform to the state's legal and political framework.

The comparison is not exact: a cultural institute is not the same thing as a church or mosque. Nevertheless, it exposes a significant issue of principle.

Beijing demands that other societies distinguish Chinese cultural exchange from political interference, while it does not consistently grant the same presumption of independence to religious institutions operating within China.

That is the central reciprocity problem.

Is Confucius Institute scrutiny itself a form of discrimination?

Not necessarily. Three separate issues need to be distinguished.

Issue	What should be examined?
Chinese culture	Whether people are unfairly discriminated against because they are Chinese or because they study Chinese culture.
Confucius Institutes	Their funding, governance, contractual obligations, academic independence and compliance with local laws.
Chinese government influence	Whether there is evidence of censorship, political pressure, surveillance or other improper conduct.

A person should not be treated as suspicious simply for learning Mandarin, studying Confucian philosophy or maintaining Chinese cultural connections.

Equally, a government-funded institution should not be exempt from scrutiny merely because it promotes cultural understanding.

The US National Academies' examination of Confucius Institutes identified genuine educational benefits alongside risks relating to academic freedom, freedom of expression and national security. Those risks warrant institutional safeguards, but allegations about a particular institute should be supported by evidence.

The same standard should apply to religious organisations in China: evaluate demonstrable misconduct where it exists, rather than treating an entire faith as a threat.

What does this reveal about the Chinese political system?

The party-state distinction

The CCP is not simply a government administering a religiously neutral public sphere. Its political ideology shapes the boundaries within which religious institutions can operate.

The international legitimacy problem

China wants its cultural outreach recognised as normal diplomacy, but international acceptance also depends on transparency, institutional independence and respect for the laws of host countries.

The inconsistency between principles and practice

When a state demands freedom from unfair stereotyping for its own cultural institutions but restricts other communities' ability to practise their beliefs, it creates a credibility problem.

A fair comparison: China, America and Europe

A balanced analysis should not assume that Western countries always defend religious freedom consistently or that every criticism of China is justified.

Western governments also impose restrictions on foreign influence, investigate organisations and sometimes treat particular religious communities unfairly. Such actions should be examined on their own evidence and merits.

Nevertheless, there is an important institutional difference between scrutinising a foreign-funded organisation and restricting religious practice because it is insufficiently aligned with the ruling party.

The distinction is whether restrictions are based on specific, demonstrable risks and proportionate safeguards, or on a broad demand that independent institutions conform to political priorities.

That distinction is essential to assessing both Confucius Institutes and China's treatment of Christianity and Islam.

The deeper question: Does China want cultural respect or control over its image?

There is a difference between asking the world to respect Chinese culture and asking the world to accept Chinese government-sponsored cultural institutions without meaningful scrutiny.

The first is a legitimate aspiration. The second is a demand that other societies surrender part of their responsibility to protect academic independence.

Likewise, China has legitimate interests in social stability and national security. But those interests do not, by themselves, establish that independent Christian or Muslim communities are threats to the state.

A consistent standard would recognise that:

• Chinese culture deserves to be studied without prejudice.

• Confucius Institutes should be evaluated on evidence, transparency and academic freedom.

• Christians and Muslims in China deserve protection against discrimination and arbitrary restrictions.

• Religious organisations must comply with legitimate laws, but should not have to subordinate their beliefs to a ruling party's ideology simply to exercise basic religious freedoms.

These principles can be applied consistently without endorsing either Beijing's position or every Western criticism of it.

The central contradiction is not that China promotes Confucianism while permitting Christianity and Islam to exist. It is that Beijing seeks international acceptance for its own cultural influence while demanding extensive political control over religious institutions at home.

The Chinese government sees Confucius Institutes as instruments of cultural diplomacy and regards certain independent religious activities as matters of political governance and national security. That helps explain its position, but explanation is not the same as justification.

The most useful test is reciprocity: would Beijing accept at home the same institutional independence, freedom of expression and tolerance of foreign cultural influence that it demands for Chinese institutions abroad?

The gap between those expectations is where the central question of consistency arises.

By Jugo Ikeji Uju

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