THE ISLAMIST QUESTION (17). Can Islamists and the Far Left Work Together?

 

THE ISLAMIST QUESTION

17. Can Islamists and the Far Left Work Together?

When Ideological Enemies Discover Common Causes

Central question:

Can two political movements with fundamentally different visions of society cooperate when they identify a common enemy?

The question is deliberately provocative.

The far left traditionally draws from:

• Marxism;

• socialism;

• anti-capitalism;

• secularism or radical laïcité in some traditions;

• class politics;

• internationalism;

• anti-imperialism.

Islamist movements, by contrast, derive political legitimacy from a religious worldview and seek a greater role for Islamic norms and identity in public life.

They are not the same ideology.

They may disagree profoundly over:

• religion;

• gender;

• sexuality;

• secularism;

• the state;

• individual freedoms;

• social organisation;

• and the ultimate source of political legitimacy.

So why would they ever cooperate?

Because political alliances do not always require ideological agreement.

Sometimes they require only:

a common opponent, a common cause, or a common political objective.

And that is where the investigation begins.

The Historical Puzzle

The idea of cooperation between left-wing and Islamist currents did not begin with the Gaza war.

French pro-Palestinian activism has historically contained several distinct political traditions.

The French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) identifies four major strands in the development of French support for the Palestinian cause:

• Arab networks;

• left-wing Catholics;

• sections of the Gaullist movement;

• and the far left.

Over time, Muslim activists became increasingly prominent.

Sciences Po's historical account similarly traces the Palestinian cause through anti-colonial politics, immigration politics, the French left and the radical left long before the current generation of students.

This gives us an important warning:

Not every political convergence around Palestine is an Islamist-left alliance.

Sometimes it is simply the continuation of a decades-old solidarity movement.

But Something Changed

There is nevertheless a significant evolution.

Ifri has noted that alongside the older secular and left-wing Palestinian solidarity movement, a pan-Islamic dimension became increasingly visible, particularly from the 2000s onward. In some demonstrations, religious practices appeared that surprised activists from the earlier secular Palestinian movement.

That creates an important historical transition:

Earlier model

Palestine

→ anti-colonialism

→ internationalism

→ left-wing solidarity.

Later model

Palestine

→ Muslim solidarity

→ identity politics

→ religious activism.

Current environment

Both traditions can exist simultaneously.

That is the environment in which tactical cooperation becomes possible.

Ideological Enemies Can Still Share a Political Space

Consider the apparent contradiction.

A radical-left activist may say:

“Israel represents colonialism and Western imperialism.”

A Muslim activist may say:

“Palestinians are being oppressed because they are Muslims.”

Those explanations are not identical.

But both may arrive at:

“France should change its policy toward Israel and Gaza.”

That is enough to create cooperation on a specific campaign.

This is the fundamental distinction:

Shared action does not necessarily mean shared ideology.

The Coalition Model

The documentary should therefore stop thinking in terms of:

Left + Islamists = one movement

and instead investigate:

Issue coalition

Palestine

anti-racism

opposition to government policy

opposition to the political right

criticism of police/security policy

Temporary political cooperation

The participants may still disagree profoundly about almost everything else.

This is normal coalition politics.

The French Campus as a Laboratory

Universities provide an unusually useful environment for testing this.

The same campus can contain:

• FSE activists;

• EMF activists;

• independent Palestine committees;

• LFI supporters;

• NPA activists;

• environmental activists;

• anti-racist organisations;

• Jewish students;

• Muslim students;

• secular students;

• Christian students;

• international students.

They may disagree about religion.

But they can cooperate on:

a campus resolution concerning Gaza.

That does not prove an ideological merger.

It demonstrates issue-based cooperation.

The EMF–FSE Connection

This is where the documentary acquires a concrete case study.

In May 2026, Higher Education Minister Philippe Baptiste told the National Assembly that an EMF-supported candidate entered the CNOUS following an alliance between:

FSE — described by the minister as a radical student union close to LFI

and EMF.

He described the result as one elected substitute among the 54 members and substitutes of the CNOUS board. He also said government services were monitoring EMF's development and possible institutionalisation.

This is verified parliamentary evidence of an electoral alliance.

But notice what it does not prove.

It does not establish that:

• FSE is Islamist;

• EMF is far left;

• the two organisations share an ideology;

• they have a permanent alliance;

• the alliance extends beyond student elections;

• or either organisation controls the other.

The evidence establishes:

They cooperated in a specific institutional contest.

That is already significant.

Why Would FSE Cooperate With EMF?

The answer may be entirely strategic.

Suppose FSE wants:

• more votes;

• greater representation;

• stronger opposition to the political right;

• broader student mobilisation.

EMF wants:

• institutional representation;

• protection of Muslim students;

• influence over student policy;

• participation in university governance.

Their interests overlap.

Neither side needs to abandon its underlying ideology.

This is classic coalition behaviour.

The Government's Interpretation

The French government has interpreted the EMF issue through the lens of possible Islamist “entrisme.”

In Parliament, Minister Baptiste said the government was attentive to EMF's institutional development and possible rapprochements with other organisations. He specifically identified the FSE–EMF alliance as an example.

That is an important official claim.

But it must be labelled correctly:

Government assessment — not judicial finding.

The same minister also provided an important qualification.

He said intelligence work concerning universities was relatively marginal and characterised the number of people involved as extremely small relative to the overall student population.

That qualification is essential to the documentary.

The EMF Position

EMF publicly presents itself very differently.

The organisation describes itself as a student association focused on:

• student representation;

• social assistance;

• culture;

• academic support;

• civic engagement;

• combating discrimination.

It says it is independent of political parties.

It also explicitly rejects the characterization that it is a Muslim Brotherhood organisation.

Therefore the documentary should place the two claims beside each other:

EMF's position

Independent student organisation serving Muslim students and the wider student community.

French government/security concern

Organisation situated within or connected to a broader Islamist network.

The documentary should then investigate the evidence between those two descriptions.

The Muslim Brotherhood Question

The Interior Ministry's 2025 report specifically investigated the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in France. The ministry says senior officials were commissioned in April 2024 to document the reality of political Islam in France, and the report was published in May 2025.

The report is therefore an important primary source.

But there is a methodological problem.

There is a major difference between:

formal membership

and:

institutional proximity

and:

ideological similarity

and:

cooperation

and:

command.

These must not be collapsed.

The Five-Level Test

Every alleged “Islamist–left alliance” should be classified at one of five levels.

LEVEL 1 — Shared issue

Two organisations attend the same Palestine demonstration.

Weak evidence of alliance.

LEVEL 2 — Joint activity

They organise a demonstration together.

Evidence of operational cooperation.

LEVEL 3 — Institutional alliance

They run a joint electoral list or campaign.

Stronger evidence of political cooperation.

LEVEL 4 — Repeated strategic cooperation

The same personnel, funding, meetings and campaigns repeatedly overlap.

Evidence of an enduring network.

LEVEL 5 — Strategic political agreement

Documents or communications demonstrate deliberate coordination toward shared political objectives.

Strong evidence of an actual alliance.

This framework prevents the documentary from treating a photograph of two people at the same demonstration as proof of an ideological conspiracy.

Palestine Is the Most Important Test

The Gaza war has created the largest contemporary opportunity for these networks to interact.

Palestine already had a long history inside the French left.

The post-2023 mobilisation brought in a much wider range of Muslim youth and student activists.

Sciences Po's historical analysis notes that Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah increasingly became important actors in the Palestinian question after the late 20th century, while also stressing that anti-Zionism does not necessarily equal antisemitism.

That creates a complicated political ecosystem.

One demonstration can contain:

humanitarian activists

anti-imperialists

radical-left activists

Muslim identity activists

Islamist activists

without all of them sharing the same objectives.

The Critical Question: Who Sets the Agenda?

This is the forensic question.

Suppose FSE and EMF organise an event.

We need to know:

Who proposed it?

Who wrote the statement?

Who chose the speakers?

Who paid for it?

Who designed the posters?

Who promoted it online?

Who negotiated with the university?

Who recruited participants?

Who decided the slogans?

Who decided what was excluded?

This is far more revealing than simply asking:

“Were they both there?”

Personnel Overlap

The next investigation should map people, not merely organisations.

For example:

Person A

FSE → Palestine committee → another association.

Person B

EMF → FEMYSO → Palestine organisation.

Person C

LFI activist → student organisation → Palestine campaign.

Person D

University association → municipal politics → Muslim organisation.

Repeated personnel overlap can demonstrate a network.

But even then:

Network overlap ≠ central command.

People can belong to several organisations because they share political interests.

Funding Overlap

Money provides another test.

Investigate:

• university grants;

• CVEC funding;

• membership dues;

• donations;

• European grants;

• private foundations;

• political-party funding;

• event sponsorship;

• foreign funding.

The question is not:

“Did this organisation receive public money?”

The question is:

“Who received it, how much, for what purpose, and did the funds support the alleged political activity?”

A grant for a student food programme does not establish funding for Islamist mobilisation.

A grant explicitly financing political campaigning would be a very different matter.

The Senate Evidence

A May 2026 Senate question alleged that EMF-supported lists obtained:

• 11 CROUS seats in February 2026;

• 3 CNOUS seats in April 2026.

The same parliamentary question alleged that some EMF events at Nanterre and Lyon received CVEC funding.

But these are parliamentary allegations/questions, not final government findings.

That distinction should appear on screen.

CLAIM MADE IN PARLIAMENT

Government response

Official financial records

University records

Actual beneficiaries and expenditures

Only the last stages can establish the money trail.

A Particularly Interesting Alliance: FSE + EMF

The FSE–EMF relationship deserves its own forensic case study.

FSE publicly describes itself in explicitly radical-left terms, including:

• class struggle;

• anti-capitalism;

• anti-imperialism;

• anti-racism;

• anti-sexism.

EMF describes itself through Muslim ethics, student representation and civic engagement.

Those are different ideological languages.

Yet they found sufficient common ground to cooperate electorally.

That does not prove an ideological merger.

It demonstrates something potentially more important:

Political interests can overcome ideological distance.

The “Enemy of My Enemy” Mechanism

Temporary coalitions frequently form around perceived common opponents.

Potential common targets include:

• the political right;

• far-right student organisations;

• government security policy;

• police practices;

• Israeli government policy;

• university restrictions on Palestine activism.

A radical-left organisation might frame the struggle as:

anti-racism + anti-imperialism.

A Muslim organisation might frame it as:

protection of Muslim dignity + Palestinian rights.

Both can oppose the same policy.

That is sufficient for cooperation.

But Cooperation Has Limits

The documentary should also search for evidence of conflict between the two camps.

For example:

Gender

Would an explicitly feminist radical-left organisation accept Islamist views on gender?

LGBTQ+ rights

Would the coalition survive disagreement over sexuality?

Secularism

Would radical-left secularists tolerate religious political claims?

Religious authority

Would Muslim activists accept Marxist anti-religious traditions?

Political violence

Would both sides accept the same definition of legitimate resistance?

Democracy

Would they agree about the role of religion in law?

If the coalition collapses whenever these issues arise, that would support:

temporary tactical alliance

rather than:

ideological convergence.

The Red-Green Alliance Hypothesis

We can now formulate the hypothesis scientifically.

H1 — No meaningful alliance

The apparent cooperation consists primarily of coincidental participation around Palestine and anti-racism.

H2 — Tactical alliance

Organisations cooperate on specific issues while retaining fundamentally different ideologies.

H3 — Electoral alliance

The organisations cooperate principally because both seek institutional representation and political influence.

H4 — Network convergence

Personnel and organisational relationships increasingly overlap across campaigns.

H5 — Strategic ideological convergence

A durable political coalition is emerging around a common worldview.

H6 — Islamist exploitation of left-wing infrastructure

Islamist actors use broader left-wing campaigns to reach audiences they could not otherwise reach.

H7 — Left-wing exploitation of Muslim networks

Radical-left organisations use Muslim identity networks to expand their political base.

Several hypotheses can be true simultaneously.

The Most Important Distinction

There are actually three different questions.

Question A

Do individuals from the two political environments cooperate?

There is evidence that they do in particular contexts.

Question B

Do organisations cooperate?

The FSE–EMF CNOUS alliance provides a concrete example.

Question C

Do they share a common long-term political project?

That remains much harder to establish.

The documentary should never use evidence for A or B as automatic proof of C.

The 2026 Student Revolt

Now connect this back to the central documentary.

The school movement began with educational grievances.

The evidence currently does not establish that Islamist organisations created it.

Nor does it establish that the radical left created it.

But once a movement becomes large enough, established political networks have incentives to enter.

That produces:

an opportunity structure.

A spontaneous movement creates:

people

attention

infrastructure

political energy

media visibility.

Existing organisations can attempt to connect themselves to that energy.

That is not necessarily manipulation.

It is often ordinary politics.

The Critical Timeline

We should construct a chronology:

BEFORE THE STUDENT REVOLT

What relationships already existed between:

• FSE;

• EMF;

• Palestine committees;

• LFI;

• other activist networks?

SEPTEMBER 2026

The school revolt begins.

Were these organisations involved immediately?

Or did they enter later?

OCTOBER 2026

The movement expands.

Do these organisations begin providing:

• logistics;

• lawyers;

• media;

• transport;

• political messaging;

• protest coordination?

The timing is critical.

If an organisation appears after the movement becomes large, that supports opportunistic participation.

If evidence shows it was preparing the mobilisation before the first protests, the interpretation changes.

The Digital Forensic Test

Search:

• TikTok;

• Instagram;

• X;

• Telegram;

• Facebook;

• student WhatsApp groups where legally accessible;

• public Discord channels.

Track:

first appearance

resharing

translation

graphic design

calls to action

location changes

coordination.

The key question:

Did the same organisational network repeatedly initiate mobilisation across apparently independent schools?

If yes, that would be significant.

If content spreads primarily through peer-to-peer imitation, the evidence points toward decentralised diffusion.

The Language Test

Political alliances leave linguistic fingerprints.

Compare statements from:

• FSE;

• EMF;

• Palestine committees;

• LFI;

• FEMYSO;

• other activist organisations.

Look for repeated phrases concerning:

• colonialism;

• genocide;

• Islamophobia;

• racism;

• police violence;

• imperialism;

• Zionism;

• secularism;

• French foreign policy.

Then determine:

Who introduced the terminology first?

and:

Did other organisations subsequently adopt it?

That would help identify ideological diffusion.

The Hamas Boundary

This investigation must maintain a hard analytical boundary.

There is a fundamental difference between:

support for Palestinian civilians

and

support for Palestinian statehood

and

opposition to Israeli government policy

and

support for Hamas

and

glorification of attacks on civilians

and

organisational support for Hamas.

These cannot be treated as interchangeable.

A coalition around Palestinian statehood does not prove an Islamist alliance.

A specific activist's endorsement of Hamas does not prove that an entire student organisation endorses Hamas.

Every claim must be tied to the individual or organisation actually making it.

The Anti-Semitism Boundary

The same principle applies to antisemitism.

Criticism of Israel is not inherently antisemitic.

But the investigation should identify:

• explicit anti-Jewish statements;

• collective blame;

• conspiracy theories;

• Holocaust denial;

• exclusion of Jews because they are Jewish;

• glorification of antisemitic violence.

The documentary should quote and contextualise specific statements rather than assign collective guilt.

That is especially important because Palestine activism contains both legitimate political criticism and, in some cases, documented antisemitic rhetoric.

The Government's Counterargument

The government and some French political figures argue that Islamist networks have developed strategies of influence within civil society and institutions.

The Interior Ministry's 2025 report is the principal official source for that broader concern.

But an important counterweight comes from the government's own higher-education minister.

He explicitly said the intelligence picture concerning universities was limited and that the number of people involved was extremely small relative to the student population.

That creates an important documentary paradox:

The state can identify a potential network while simultaneously acknowledging that it represents a very small fraction of university students.

Both facts can be true.

The Opposite Counterargument

The far-left and Muslim student organisations can make an equally important argument:

Coalition is not conspiracy.

If two organisations cooperate against the far right, oppose racism and support Palestine, that may simply be democratic coalition politics.

The burden of proof therefore rests on showing something beyond cooperation:

• hidden coordination;

• ideological recruitment;

• financial dependency;

• organisational control;

• systematic political direction.

Without such evidence, the conclusion should remain:

tactical cooperation.

What Would Prove a Deeper Alliance?

The documentary should establish a threshold.

Strong evidence would include:

1. Joint strategy documents

Explicit plans for cooperation.

2. Repeated joint campaigns

Not one isolated demonstration.

3. Shared personnel

Leaders moving between organisations.

4. Shared financing

Money crossing organisational boundaries.

5. Shared infrastructure

Offices, communications systems, event logistics.

6. Shared recruitment

One organisation directing supporters toward another.

7. Strategic messaging

Evidence that organisations deliberately coordinate narratives.

8. Common political objectives

Agreement extending beyond one issue.

That would move the story from:

coalition

toward:

political network.

What Would Falsify the Alliance Hypothesis?

An investigation must also ask what evidence would disprove it.

Suppose we find:

• no recurring personnel overlap;

• no shared financing;

• no common strategy;

• no coordinated messaging;

• no recruitment;

• no operational dependence;

• repeated ideological disagreements;

• cooperation limited to Palestine or anti-far-right campaigns.

Then the stronger alliance hypothesis weakens considerably.

That is just as important a finding.

The Most Interesting Possibility

The evidence may eventually point to neither:

“There is no alliance.”

nor:

“There is one unified Islamist-left movement.”

Instead, we may find:

A flexible ecosystem of temporary alliances.

One campaign:

FSE + EMF

Another:

LFI + Palestine committees

Another:

human-rights groups + Muslim associations

Another:

student unions + trade unions

Participants cooperate where interests overlap and separate where ideology divides them.

That is much closer to how many modern political movements actually operate.

The Bigger Political Question

This leads to a broader question about French democracy.

Can radically different political movements cooperate without becoming one movement?

Absolutely.

The more important question is:

At what point does tactical cooperation become political dependency?

If:

A needs B's activists

and

B needs A's institutional legitimacy

then a mutually beneficial relationship can develop.

Over time, that can reshape political organisations themselves.

The 2027 Dimension

The timing makes this particularly significant.

France is approaching the 2027 presidential election.

Palestine has become a major dividing issue inside the French left. A September 2026 debate among left-wing presidential contenders showed Gaza and the question of cooperation with LFI producing sharp political divisions.

This means Palestine is no longer merely a foreign-policy question.

It is increasingly embedded in:

• French left-wing coalition politics;

• questions of political identity;

• relations with Muslim voters;

• debates over antisemitism;

• relations with Israel;

• and the future configuration of the French left.

That makes the student movement politically important even if it never becomes an electoral organisation.

The Documentary's Central Test

The investigation should ultimately ask:

When the far left and Islamist networks appear together, are we looking at coincidence, coalition, convergence or coordination?

Those four words should become the analytical vocabulary of this episode.

COINCIDENCE

They happen to participate in the same event.

COALITION

They deliberately cooperate on a specific cause.

CONVERGENCE

Their political positions increasingly overlap.

COORDINATION

They deliberately organise activities together.

The evidence required for each level is different.

PROVISIONAL FINDING

The evidence already establishes that politically distinct organisations can and do cooperate in specific French student and institutional contexts.

The FSE–EMF CNOUS electoral alliance is a concrete 2026 example.

French Palestine activism also has a long history in which secular left-wing, anti-colonial and Muslim currents have occupied overlapping political spaces.

But that does not establish a unified “Islamist-left movement.”

Nor does it establish that Islamist organisations control French student mobilisation.

The strongest evidence-based proposition at this stage is narrower:

Different ideological networks can form tactical alliances when their interests overlap, particularly around Palestine, anti-racism, opposition to the far right and criticism of government policy.

The investigative question is therefore not whether they are secretly identical.

They are not.

The real question is:

How much political cooperation can occur between ideological opponents before the cooperation itself becomes a meaningful political network?

And there is one more question.

Perhaps even more important:

Who gains more from the relationship?

Does the radical left gain access to new constituencies?

Does Islamist activism gain access to secular political institutions?

Do both gain?

Or does the relationship primarily benefit individual organisations while the broader student movement remains fundamentally independent?

That is the evidence trail for the next stage of the investigation.

NEXT INVESTIGATIVE STEP

Episode 18 — The Network Map

Who Knows Whom, Who Funds Whom, and Who Works With Whom?

Instead of another ideological debate, the next episode should become almost forensic.

Build a database of:

People

→ organisations

→ universities

→ student unions

→ Palestine committees

→ political parties

→ NGOs

→ funding

→ events

→ campaigns

→ digital accounts

→ electoral alliances.

Then calculate:

• personnel overlap;

• organisational overlap;

• event overlap;

• funding overlap;

• messaging overlap;

• leadership movement;

• campaign coordination.

The question becomes brutally simple:

Is there actually a network—or are we mistaking a collection of temporary political friendships for one?

That is where the documentary can move from political argument to network forensics.

By Jugo Ikeji-Uju. 

admin@ubuntusafa.com 

sappertekinc@gmail.com

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