A compound shock model (demographic decline + quantum monopoly + climate stress), and quantify Africa’s pole probability under three integration speeds (slow, moderate, rapid).

 

Below is a structured compound shock model integrating:

1. Demographic decline (China + Europe aging)

2. Quantum monopoly (asymmetric breakthrough)

3. Climate stress acceleration (water scarcity, heat zones, migration pressure)

Then I quantify Africa’s pole probability under three institutional integration speeds.

This is a systemic stress test, not a forecast.

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PART I — Compound Shock Model (2035–2055)

Shock 1: Demographic Decline

• China: severe working-age contraction

• Europe: aging + fiscal burden

• Japan & Korea: extreme aging

• Africa & India: youth bulge

Impact:

• Slower GDP growth in aging poles

• Fiscal stress → defense spending constraints

• Greater reliance on automation

Net effect: structural weakening of incumbent poles’ growth momentum.

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Shock 2: Quantum Monopoly

Assume a single actor achieves operational fault-tolerant quantum computing dominance.

Most plausible candidates:

• United States

• China

Immediate effects:

• Encryption collapse asymmetry

• Intelligence dominance

• Optimization superiority (logistics, AI training, materials science)

• Strategic opacity

This sharply increases technological concentration.

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Shock 3: Climate Stress Acceleration

Assume:

• Severe heat belts expand

• Water stress intensifies

• Coastal flooding increases

• Migration flows accelerate

Regions under highest stress:

• Sahel belt

• South Asia

• Parts of Middle East

States with adaptive capacity (capital + governance) absorb shocks better.

Climate acts as an institutional stress amplifier.

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Combined Systemic Effects

Now we layer the shocks:

A. Aging Poles + Quantum Monopoly

If the U.S. wins quantum monopoly:

• U.S. offsets demographic drag via AI + QC optimization

• China suffers relatively greater slowdown

If China wins quantum monopoly:

• China partially offsets demographic contraction

• U.S. strategic dominance weakens

Quantum monopoly reduces multipolarity.

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B. Climate + Demographic Stress in Europe

Europe faces:

• Aging

• Climate migration

• Energy transition costs

Without federalization:

Europe’s PCI (Pole Capacity Index) likely drops below pole threshold.

Tripolar scenario probability declines sharply.

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C. Africa Under Climate Stress

Africa is bifurcated:

1. High-risk climate exposure (Sahel, Horn of Africa)

2. High demographic growth

3. Mineral leverage

4. Potential renewable abundance

Climate can either:

• Destabilize governance

• Or accelerate integration (shared adaptation infrastructure)

Outcome depends entirely on integration speed.

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Adjusted 2050 Probability Matrix Under Compound Shock

Configuration	Pre-Shock Adjusted	Compound Shock
A — U.S.–China Duopoly	30%	40% (if quantum monopoly exists)
B — Tripolar (EU included)	16–18%	10%
C — Diffuse Multipolar	18%	12%
D — Quantum Concentration Dominance	10%	20%
E — Fusion Flattened	8%	6%
F — African Leapfrog	8%	Variable (see below)
G — Space Stratification	8%	12%

Key conclusion:

Compound shocks favor concentration, not diffusion.

Quantum advantage compresses hierarchy.
Climate stress weakens marginal actors.
Demography slows aging powers but does not automatically dethrone them if quantum offsets productivity loss.

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PART II — Africa’s Pole Probability Under Three Integration Speeds

We now quantify Africa’s chance of achieving systemic pole status by 2050 under fusion-enabled compute and compound shock.

We define pole threshold as:

PCI ≥ 0.75 sustained across continental bloc.

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Scenario 1: Slow Integration

Characteristics:

• Fragmented regulatory systems

• Weak African Union enforcement

• Limited cross-border grid integration

• Climate instability unmanaged

• Continued mineral export dependence

Institutional Cohesion (I): ~0.40–0.50
Compute (C): ~0.50 (fusion helps but chips external)
Energy (E): ~0.75 (fusion or renewables scale)

PCI ≈ 0.4(0.50) + 0.3(0.75) + 0.3(0.45)
≈ 0.20 + 0.225 + 0.135
≈ 0.56

Below pole threshold.

Pole Probability: ~5%

Africa remains arena or regional bloc at best.

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Scenario 2: Moderate Integration

Characteristics:

• Regional blocs consolidate (ECOWAS, EAC, SADC deepen)

• Shared digital markets

• Continental AI regulatory harmonization

• Climate adaptation infrastructure coordinated

Institutional Cohesion: ~0.60
Compute: ~0.65
Energy: ~0.80

PCI ≈ 0.4(0.65) + 0.3(0.80) + 0.3(0.60)
≈ 0.26 + 0.24 + 0.18
≈ 0.68

Approaching threshold but not consistently pole-level.

Pole Probability: ~15%

Africa becomes major regional AI-energy bloc, not full systemic pole.

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Scenario 3: Rapid Integration (High-Coherence Bloc)

Characteristics:

• Strong African Union fiscal authority

• Coordinated defense-industrial development

• Mineral-to-semiconductor equity swaps

• Continental energy grid (fusion + renewables)

• Large AI research clusters emerge

• Stable governance reform

Institutional Cohesion: ~0.75
Compute: ~0.75
Energy: ~0.85

PCI ≈ 0.4(0.75) + 0.3(0.85) + 0.3(0.75)
≈ 0.30 + 0.255 + 0.225
≈ 0.78

Above pole threshold.

Pole Probability: ~30–35%

Under compound shock (aging North + climate stress + quantum concentration elsewhere), Africa’s demographic growth becomes an asset if governance scales.

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Final Structural Takeaways

1️⃣ Compound shocks centralize power unless institutional reform occurs.

Quantum monopoly increases concentration.
Climate stress punishes weak governance.
Demographic decline slows incumbents but does not automatically dethrone them.

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2️⃣ Africa’s probability is integration-sensitive.

Integration Speed	Pole Probability
Slow	~5%
Moderate	~15%
Rapid	~30–35%

Africa’s structural ceiling is no longer constrained by energy (if fusion succeeds).
It is constrained by institutional cohesion.

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3️⃣ Most Likely Compound Outcome (Weighted)

If we combine shock probabilities and institutional inertia:

• U.S.–China concentrated order: ~40%

• Quantum-dominant hierarchical compression: ~20%

• African pole emergence: ~10–15% overall weighted

• Tripolar EU-inclusive order: ~10%

• Diffuse multipolarity: ~12%

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Core Insight

Under compound stress:

Power flows toward actors that combine:

• Automation

• Institutional coherence

• Semiconductor access

• Climate adaptation capacity

Africa’s demographic expansion becomes strategic leverage only if governance coherence scales with it.

The Candle That Lit Another One candle feared losing its flame if it lit others.

 

The Candle That Lit Another.  

One candle feared losing its flame if it lit others. 

But the room grew brighter, and its own flame never diminished. 

 Core lesson: Sharing doesn’t reduce you. 

Expansion angle: Mentorship, leadership, service.

In a quiet room stood a single candle on a wooden table.

Its flame was small but steady. It had burned for a long time, and it guarded its light carefully. The room was dim, and the corners were thick with shadow.

Nearby sat unlit candles—new, untouched, waiting.

The candle watched them with worry.

“If I light them,” it thought, “my flame will grow smaller. I will fade faster. I must protect what I have.”

So it burned alone.

One evening, a hand entered the room. It lifted the candle and tilted it toward another wick. The first candle trembled, certain this was the beginning of its end.

The flame touched.

Light leapt.

The second candle burned bright.

Then a third. Then a fourth.

The room changed. Shadows retreated. Faces became visible. Warmth spread where cold had lived.

The first candle felt itself still burning—unchanged, steady, alive.

It realized something it had never been taught: fire is not divided by sharing.

From then on, the candle no longer feared being used. It welcomed each unlit wick, knowing that lighting others did not shorten its purpose—it fulfilled it.

And the room learned a quiet truth:

What is given in service multiplies without loss.

Burhan Rejects President Trump’s Plan to End the War in Sudan

 

The plan calls for an immediate truce between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, permanent ceasefire, civilian-led political transition in Sudan, and sustained humanitarian access.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, have rejected President Donald Trump’s proposed plan to end Sudan’s devastating civil war.

Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged remarks made by US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos, who presented the proposal at the UN Security Council on Friday, but said that “did not mean Sudan will automatically accept or approve it.”

The American blueprint, pushed by Boulos, demands “an immediate humanitarian truce, sustained humanitarian access and protection of civilians, a permanent ceasefire and credible security arrangements, and an inclusive, civilian-led political transition.” Boulos claimed these measures would place Sudan on “a long-term path toward recovery and reconstruction that restores stability and opportunity for the Sudanese people.”

Burhan, too, opposed the US plan. Speaking at a military cadets’ graduation ceremony at Karary University in Khartoum, on Tuesday, the Sudanese army chief said military operations against Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will continue until the rebellion is eliminated or they surrender. He offered amnesty for those who lay down arms.

To cling to authority, Burhan has proclaimed that the only path to ending the war is either the RSF’s unconditional surrender or the SAF’s outright, total military triumph over its adversary.

The US plan stems from the Quad, an informal coalition comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, building on the Jeddah Agreement of May 2023, which both the SAF and its bitter rival, the RSF, had previously endorsed. Boulos even managed to drag the two warring factions, the SAF and RSF, into indirect talks in Washington, in October.

Until recently, al-Burhan stood isolated in his uncompromising demand for victory and continued military dominance in Sudan’s postwar era. But a dramatic shift occurred in January, triggered by escalating fallout between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh abandoned its earlier insistence on sidelining both the SAF and RSF from power, pivoting instead to fully endorse Burhan’s uncompromising “war until victory” stance.

This reversal crystallized at the Security Council session. After perfunctorily thanking Boulos for his conflict-ending efforts, Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Representative, Abdulaziz Al-Wasil, downgraded the Quad’s initiative, describing it as merely “one element to support a purely Sudanese political process to create the appropriate conditions for reaching a sustainable solution.” This marked a Saudi retreat from prior commitments, reframing the Quad plan as unacceptable “foreign diktats” that must never be imposed on a “Sudanese-led political process… that preserves state institutions.” For Riyadh, those “state institutions” mean the SAF, which must crush the RSF, steer the political transition, and potentially entrench its grip on power indefinitely.

The Saudi reversal on Sudan first reared their head last month, when Riyadh funded arms procurement for SAF, enabling a reported $1.5 billion deal with Pakistan for advanced weaponry, including fighter jets such as JF-17s, light attack aircraft, over 200 drones, and sophisticated air defense systems. The move marked a decisive pivot from Riyadh’s earlier neutral mediation stance toward unequivocal support for al-Burhan’s forces, despite a UN arms embargo on all warring parties in Sudan and ongoing diplomatic efforts for peace.

But according to media reports, Pakistan balked at selling arms, particularly the J-17 fighter jets, to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), citing concerns over violating the UN arms embargo on Sudan.

Buying arms from Pakistan was only one way of shoring up SAF against RSF. Earlier this month, The New York Times reported that Egypt has been secretly operating a drone base in its Western Desert for at least six months, launching Turkish-made Akinci strikes against the RSF, according to satellite imagery, flight data, videos, and officials.

The intervention of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey on behalf of SAF has partially shifted the balance of the war. Following a string of defeats inflicted by RSF, including at al-Fasher, where the RSF is widely accused of committing war crimes, the SAF finally broke a months-long siege of Kadugli in South Kordofan state.

However, prevailing in a single battle does not guarantee the SAF ultimate victory in the broader conflict. Some experts believe that, given Sudan’s vast territory and the severe resource and manpower constraints facing both the SAF and RSF, outright victory for either side remains improbable. The most likely scenario is a prolonged stalemate, perpetuating a grinding civil war with no clear end in sight.

Cyber Deterrence Without Illusions: Europe’s Escalation Dilemma

 

The divided political structure of Europe makes it uniquely vulnerable to cyberwarfare from external actors—and European security institutions must devise better ways to respond.

Cybersecurity is now a permanent feature of Europe’s strategic environment. Cyber deterrence is not. Despite years of regulatory expansion, institutional reform, and alliance coordination, Europe still struggles to influence adversary behavior in cyberspace in any sustained way. This is not because policymakers underestimate the threat. Rather, it is because deterrence, as traditionally understood, fits poorly with how power is actually exercised in the digital domain.

How Deterrence Works—and Doesn’t

Classical military deterrence depended on relatively stable thresholds and legible escalation pathways. Adversaries were expected to recognize not only the existence of retaliatory capabilities, but also the circumstances under which those capabilities would be employed and the political resolve supporting their use. In that sense, deterrence functioned less through the promise of escalation than through its credibility. It was effective because intent, capacity, and consequence were legible to allies and adversaries alike.

Cyberspace lacks these stabilizing conditions. Most cyber operations are designed to remain incremental, ambiguous, and persistent. They are calibrated to exploit legal uncertainty and political hesitation rather than provoke decisive retaliation. The strategic effect is not crisis escalation, but continuous pressure applied below any clearly-defined red line.

Europe is especially vulnerable to this pattern. European economies, public services, and defense supply chains are all deeply digitized, while authority over security, response, and escalation remains fragmented across national and supranational institutions. Individual cyber incidents are rarely dramatic enough to justify a heavy-handed collective response. Instead, their significance lies in accumulation; over time, they degrade confidence, extract intelligence, and test institutional cohesion. Deterrence struggles in an environment where no single incident carries decisive weight.

Europe Can’t Act with One Policy on Cybersecurity

European policy reflects this tension. Deterrence is frequently invoked, but it is rarely operationalized. Red lines are left implicit, and thresholds for response remain deliberately flexible. Consequences for adversaries are often improvised rather than pre-signaled. Critically, attribution—identifying the culprit behind a cyberattack—has improved, but agreement on how to act on it remains uneven. These features reflect Europe’s challenging political reality: a union of sovereign states with disparate and sometimes divergent legal authorities, strategic cultures, and tolerance for escalation.

This institutional reality is compounded by a structural mismatch between governance and deterrence. Conventional cybersecurity decisions remain largely national, and at the European level, they sit primarily within regulatory and civilian frameworks. Deterrence, by contrast, is traditionally articulated through military and alliance structures, most clearly within NATO. And though NATO has declared that a devastating cyberattack could trigger Article 5 of the NATO charter, in practice, there is no specificity as to what an attack of this nature would look like.

This helps explain Europe’s reliance on deterrence by denial. Resilience, redundancy, and recovery align well with European governance traditions. Regulatory instruments such as NIS2 and the Digital Operational Resilience Act aim to raise the security baseline across sectors. Denial reduces vulnerability and limits damage, and it is scalable and politically acceptable. However, it does not deter on its own. It lowers adversary returns without imposing costs, and mitigation is not the same as influence.

Punitive deterrence is more constrained. Effective punishment requires credible signaling, predictable escalation, and willingness to impose costs. In cyberspace, these conditions are difficult to sustain. Only a small number of European states maintain acknowledged offensive cyber capabilities. At the EU level, punitive tools are largely diplomatic, including through sanctions and public attribution of cyberattacks. These matter, of course, but their deterrent effect depends on consistency and coordination—both of which are hard to maintain across institutions and capitals.

NATO’s Cybersecurity Policy Is Ambiguous by Design

NATO adds another layer of complexity. The alliance has recognized cyberspace as an operational domain and affirmed that cyberattacks could, in principle, trigger collective defense, Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Yet this ambiguity is intentional. Allies differ in how they assess severity, intent, and proportionality. Intelligence-sharing has improved, but legal authorities and escalation thresholds remain national.

Structural dependencies further weaken deterrence. Europe relies heavily on non-European providers for cloud infrastructure and cybersecurity services. This shapes not only markets but strategic posture. Visibility, response capacity, and escalation options are unevenly distributed. Smaller states often lack comprehensive threat awareness and depend on a narrow set of private actors for situational insight. These asymmetries create seams that adversaries can and often do exploit.

The core problem is institutional rather than technical. Cyber deterrence in Europe is constrained less by capability than by governance. Decision-making remains slow relative to the speed of operations, crisis response is fragmented, and cross-domain coordination between civilian, military, economic, and legal tools remains inconsistent.

Adversaries understand this environment well. They exploit ambiguity, legal complexity, and procedural delay to sustain pressure without crossing a line that would force response.

Cyber deterrence should therefore not be understood as a binary condition. Instead, it is a process. It depends on reducing adversary gains through denial, raising costs through coordinated response, and embedding cyber considerations into broader escalation planning. Cyberspace can no longer be treated as a regulatory silo or technical specialty, but must become a primary arena of strategic competition—albeit one below the threshold of war.

Europe’s challenge is not a lack of strategy. It is the persistent gap between ambition and execution. Until signaling, crisis management, and cross-domain coordination become routine rather than exceptional, cyber deterrence will remain a concept that reassures policymakers more than it restrains adversaries.

Why the US Marine Corps Isn’t Adopting the M7 Rifle After All

 

The Marines may have backtracked on the rifle after a US Army expert disparaged it at an exhibition in Washington, DC, last year.

The United States Marine Corps has increasingly made clear that it isn’t a “Second Army,” and this month also confirmed it won’t adopt the SIG Sauer-designed M7 rifle, opting to retain its M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle. Task and Purpose first reported that the USMC rejected the US Army’s M7, which was selected for the Next Generation Squad Weapons (NGSW) program to replace the M4 carbine and M249 light machine gun.

“The Marine Corps will retain the M27 for our close combat formations as it best aligns with our unique service requirements, amphibious doctrinal employment of weapons, and distinct modernization priorities, while ensuring seamless interoperability across the Joint force and with coalition partners,” a USMC spokesperson told Task & Purpose in an email, but didn’t offer any further information as why the service made the decision.

However, the spokesperson added, “We will continue to monitor development of the M7 [Next Generation Squad Weapon rifle] to inform future requirements.”

Did the Marines Listen to One Soldier?

The US Marine Corps had never officially moved forward with the M7, and in May 2020, the Marine Corps Systems Command even backtracked after it was reported that it would replace the M27 with the NGSW.

Perhaps some Marines listened to what an Army soldier had to say about the M7’s predecessor, the experimental XM7, last year at the Modern Day Marine exhibition in Washington, DC.

Captain Braden Trent, US Army, presented evidence gathered on the XM7 and offered the very blunt conclusion that it is “unfit for use as a modern service rifle.”

Trent added, “The XM7 is a tactically outdated service rifle that would be better classified as a designated marksman rifle, if that.”

As previously reported, the XM7 was based on SIG Sauer’s MCX line, an evolution of the AR-15/M16 rifles used by the military for nearly six decades.

That may have given it a slight advantage over the competing offerings in the NGSW program, with the key differences in the operation. Instead of the direct impingement system found in the AR-15/M16, the MCX utilized a gas piston operating mechanism.

The key benefit was improved reliability, but it comes at a weight trade-off, as the gas piston is heavier. However, the XM7 offered greater range and stopping power, requirements that were borne of experiences in Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Both the XM7 rifle and XM250 automatic rifle were to be chambered for the newly developed 6.8x51mm Common Cartridge, which was also designated by the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI) as .277 SIG Fury.

The cartridge was developed to be “midway” between the 5.56x45mm NATO and the 7.62x51mm NATO in bore diameter, even though it is dimensionally similar to the latter round. It should not be confused with the 6.8x43mm Remington cartridge, also developed in recent years.

The Common Cartridge was shown to stop an adversary with a single round, whereas the 5.56 NATO cartridge fired by the M4 required multiple rounds.

In theory, this all sounds good. But Trent based his warnings on how the XM7 has been used in testing, where it hasn’t quite lived up to its promise.

Soldiers complained of the 20-round magazine, which limited the amount of ammunition available in a firefight. In addition, the XM7 is heavier than the M4, and modern tactics still call for engaging a potential adversary at 300 meters or less, negating its longer-range accuracy.

A bigger concern is that the barrel showed excessive wear after just 2,000 rounds.

The M27 Rifle Is the Rifle the Marines Know and Love

The other consideration is that the USMC selected its M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR), based on the Heckler & Koch, not all that long ago. It was first employed in combat in Afghanistan in 2011, initially to replace the M249, but it has since evolved and replaced the M16A4 and M4A1 as well.

The M27 is still chambered for the 5.56 round, and therefore doesn’t have the stopping power of the XM7’s heavier cartridge, but Marines have touted its greater accuracy and range than the M4. It also employs a short-stroke gas piston system that helps keep the action cleaner and cooler.

An advantage of the 5.56 cartridge is that the Marines can carry more of it, which may be necessary when landing on distant beaches and engaging the enemy at close range. 

A Major US Air Base in Utah Just Retired the A-10 Warthog for Good

Hill Air Force Base is home to the Ogden Air Logistics Complex (ALC), which maintained the US Air Force’s Warthog fleet for decades.

All good things come to an end, and for Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah, that means saying goodbye to the famed Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II, an aircraft that earned the unofficial nickname “Warthog” due to its rugged, utilitarian appearance. Initially not considered an “attractive” aircraft, the Warthog moniker has become a term of endearment for a tough—at times seemingly unstoppable—close air support (CAS) aircraft.

This month marks the official end of the Thunderbolt II program at Hill AFB, as the Ogden Air Logistics Complex prepares to see its final A-10 head to retirement.

“The departure of the A-10 depot maintenance mission marks the end of an era for the 571st Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, which will deactivate following completion of its last A‑10,” the 75th Air Base Wing explained, further noting it will close out a mission that has been carried on for nearly three decades at the Utah facility.

“This mission has been a point of pride for the entire complex,” said Brig. Gen. Hall Sebren, Ogden Air Logistics Complex (ALC) commander. “The A‑10 came to Hill because of the skill and dedication of our workforce, and it stayed here because that expertise only grew stronger with time. Our maintainers extended the life of this aircraft again and again, and they did it with a level of pride and professionalism that has become part of Hill’s identity.”

The A-10 Warthog Is the US Air Force’s Flying Tank

• Year Introduced: 1979
• Number Built: 713 (~160 still in service)
• Length: 53 ft 4 in (16.16 m)
• Height: 14 ft 8 in (4.42 m)
• Wingspan: 57 ft 6 in (17.42 m)
• Weight (MTOW): 51,000 lbs (22,950 kg)
• Engines: Two (2) General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbofans
• Top Speed: 420 mph (Mach 0.56)
• Range: 800 miles (695 nautical miles)
• Service Ceiling: 45,000 ft (13,636 m)
• Loadout: One 30mm GAU-8/A seven-barrel Gatling gun; up to 16,000 pounds (7,200 kilograms) of mixed ordnance on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage pylon stations
• Aircrew: 1

Production of the A-10 Thunderbolt II began in 1972, and the aircraft officially entered service with the United States Air Force in 1977. The A-10’s short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability permitted it to operate from airstrips close to front lines. The aircraft could also be serviced at forward base areas with limited facilities due to its simple design.

The A-10 was first deployed during Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 American invasion of Grenada, where it provided air cover for the United States Marine Corps but did not fire its weapons. It wasn’t until the Gulf War in 1991 that the aircraft first took part in combat operations. A-10s successfully shot down two Iraqi helicopters with the GAU-8 and took part in numerous sorties against Iraqi Republican Guard ground targets.

Supporters of the A-10 note that it offers excellent maneuverability at low airspeeds and altitude while maintaining a highly accurate weapons-delivery platform. The Thunderbolt II can loiter near battle areas for extended periods, perform austere landings, and operate under 1,000-foot ceilings (303.3 meters) with 1.5-mile (2.4 kilometers) visibility. The supporters also argue that no other aircraft, notably the F-35 Lightning II, can fill the Thunderbolt II’s role.

Ogden ALC Will Miss the A-10

Hill AFB’s Ogden ALC first performed depot-level maintenance of the A-10 in 1998, and it has since become the US Air Force’s “primary location for structural repair, wing replacements, and major overhauls.  The 309th Aircraft Maintenance Group manages A‑10 depot maintenance and has overseen thousands of A‑10 inductions over the years.”

The facility was once staffed by “hundreds of maintainers, sheet‑metal technicians, engineers, and logisticians.” The team carried out the major work on the aircraft, including structural refurbishment and re-winging, to ensure the aging Thunderbolts would be ready to strike for years to come. 

The team tackled everything from complex structural refurbishment to a major re‑winging effort that kept the fleet viable for many additional years.

“We have had maintainers who have worked on the A‑10 for decades,” said Col. Ryan Nash, commander of the 309th AMXG. “They know every inch of this aircraft. They’ve trained generations of maintainers, and they’ve poured their hearts into keeping the Warthog in the fight. Watching the last jet roll out is emotional for all of us.” 

How US Strikes on Iran Can Aid the Protest Movement

 

US and Israeli strikes on Iran should actively degrade the regime’s ability to kill protesters—including by directly targeting the Basij troops working to suppress them.

As the United States’ efforts at diplomacy with Iran stall, the US military is moving additional assets into the Middle East in preparation for war. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refuses to dismantle the Islamic Republic’s uranium enrichment capacity and shields the ballistic missile program from negotiations. If talks collapse, the question is not simply whether the United States can use force, but how to align military action with Iran’s ongoing protest movement so that pressure accelerates regime fracture rather than suppresses it.

Israel’s June 2025 strikes inside Iran, codenamed “Operation Rising Lion,” were an early attempt to link internal unrest with external pressure on the clerical regime; the name itself invoked Iran’s pre-1979 imagery in a plea for the Islamic Republic’s overthrow. Despite Israeli efforts to spur protests, however, Iranians stayed home as contradictory messaging from Washington and Jerusalem paired calls to rise up with evacuation warnings. Iranians also tended to view Israel as initiating the conflict rather than responding to regime aggression, thereby muddying the political framing—even though the strikes also failed to trigger a rally-round-the-flag effect for Tehran. Force alone did not mobilize the streets because it was not synchronized with a coherent political narrative inside Iran.

Nearly nine months later, the political environment is different. Iranians answered Trump’s calls for protests and pleaded for American intervention, regarding US action as indispensable help rather than the start of a new confrontation. After Iran accepted the aid of foreign militiamen from its Iraqi and Lebanese terror proxies to kill unarmed Iranian protesters, the protest movement appears far more willing to tolerate foreign intervention from its allies abroad. Ultimately, Iranians view the unrest as a revolutionary rupture centered on clear leadership and a defined transition plan that places Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi at the helm.

Airstrikes Can Aid Iran’s Protest Movement—if Timed Correctly

If Trump launches an extensive campaign resembling the 12-Day War, it would likely target senior leadership and missile stockpiles. Crucially, it should also include the forces actively suppressing protesters, paired with disciplined sequencing and direct communication to Iranians. Clear guidance on when and where to mobilize would reduce the risk of civilians entering strike zones and would extend momentum beyond Tehran into major provincial cities. Any prospective strategy should measure success not only by battlefield damage, but also by whether it shifts the internal balance of power without drawing the United States into another ground war.

The 12-Day War got the sequencing of external assistance to the protest movement broadly right, but it faltered in execution. Israeli strikes that began on June 13 focused first on nuclear and core military targets. By June 23, Jerusalem’s emphasis shifted toward the repression apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij militia, law enforcement headquarters, and political prisons used to detain and kill dissidents. The logic was sound. First, Israel needed to degrade air defenses and missile capacity to limit retaliation. Once this was complete, it could pivot toward the regime’s internal coercive machinery, creating space for mobilization once large-scale urban bombardment subsided.

The problem was not the concept but the timing. Israel made a strategically sophisticated move by hacking the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting network and airing footage of prior protests alongside calls for citizens to rise up. Leveraging the regime’s own propaganda hub allowed outreach despite internet blackouts. But the hack occurred on June 18 in the middle of intense bombing and before Israel’s shift toward dismantling the repression apparatus. Expecting mass mobilization while strikes hit urban areas, and before security forces were degraded, was never realistic.

Similar inconsistencies also played a role. Israeli Persian-language channels issued evacuation warnings on June 16, and Trump called on residents to immediately evacuate Tehran. Yet the next day, the hacked state television carried calls to take to the streets. When Iranians received the two competing instructions, they did not know whether to wait until the strikes subsided so they could protest or flee for their lives. In a country without shelters or warning systems and with living memory of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, caution ultimately prevailed, and they remained off the streets. The issue was not lack of anti-regime sentiment, but the absence of synchronized sequencing between military pressure and political mobilization.

January 2026 proved that clear leadership and direct calls to mobilize can work to fill the streets. Iranians answered Pahlavi’s call for protests, with millions taking to the streets nationwide on January 8 and 9 in what became the largest anti-regime demonstration in the Islamic Republic’s history. Protesters waved the pre-1979 flag and chanted “death to the dictator” and “long live the king.” The movement no longer centers solely on removing the regime but on the transition that follows. Trump reinforced that momentum on January 13 when he declared that help was on the way and urged Iranians to occupy government institutions. The clarity and timing amplified the surge already underway. Mass turnout followed because the message was direct, aligned, and synchronized with the movement’s energy.

Israel and America Must Strike Directly at the IRGC

It follows, then, that striking at Iran’s repressive apparatus must go beyond hitting empty buildings. While bombing a local IRGC or Basij headquarters may be a symbolic statement, it is far more important to actively target Basij units and security forces actively involved in repression on the ground.

This is no easy task, of course. It means leveraging real-time intelligence and precision drone operations, rather than relying solely on airstrikes against large fixed bases. But it is possible to do. During the 12-Day War, Israel demonstrated the effectiveness of forward intelligence assets and drone bases inside Iran for targeted eliminations. The United States should apply those same capabilities directly against mobile repression units, including Basij squads on motorcycles or pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons.

Altering the balance inside Iran depends on changing the risk calculus of those enforcing repression. At present the asymmetry is clear. Protesters face live fire, while Basij forces operate with relative impunity. Once security personnel see that their own lives are in jeopardy, they are more likely to defect than to suppress. They must lose the sense of impunity and understand that continued loyalty carries immediate personal cost.

It’s Time to Confront Afghanistan and Iran About Al-Qaeda

 

The al-Qaeda terror network operates with impunity out of Iran and Afghanistan. America must lean on both countries’ regimes to bring it to heel.

Iran’s nuclear program is at the heart of its ongoing standoff with the United States, but Washington also needs to confront Iran on another key issue: its persistent support for al-Qaeda and its ongoing relationship with the Taliban.

Saif al-Adel, a top al-Qaeda leader, resides in Tehran under the protection of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to the UN Security Council’s Monitoring Team. Al-Adel is the likely successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former al-Qaeda chieftain killed by a US airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan, five years ago.

The Taliban remains as close to al-Qaeda as ever, and its leadership has publicly inserted itself into the tense standoff between the United States and Iran, siding with the Iranian regime. On February 15, the Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, told Radio Iran’s Pashto service that if the United States were to launch an attack on Iran and Tehran requested assistance, the Taliban would cooperate and show solidarity with the Iranian regime. Mujahid was circumspect in his remarks, noting Afghanistan preferred a diplomatic settlement between Washington and Tehran, and adding that Afghan support to Iran in the event of a military confrontation would necessarily be within Afghanistan’s somewhat limited “capacity.” The Taliban statement should serve as a stark reminder of the regime’s disdain for the United States—and fierce opposition to the possibility of the US assuming an expanded position of strength along Afghanistan’s western border.

Al-Qaeda Never Stopped Working with the Taliban

The purpose of Mujahid’s comments was almost certainly to gain good will with the Iranian regime. Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, the relationship between the two countries has been a mixture of engagement and localized conflict. There have been ongoing disputes over resources, borders, refugees and migrants, and the Taliban’s treatment of its Shia Hazara minority, which Shia-majority Iran has long assumed an informal protective role over. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime is close to formally recognizing the Taliban, which would make it only the second nation after Russia to do so.

While Mujahid’s comments constitute no real threat to the United States, they underscore the long-standing support of both Kabul and Tehran for al-Qaeda, which remains committed to attacking the United States and the West. Al-Qaeda’s regional entities in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel remain hard at work in plotting against America. Unlike its longtime adherent Ahmed al-Shara (alias Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) in Syria, who has at least paid lip service to moderation, al-Qaeda has never even pretended to seek an ideological transformation and remains as dangerous as ever. Only the dogged work of US and allied military forces and intelligence services have made these groups somewhat less capable of carrying out attacks in the West.

Pursuant to the 2020 Doha Agreement with Washington, the Taliban pledged that al-Qaeda would not use Afghan soil to plot against the United States. These commitments have been utterly meaningless. There was no starker example of this than the Taliban’s granting the late al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri refuge in an upscale district of Kabul, in an area controlled by and under the protection of the Taliban Minister of Interior Sirajuddin Haqqani. To this day, the Taliban provides operational shelter and passive support to al-Qaeda. Of course, the Taliban curtails some al-Qaeda activity from its soil, but that is solely to prevent US drone strikes on its territory, not in any sense out of an obligation to adhere to the Doha Agreement.

America Could Lean on Iran to Expel Al-Qaeda Members

Iran has likewise provided al-Qaeda senior leadership safe haven since 2001. It has allowed al-Qaeda leaders to reside in Iran and to move money internationally and personnel between Afghanistan and Syria. In fact, the IRGC has provided logistical support, travel documents, and various levels of freedom of movement to al-Qaeda elements in Iran. A stark reminder of al-Qaeda’s presence in Iran was the 2020 assassination in Tehran of al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Abu Muhammad al-Masri.

The Iranian regime is currently in its weakest state since the 1979 revolution. The US is currently examining all options, from negotiations to kinetic action, to force Iran to curb its menacing actions in the region or face the hastening of regime change. One urgent US request should be the extradition of Saif al-Adel to his home country of Egypt and the removal of other al-Qaeda members known to the US intelligence community from Iran.

The Taliban regime is also in a weakened state, presiding over an isolated and economically crippled state. Like the Iranian leader, the Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada faces both internal and external opposition to his regime. Now, too, is a good time for the United States and its international partners to pressure the Taliban to fully live up to its commitments under the Doha Agreement—or else face consequential US support to viable alternatives to the Hibatullah regime.

Donald Trump Risks a Quagmire in Iran

 

The Trump administration appears to believe that the Iranian government can be overthrown, or at least coerced into a political settlement, via airstrikes. History begs to differ.

Once again, President Donald Trump has threatened to bomb Iran. This time, however, it appears likely to actually happen. With nuclear talks faltering and the deployment of two aircraft carrier strike groups to the region, an attack on Iran is now seemingly a matter of when, rather than if.

The administration’s goal seems to stop Iran’s enrichment of uranium, and, should that fail, regime change. Though candidate Trump denounced regime change on the campaign trail, President Trump seems to favor it. Essentially, it seems the administration hopes to flex America’s military muscle to intimidate Iran into agreeing to nuclear concessions. Should this not work, the United States will probably seek to overthrow the Iranian regime without becoming bogged down in another ground war in the Middle East.

This line of thinking is rose-tinted at best and delusional at worst. Threatening to coerce Iran to agree to America’s nuclear demands will almost fail. Conversely, bombing Iran is unlikely to take down the current government, which has shrugged off previous rounds of bombing and has contingency plans in place for future ones. Even if by some miracle the Islamic Republic were to fall, there is little guarantee that whatever succeeds it will be stable or more friendly to America’s interests.

Regime Change Doesn’t Work from the Air

Using military force to change a country’s behavior rarely works. Legitimacy is vital for all governments, including non-democratic ones. Leaders never want to be perceived as weak or appeasing to the enemy, all of which can undermine their legitimacy. This is especially the case with Iranian leaders today, who recently faced protests and continue to face massive discontent among the population. At such a precarious moment, the last thing Iran’s leaders desire is to appear weak against one of their archenemies.

In other words, blackmailing Iran’s government to give up its nuclear weapons further incentivizes Tehran to dig in its heels. According to political scientists Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause, using force to compel a country to stop a certain action has only been successful in around 35 percent of historical cases. This statistic alone should deter the administration from attempting to use force to coerce Iran into a nuclear deal. With limited US interests at stake, the Trump administration should avoid the risk of failing to coerce Iran into a nuclear deal.

Given that it is improbable for the United States to compel Iran to give up its nuclear stockpile, the Trump administration seems likely to bomb its government to overthrow it—or, the thinking goes, at least pound it into favorable terms at the negotiating table. This won’t work, either. Strategically bombing countries to force a political settlement almost never works: instead, it strengthens the resolve of the enemy to resist. Cases of this include the Blitz during World War II, Operation Linebacker during the Vietnam War, and even Russia’s bombing campaign during the ongoing war in Ukraine, where Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv have failed to coerce Ukrainian leaders into agreeing to an unfavorable political settlement.

This is not to say that air power has no use in war; it is useful in destroying an enemy’s military capabilities and helps protect ground forces from enemy aerial attacks. But as a tool of coercion, it is useless. Such misguided thinking is traced back to immediately after the Gulf War, where defense analysts at the time thought that America’s new technology changed the nature of warfare and that war could be won on the cheap. Yet the bombing of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait in 1991, and then in Iraq proper in 2003, did not win those wars for the United States. Boots on the ground did.

Trump Is Headed for a Military Occupation of Iran

Since airpower alone is incapable of overthrowing the Iranian regime, ground forces must be used. This means that the bombing of Iran will likely lead to a ground invasion of the country. Unless US boots are on the ground, there is no way to verify that Iranian government forces are defeated—and that insurgents or worse actors are prevented from filling the vacuum.

Given this likely escalation to American boots on the ground, the administration should avoid bombing Iran in the first place. History shows time and time again that policymakers who think they can control world events and military escalation instead find themselves being controlled by those very forces. For instance, the George W. Bush administration, which President Trump continuously criticized for its endless wars, was initially opposed to nation-building and sought to use minimal force to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, the Bush administration ended up nation-building in Iraq and becoming bogged down in a quagmire. The Trump administration could easily find themselves in a similar situation with Iran.

Alexander Hamilton, one of the fiercest proponents of executive power, asserted that the president has the duty to “preserve peace till war is declared,” while only Congress has the power to declare war. This line of reasoning should be applicable to America’s current commander-in-chief. Trump has the duty to preserve peace. Bombing Iran would disrupt that peace. The buck stops with him and him alone. Whatever consequences come from this potentially unconstitutional and dimwitted bombing of Iran, Trump will be solely responsible. The administration should think long and hard about its next move.