The Tigray War: What Really Caused It, From the Beginning to Today.
The war in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, was not simply an ethnic conflict, nor was it merely a dispute between two politicians. It was the result of a struggle over political power, competing visions of the Ethiopian state, ethnic federalism, control of the military, historical grievances, and territorial disputes. Regional rivalries and outside involvement then made the conflict much more destructive.
The fighting began on a massive scale in November 2020 between Ethiopia's federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the political movement that had dominated Ethiopian national politics for nearly three decades. Eritrea and forces from Ethiopia's Amhara region also became major participants.
A ceasefire agreement signed in November 2022 ended the principal phase of the war, but it did not resolve every underlying dispute. The political and security situation has remained fragile, with unresolved territorial questions, incomplete disarmament and tensions over the future of Tigray.
To understand the real causes, we need to go back well before 2020.
Before the war: How Ethiopia's political system created the conditions for conflict
1974–1991: Revolution, dictatorship and the rise of the TPLF
The modern conflict cannot be understood without examining the political transformation of Ethiopia in the late twentieth century.
1974: A military junta known as the Derg overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie.
1970s–1980s: The Derg government, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, fought armed opposition movements. Its rule was associated with mass repression, forced resettlement, famine and political violence.
1975: The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) emerged as an armed movement fighting the Derg.
1991: The TPLF, working with other opposition forces in the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), helped overthrow Mengistu's government.
The TPLF began as a regional insurgency but eventually became one of the most powerful organizations in Ethiopia.
Its leaders argued that Tigrayans needed political self-determination and protection against domination by Ethiopia's central state. Their opponents argued that the movement eventually concentrated too much power in its own hands.
Both the historical grievances and the later concentration of power matter when assessing the origins of the war.
1991–2018: The TPLF dominates national politics
After the Derg fell, Ethiopia adopted an ethnic-based federal system. Regional states were organized largely around the country's major ethnolinguistic communities.
Under the EPRDF coalition:
Tigray had its own regional government, dominated by the TPLF.
The TPLF exercised influence far beyond its region through its position within the federal ruling coalition.
Ethiopia experienced substantial economic growth and expanded infrastructure, but political opposition, media restrictions and state repression remained serious concerns.
Many Ethiopians, particularly among Oromo and Amhara constituencies, resented what they regarded as disproportionate TPLF influence over national security, politics and the economy.
One important distinction: the TPLF was not the same thing as the entire Tigrayan population. Likewise, opposition to the TPLF did not mean every Ethiopian opposed Tigrayans as an ethnic community.
Nevertheless, political grievances increasingly acquired an ethnic dimension because the ruling coalition's regional parties were organized around ethnic identity.
2015–2018: Popular protests change the political balance
Protests, particularly among Oromo demonstrators and later other groups, weakened the EPRDF's authority.
In 2018, Abiy Ahmed became prime minister.
He promised political reform, greater national unity and a new political direction. He also pursued reconciliation with Eritrea, Ethiopia's former enemy.
Abiy's rise changed the balance of power. The TPLF, which had been central to national government for decades, increasingly found itself outside the federal political establishment.
For Abiy's supporters, this represented a necessary transition away from the old ruling elite. For TPLF leaders, it increasingly appeared that their political influence, security interests and regional autonomy were under threat.
This was the fundamental political rupture that preceded the war. It did not make war inevitable, but it created the conditions for a dangerous confrontation.
2018–2020: How the political confrontation became a military crisis
Abiy Ahmed — Ethiopia's prime minister
He sought to strengthen federal authority and reorganize the political system. His government viewed the TPLF as an increasingly defiant regional power that threatened national stability.
Debretsion Gebremichael and the TPLF leadership
They defended Tigray's regional autonomy and rejected what they saw as the federal government's attempt to marginalize their movement and weaken the constitutional federal system.
Isaias Afwerki — Eritrea's president
He had a long history of hostility toward the TPLF. His government's military involvement in the 2020–2022 war added another dimension to the conflict.
The election dispute
Ethiopia's national election was postponed in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Abiy's government maintained that the postponement and extension of government mandates were necessary under the circumstances.
The TPLF argued that extending the federal government's mandate without a timely election was unconstitutional.
In September 2020, Tigray held its own regional election despite objections from the federal government. The TPLF won overwhelmingly.
The federal government rejected the election's legitimacy. Tigray's leaders, in turn, challenged the federal government's legitimacy after its mandate was extended.
Federal authorities also reduced budget support to Tigray, further deepening the confrontation.
Why this mattered
The dispute was about more than an election. It raised a fundamental constitutional question:
Who has the ultimate authority when an Ethiopian regional government refuses to accept a decision made by the federal government?
The federal government emphasized national constitutional authority. The TPLF emphasized regional autonomy and the constitutional limits on federal power.
Both sides claimed legitimacy, but neither was willing to accept the other's position.
Military deployments and disputes over command of federal forces stationed in Tigray made the situation increasingly dangerous. The remaining question was whether the confrontation would be resolved through negotiations or force.
It was resolved through force.
November 2020: Who started the war?
This is one of the most important questions, and the answer requires separating the immediate trigger from the deeper causes.
On the night of 3–4 November 2020, Tigrayan forces attacked the Ethiopian National Defence Force's Northern Command installations in Tigray. The federal government said the attack targeted national military bases and that it had to respond to defend the country.
The TPLF argued that the federal government was preparing to attack Tigray and that its actions were defensive.
On 4 November, Abiy announced military operations against the TPLF. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war.
A careful assessment should distinguish three questions:
Question | Assessment |
|---|---|
What triggered the open war? | The attack on federal military installations and the federal government's ensuing military offensive. |
Who bears responsibility for the immediate escalation? | Tigrayan forces bear responsibility for the attack on the Northern Command; the federal government bears responsibility for the decision and conduct of its subsequent offensive. The wider sequence of military preparations and responsibility for initiating the confrontation remains contested. |
What caused the conflict to become possible? | Years of political rivalry, declining trust, the constitutional dispute, competing security interests and failed efforts to reach a settlement. |
The immediate military trigger is relatively clear. The broader question of who made war unavoidable is more complicated.
My assessment: the TPLF's attack was the immediate trigger, but it was not the original cause of the conflict. The federal–regional power struggle had already created a situation in which both sides increasingly treated the other as an existential threat.
That does not absolve either side of responsibility for its decisions.
Why did the war become so destructive?
The conflict quickly expanded beyond the original confrontation between the federal government and the TPLF.
Eritrea entered the war
Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces. President Isaias Afwerki had long-standing hostility toward the TPLF, whose leaders had been influential during the period of war and confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
For Eritrea, the war offered an opportunity to weaken a historic adversary. For the Ethiopian government, Eritrean military involvement provided a powerful ally on its northern flank.
Eritrean forces were accused of serious abuses against civilians. Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, along with other armed groups, operated in areas where civilians were exposed to killings, sexual violence, looting and displacement. Responsibility for particular incidents must be assessed individually rather than attributed indiscriminately to entire populations.
Amhara forces entered the conflict
Amhara regional forces and allied militias fought alongside the federal government.
Their involvement was connected partly to long-standing disputes over territories in western and southern Tigray, especially Western Tigray, also known as Welkait in Amhara political discourse.
These areas are contested because of competing historical, administrative and identity-based claims.
During the war, Amhara forces took control of disputed territories. Tigrayans were expelled or fled from some areas, and reports documented serious abuses. Many displaced people have not been able to return.
This transformed the conflict from a federal–regional power struggle into a conflict involving territory, ethnicity, historical ownership and the right of displaced people to return home.
The territorial question remains one of the biggest obstacles to peace.
The humanitarian catastrophe
The war severely damaged Tigray's health system, infrastructure, agriculture, telecommunications, banking and other essential services. Access to food and humanitarian assistance was disrupted.
The conflict also involved atrocities attributed to multiple parties. Investigations by international bodies and human rights organizations documented serious violations, including unlawful killings and sexual violence.
The war's death toll remains uncertain. Estimates vary according to whether they include direct combat deaths, civilian killings, deaths from hunger and disease, and other indirect effects. Some later assessments have placed the total at around 500,000, but that figure should be understood as an estimate rather than a definitive, independently verified count.
The consequences were not limited to Tigray. Fighting spread into neighbouring Amhara and Afar, displaced people across the region and weakened social trust throughout Ethiopia.
2021–2022: How Tigrayan forces turned the war around
The initial federal offensive captured Mekelle, Tigray's capital, in November 2020. TPLF leaders withdrew, regrouped and continued fighting.
In 2021, Tigrayan forces recaptured Mekelle and regained substantial territory. They later advanced into parts of Amhara and toward the direction of Addis Ababa.
Federal forces eventually regained the initiative, using superior firepower and armed drones, while mobilizing wider support for the war effort. Tigrayan forces retreated toward Tigray in December 2021.
A humanitarian truce in March 2022 created some space for negotiations, but a new round of major fighting began later that year.
This phase revealed an important reality: neither side could easily impose a lasting political settlement through military force alone.
The federal government could deploy substantial military resources, but defeating the TPLF completely was costly.
The TPLF could mobilize substantial regional resistance, but it could not sustainably defeat the federal state.
Eritrean and Amhara participation made the conflict more dangerous and complicated any settlement.
Civilians continued to bear the heaviest burden.
The result was a conflict in which the costs of continued fighting became increasingly difficult to justify.
November 2022: The Pretoria peace agreement
On 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF signed the Pretoria Agreement in South Africa, ending the principal phase of large-scale fighting.
The agreement provided for a cessation of hostilities, disarmament of Tigrayan forces, restoration of federal authority, humanitarian access and a political process for addressing outstanding issues.
Implementation brought important improvements. Some essential services were restored, humanitarian access improved, and Tigrayan forces handed over heavy weapons under the agreed process.
However, the agreement stopped the main war without resolving all the causes of the war.
Four major problems remained:
Western Tigray: Disputed territory remained under Amhara and federal control, while many displaced Tigrayans could not return.
Disarmament: The process of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants was incomplete.
Political representation: The TPLF's political status and relationship with the federal government remained contested.
Governance: Tigray's interim administration became the centre of an increasingly bitter struggle between TPLF factions and leaders who favoured closer cooperation with Addis Ababa.
The Pretoria agreement was therefore a necessary peace framework, but not a comprehensive political settlement.
2023–2025: Why peace began to unravel
2023: An uneasy peace
The TPLF agreed to the creation of an interim regional administration. Getachew Reda became its president in March 2023.
But the settlement left a fundamental problem: the TPLF still had considerable influence inside Tigray, while the federal government wanted a regional administration that would cooperate with Addis Ababa.
The two sides had different expectations about what the peace agreement meant for the future political order.
2024–2025: Rivalries deepen
The interim administration became increasingly divided between Getachew Reda's more cooperative approach toward the federal government and TPLF hardliners associated with party chairman Debretsion Gebremichael.
Getachew was pushed out of the regional leadership in 2025, and Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede subsequently led the interim administration.
In May 2025, Ethiopia's National Election Board cancelled the TPLF's party registration, further intensifying the dispute over political representation.
At the same time:
Disarmament and the reintegration of former combatants remained incomplete.
Western Tigray's status remained unresolved.
Restrictions on federal funding and fuel supplies worsened tensions.
Armed clashes developed between rival Tigrayan factions, including the Tigray Defence Forces and the Tigray Peace Force.
Federal drone strikes against Tigrayan forces added a direct military dimension to the renewed confrontation.
These developments made it increasingly difficult to sustain the Pretoria settlement.
The key lesson is that a peace agreement can stop fighting without producing a political system that all major parties consider legitimate.
September–October 2026: The war returns
As of 26 October 2026, Ethiopia is experiencing a renewed armed conflict in Tigray. The Pretoria agreement has been effectively shattered by the latest fighting.
Here is the recent sequence.
23 Sep 2026
A new offensive begins
Tigrayan forces launched a major offensive, seized three airports in Mekelle, Axum and Shire, and clashed with federal forces. The TPLF described its actions as defensive, while the federal government accused the TPLF of initiating the escalation.
4 Oct 2026
Federal-aligned forces retake Mekelle
Ethiopian federal troops and the pro-government Tigray Peace Forces regained control of the regional capital. The TPLF withdrew its regional administration from the city. This was a major military setback for the TPLF, but it did not establish that the insurgency had ended.
5–6 Oct 2026
Fighting continues after the capital falls
Reports described airstrikes and artillery exchanges in northern Tigray. Humanitarian sources reported civilian deaths, although Reuters could not independently verify the reported casualty figures.
16 Oct 2026
A new caretaker administration is announced
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed a caretaker administration intended to stabilize Tigray and prepare elections within six months. The TPLF's acceptance of the new arrangement remains a central issue.
23 Oct 2026
The fight continues despite calls to disarm
Officials in the federal-backed administration called on Tigrayan fighters to disarm. A Tigrayan military commander vowed continued resistance. Reports of suspected drone attacks and civilian casualties underlined the continuing danger.
Why has the renewed war become more dangerous?
The conflict now involves a wider political and regional alignment than the original war.
The TPLF and allied opposition groups are seeking to challenge Abiy's government.
The federal government and its allies are seeking to regain control and establish a new regional administration.
Eritrea is a major source of concern because Ethiopia accuses it of supporting armed opponents. Eritrea denies the allegations.
Amhara armed groups have their own grievances, including territorial disputes with Tigray and disagreements with the federal government.
Sudan and Egypt have become part of the wider strategic context because of regional rivalries and Ethiopia's disputes over security, the Red Sea and the Nile. Allegations of support for armed opposition groups have been denied by the countries accused.
In September 2026, the TPLF joined a coalition of six other armed groups seeking to overthrow Abiy's government. The alliance creates the possibility that the conflict could spread beyond Tigray and become a broader Ethiopian security crisis.
The decisive question is whether the federal government can establish legitimate and durable political authority without generating a new insurgency.
What are the real causes of the war? Five explanations examined
The conflict becomes easier to understand if we separate its different causes rather than look for one person or one event to blame.
1. The struggle for political power
2. The unresolved question of Ethiopian federalism
Ethiopia's ethnic federal system gives regional governments a constitutional role and recognizes the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples. The conflict exposed deep disagreements over the limits of regional autonomy and the authority of the central state.3. Ethnic grievances and territorial disputes
Historical resentment toward the TPLF, fear of domination, contested regional boundaries and the displacement of Tigrayans helped transform a political confrontation into a much broader conflict involving communities and territory.4. Eritrea's rivalry with the TPLF
Eritrea's intervention helped intensify the original war. Its current antagonism toward Ethiopia, combined with allegations about its relationship with Tigrayan forces, creates a serious risk of interstate escalation.5. Failure to implement a complete peace settlement
The Pretoria Agreement did not settle territorial control, displacement, political representation, disarmament or long-term security arrangements. Those unresolved issues became the foundations of the renewed conflict.Overall assessment based on conflict reporting and analysis by the International Crisis Group, Rift Valley Institute and other cited sources.
Is this an ethnic war, a political war or a war over territory?
The most accurate answer is that it is a political and territorial conflict that has become heavily ethnicized.
Each dimension reinforces the others.
Dimension | What it explains |
|---|---|
Political | Why the federal government and TPLF fought over authority, legitimacy and control. |
Constitutional | Why the relationship between the central state and regional autonomy became a point of confrontation. |
Ethnic | Why historical grievances and fears of collective punishment mobilized communities. |
Territorial | Why Western Tigray and the return of displaced people remain central to the dispute. |
Geopolitical | Why Eritrea and wider Horn of Africa rivalries make a local settlement harder to secure. |
It would be inaccurate to say that all Tigrayans support the TPLF, that all Amhara support the same territorial claims, or that the Ethiopian government represents every Ethiopian community's interests.
Nor should atrocities committed by particular forces be used to assign collective guilt to an entire ethnic population.
A credible analysis must distinguish political leadership, military organizations and civilians.
Who benefits from the conflict, and who pays the price?
The war creates opportunities for political and military actors seeking leverage, but it does not follow that every actor who benefits from instability deliberately caused it.
Potential political beneficiaries
Federal hardliners may gain leverage by presenting the conflict as a struggle to preserve national unity.
TPLF hardliners may use renewed confrontation to consolidate their position and mobilize supporters.
Regional armed groups may seek territorial gains or stronger bargaining positions.
External powers may gain strategic leverage if Ethiopia's internal divisions weaken its regional position.
These are possible incentives, not proof that any particular actor engineered the war.
Those who bear the greatest costs
Tigrayan civilians, who continue to face displacement, insecurity and disrupted services.
Amhara and Afar civilians affected by fighting and retaliatory violence.
Families of combatants and civilians killed or injured.
Farmers, traders and businesses affected by insecurity, restricted transport and interrupted markets.
Ethiopia's wider population, which bears the economic costs of renewed conflict.
The humanitarian situation is especially concerning because Tigray has not fully recovered from the previous war. Around 750,000 people from Tigray were still internally displaced as of February 2026, according to figures attributed to UNHCR in recent reporting.
Scenario A — Negotiated settlement
The African Union and international partners broker renewed talks. The parties agree on security guarantees, political representation, a credible process for resolving disputed territories and the return of displaced people.
Best outcome for civilians
Scenario B — Prolonged insurgency
Federal-aligned forces retain major towns, including Mekelle, while TPLF forces regroup in rural and mountainous areas. The conflict becomes a lower-intensity insurgency, with intermittent attacks, displacement and humanitarian disruption.
A plausible risk even after territorial gains
Scenario C — Wider regional war
Renewed fighting draws Eritrea or other external actors directly into a larger confrontation. Ethiopia's search for Red Sea access, especially amid tensions surrounding Eritrea's Assab port, adds a strategic dimension that could extend beyond Tigray.
Highest regional escalation risk
These scenarios are analytical possibilities, not predictions with known probabilities. The balance between them depends on military developments, the willingness of the parties to negotiate and whether outside powers can prevent further escalation.
What should the international community do?
A durable settlement would need to address more than the immediate fighting.
Secure a ceasefire. Stop attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, and establish verifiable military de-escalation measures.
Restart negotiations. The African Union should lead an inclusive process with meaningful participation from the federal government, Tigrayan representatives and other affected communities.
Resolve territorial disputes lawfully. Western Tigray requires a credible political and legal process that protects residents' rights and enables displaced people to return voluntarily and safely.
Restore political legitimacy. Tigray needs an agreed, credible path toward representative regional governance and elections.
Complete security arrangements. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be accompanied by credible security guarantees, rather than leaving former combatants fearful of persecution or renewed attacks.
Protect humanitarian access. Food, medicine, banking, communications and essential services must not be used as instruments of collective punishment.
Investigate atrocities. Accountability should be based on evidence and individual responsibility, regardless of the perpetrator's political or ethnic affiliation.
Prevent regional escalation. Ethiopia and Eritrea need diplomatic channels to address border security and sea-access disputes without resorting to force.
The Pretoria framework remains an important starting point, but restoring peace will require renewed negotiations and practical mechanisms to resolve the disputes it left open.
Final assessment: What is the real cause?
My conclusion is that the Tigray War grew out of a struggle over who would control Ethiopia's political future after the decline of the TPLF's national dominance. That struggle collided with constitutional disagreements, ethnic grievances, competing territorial claims and Eritrea's long-standing hostility toward the TPLF.
The 2020 military confrontation turned those unresolved political disputes into a devastating war. The 2022 peace agreement stopped the main fighting but did not establish a settlement acceptable to all the major parties. By 2026, those unresolved questions had again become armed conflict.
The latest fighting is therefore not simply a continuation of the 2020 war. It is also a consequence of the failure to resolve the political and territorial issues that survived the original peace agreement.
The central question is no longer only who won the first war. It is whether Ethiopia can establish a political settlement in which regional autonomy, national unity, territorial rights and civilian security can coexist.
Until those questions are addressed, military victories may change who controls a city or a government building without delivering lasting peace to the people of Tigray—or to Ethiopia as a whole.
By Jugo Ikeji-Uju.
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