Despite public displays of defiance, Hezbollah is weaker than ever before—and the rest of Lebanon is united in opposition to its continued militancy.
Lebanon has witnessed heightened momentum this month surrounding efforts to disarm Hezbollah.
While the visit by Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Rodolphe Haykal to Washington to discuss military cooperation reaffirmed the importance of sustained support for the LAF in its efforts to defend state sovereignty and advance Hezbollah’s disarmament, the visit of French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot to Beirut to coordinate preparations for a March conference in Paris backing the LAF underscored growing international pressure on the issue. These visits coincided with a congressional hearing dedicated to Hezbollah’s disarmament, as well as the introduction of a new bill by congressmen Darrell Issa (R-California) and Darin LaHood (R-Illinois) seeking to sanction “any foreign person or entity that hinders, obstructs or delays Lebanon’s electoral process.”
Such momentum surrounding Hezbollah’s disarmament is unprecedented, and presents a historic opportunity to reshape Lebanon. Disarming and weakening Hezbollah is not only integral to restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty and prosperity, but also a key component of US efforts to consolidate peace and stability in the Middle East and potentially anchor a durable regional security framework.
Hezbollah Doesn’t Want to Give Up Its Guns
US support for the LAF has long remained complex, given Hezbollah’s continued entrenchment within Lebanon’s “deep state,” including elements of military and security institutions. However, advocacy for sustained assistance persists on the premise that a capable LAF can serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah. It is now evident that the disarmament file has shifted from a crisis management approach to shaping Lebanon’s future.
Against this backdrop, the LAF presented on February 16 during a cabinet meeting its plan for the second phase of Hezbollah’s disarmament—requesting four months for its completion, extendable to eight depending primarily on available capabilities. The phase covers the area between the Litani and Awali rivers, approximately 25 miles to the south of Beirut. The broader five-phase plan began with the LAF’s deployment south of the Litani River, then expands northward between the Litani and Awali, proceeds to Beirut and its southern suburbs, pivots to the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, and ultimately extends to the rest of the country. The LAF stated in January that it had completed the first phase and achieved operational control south of the Litani, though Israel remains skeptical of the army’s execution.
Yet while the LAF commander was outlining the plan, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem rejected in a speech both the framework and the four-month timeline, describing the focus on disarmament as serving Israeli interests.
Qassem’s rejection was not surprising. Since the conclusion of the first phase, Hezbollah has argued that the US-brokered 2024 ceasefire that ended 13 months of conflict with Israel applied only south of the Litani. Days after the LAF declared operational control in the south, Qassem delivered a combative speech categorically rejecting full disarmament and accusing domestic opponents of aligning with Israeli and American interests. His remarks came amid escalating international momentum for Hezbollah’s disarmament and renewed US threats against Iran, but also after President Joseph Aoun described Hezbollah’s armament in a January interview as a “burden on Lebanon” that contradicts state sovereignty—marking a firmer official stance from the Lebanese government on the group’s continued militancy.
Publicly, Hezbollah maintains that retaining its arms is essential to defending Lebanon against Israel, while reportedly seeking in private political and security guarantees to preserve its embedment within state institutions. In parallel, pro-Hezbollah narratives have circulated warning of alleged preparations by Syrian interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to attack Hezbollah in coordination with Israel in the event of a US strike on Iran.
At this juncture, though unlikely, Hezbollah likely hopes that any breakthrough between Washington and Tehran would at least postpone the question of disarmament north of the Litani. Pro-Hezbollah commentators have promoted speculation about a potential US-Iran deal favorable to Tehran and its regional proxies, including compromises on Hezbollah’s weapons north of the Litani. Hezbollah official Mahmoud Qmati recently said that the group’s disarmament was not part of US-Iran negotiations, portraying Hezbollah as an autonomous Lebanese actor allied with—not subordinate to—Iran.
Though cautious in tone, Hezbollah has also resorted to rhetoric with veiled threats of retaliation in the event of a US strike on Iran. In a recent speech, Qassem stopped short of an overt declaration of war on Israel in the event of US-Iran clashes, but stated that Hezbollah would not remain neutral and warned of a widespread regional war if America waged war on Iran. Qmati characterized these remarks as deliberate strategic ambiguity for the right reasons.
Hezbollah Is Still Hurting from the Last War
Despite such rhetoric, and unless a US-Israel strike on Iran evolves into a prolonged offensive or war of attrition, Hezbollah is unlikely to start another war with Israel.
Although reports suggest efforts to reconstitute, the group faces significant constraints: domestic opposition to renewed conflict, a demoralized base, sharply diminished military capabilities following Israel’s fall 2024 campaign, and disrupted supply lines after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Meanwhile, Israel continues targeted strikes and assassinations against Hezbollah to prevent its reconstitution, with more than 400 Hezbollah operatives reportedly killed by Israeli agents since the ceasefire. The argument that Hezbollah is not retaliating against Israeli strikes because the group is entrusting the Lebanese state to pursue diplomatic means is a fig leaf; in truth, Hezbollah is not militarily capable of meaningful retaliation.
It is notable that Hezbollah opted not to intervene during the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June 2025, despite every indication that the Iranian regime was under severe pressure. According to this account, the group’s leadership was advised by Iran on the fifth day of the war, when Iran (allegedly) absorbed the initial shock, to intervene in a bid to potentially renegotiate a new ceasefire agreement better than the 2024 ceasefire. However, after a thorough assessment, Hezbollah reportedly decided not to intervene taking into account crucial factors such as its supporting base’s grievances and domestic “divisions.” While such narratives may be carefully curated, they reflect genuine structural constraints facing the organization.
The LAF Can Stand Up to Hezbollah
Although confrontations between the LAF and Hezbollah have occurred since the civil war, Lebanese officials currently dismiss the prospect of direct clashes during the second phase. From the LAF’s securing and removal of a Hezbollah ammunition shipment in Kahale in August 2023 amid exchanges of fire, to its posture during the October 17, 2019 protests, and its blocking of armed Hezbollah and Amal Movement affiliates in Beirut’s Tayouneh in October 2021, the army’s responses have been measured yet decisive.
Assertions that sectarianism within Lebanese institutions would fracture the LAF in a serious confrontation are likewise overstated.
The first phase south of the Litani proceeded without incident. This does not eliminate risk altogether, of course. On August 9, 2025, six Lebanese soldiers were killed and others wounded while dismantling munitions in a southern weapons depot.
Several assessments indicate that Hezbollah has repositioned weapons and combat units north of the Litani, into the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs. The North Litani area hosts the group’s core defensive capabilities, embedded within mountainous terrain and long outside the operational remit of UNIFIL. According to the Alma Research and Education Center, Hezbollah retains roughly 25,000 short- and medium-range rockets, a smaller number of precision missiles and air defenses, and an expanding drone arsenal including approximately 1,000 kamikaze drones. The group fields an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 active fighters and tens of thousands of reservists, including the elite 5,000-strong Radwan Unit as its primary offensive formation. Israel, in turn, has expanded its strike campaign to include North Litani and the Bekaa.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah is reportedly undertaking internal restructuring, shifting from a clerically dominated hierarchy toward a structure led by non-clerical political figures. Particularly, such reports surfaced in conjunction with news indicating that Wafiq Safa, former head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, submitted his resignation—characterized by some as a dismissal as part of an internal shake-up and by others as a reflection of an internal crumbling following Hezbollah’s devastating losses in its 2024 war with Israel. Yet Qmati denied such accounts, commenting that Safa could assume a more important role in the future. Indeed, according to an Israeli assessment, Safa will still play an important role in overseeing smuggling operations despite his overt resignation. Israeli analysts have even speculated that Safa’s resignation could be “a form of deception” to lower his priority level for Mossad and escape potential elimination.
Is War Returning to Lebanon?
Lebanon now is at a critical juncture, amid an intensified interplay between regional strategic imperatives and domestic operational realities. While preparations are underway for Paris March 5 conference aimed at mobilizing support of the LAF to pursue the second phase of Hezbollah’s disarmament, following Haykal’s visit to Washington and subsequently to Riyadh to discuss cooperation and later to the Munich Security Conference in the same vein, confrontation is highly looming between Washington and Tehran, with reports emerging from Iran’s Al-Alam TV channel describing LAF Hamat Air Base as a US base that is under surveillance. According to Israeli Kan public broadcaster, the IDF is in a state of alert along Israel’s northern border in preparation for a potential conflict with Iran and Hezbollah.
Amid these rising tensions, Lebanon’s leadership, particularly President Joseph Aoun, is reportedly in contact with international counterparts, particularly the United States, in an attempt to keep Lebanon away from any escalation, as well as with Hezbollah to dissuade the group from joining a potential war alongside Iran. Most tellingly, Lebanese news outlet Nidaa al-Watan is citing prominent political figures calling for the Lebanese state to officially declare Lebanon neutral and insisting that Hezbollah not drag the country back into war.
At this moment, Hezbollah’s disarmament in north of Litani features as the most serious phase in Lebanon’s efforts to achieve sovereignty and bring all weapons under state authority and this remains dependable on international backing, while keeping Lebanon out of regional conflicts. At the least, in setting a clear timetable of four to eight months to implement the second stage, the Lebanese government has shown that it is squarely committed to expanding the state’s authority over arms.
