THE SAHEL-
The Sahel's New Sovereignty Politics.
Why Anti-Colonial Language and Demands for Political Autonomy Have Become Powerful Forces Across the Region.
One of the most important political developments in contemporary Africa is taking place across the Sahel.
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, governments increasingly speak the language of sovereignty, dignity, independence, self-determination and anti-imperialism. French troops have departed. Long-standing security agreements have been terminated. Mining contracts are being renegotiated. The role of the CFA franc is being questioned. The three countries have withdrawn from ECOWAS and constructed the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES.
Political speeches frequently refer to colonialism and neocolonialism.
Foreign military bases are increasingly portrayed not merely as security arrangements but as symbols of unfinished independence.
Natural resources are discussed not simply as commodities but as instruments of national sovereignty.
Even language, media and regional organizations have become part of the debate.
Something deeper than a diplomatic dispute with France is therefore occurring.
The Sahel is experiencing what can reasonably be described as a sovereignty revolution.
But this movement contains a major contradiction.
On one side, demands for greater autonomy reflect genuine historical grievances and widespread frustration with political and economic relationships that many Africans believe have remained unequal decades after independence.
On the other side, sovereignty language can also be used by military governments to justify restrictions on political competition, weaken criticism and present domestic opponents as agents of foreign influence.
The essential question is therefore not simply whether sovereignty matters.
It clearly does.
The more difficult question is:
What kind of sovereignty is actually being constructed—and sovereignty for whom?
1. Formal Independence Did Not End the Sovereignty Debate
Mali became independent in 1960.
Burkina Faso, then Upper Volta, became independent the same year.
Niger also achieved independence in 1960.
Legally, all three became sovereign states.
But political independence did not automatically eliminate the structures created during colonial rule.
France continued to maintain unusually strong relationships across much of Francophone Africa through:
military agreements;
political networks;
commercial relationships;
development institutions;
language;
education;
currency arrangements;
and direct relationships with African political elites.
This broader post-colonial architecture became associated with the term Françafrique.
For decades, supporters defended these relationships as practical cooperation.
Critics increasingly interpreted them as evidence that political independence had not produced complete strategic autonomy.
The OECD's analysis of insecurity and coups in the Central Sahel identifies several sources of the later rejection of France that predated both the recent military takeovers and Russian influence campaigns: memories of colonial rule, perceptions of French neocolonial influence, resentment toward political elites viewed as excessively close to France, and frustration that French-led counterterrorism had failed to deliver everyday security.
These grievances did not suddenly appear after the coups.
The coups gave them political vehicles.
2. Security Failure Made the Sovereignty Argument Much Stronger
France's 2013 intervention in Mali initially enjoyed substantial support.
Operation Serval helped prevent jihadist forces from advancing farther south and helped recapture northern cities.
But the intervention gradually evolved into a much longer regional counterterrorism campaign.
Years passed.
Thousands of foreign troops remained.
Yet insecurity expanded through Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
For many Sahelians, this created a devastating political contradiction.
If France possessed:
advanced aircraft,
special forces,
satellites,
intelligence,
drones,
military bases,
and thousands of soldiers,
why was terrorism becoming worse?
The explanation is much more complicated than the slogan suggests. Insurgencies were driven by weak governance, local grievances, porous borders, criminal economies and other factors no foreign military could solve alone.
But politically, the result mattered more than the explanation.
French military presence increasingly became evidence not of security but of dependency without security.
That transformed sovereignty from an abstract historical idea into an immediate political demand.
The argument became:
If foreign troops cannot protect us, why should they remain?
3. The Coups Converted Popular Frustration Into State Policy
The military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger accelerated this transformation.
Mali experienced coups in 2020 and 2021.
Burkina Faso experienced two coups in 2022.
Niger's elected government was overthrown in 2023.
All three military-led governments presented themselves, to varying degrees, as corrective responses to failed political systems.
Security failure was central.
But so was sovereignty.
The new governments argued that earlier administrations had become too dependent on foreign powers, particularly France.
This framing was politically effective because it connected three different frustrations:
insecurity,
weak governance,
and post-colonial resentment.
Instead of presenting the political crisis merely as civilians versus soldiers, governments increasingly presented it as:
national sovereignty versus foreign interference.
That narrative dramatically changed the political battlefield.
Criticism from Paris, Brussels or other Western governments could now be interpreted as evidence confirming the sovereignty argument.
External pressure sometimes strengthened rather than weakened the new regimes.
4. ECOWAS Sanctions Deepened the Sovereignty Narrative
The confrontation with ECOWAS became equally important.
Following the coups, ECOWAS imposed sanctions and demanded transitions toward constitutional civilian government.
From ECOWAS's perspective, the principle was understandable.
If military officers could overthrow elected governments without consequences, repeated coups could undermine the entire regional constitutional order.
But in Mali, Burkina Faso and especially Niger, sanctions were increasingly portrayed as punishment imposed by an organization allegedly influenced by outside powers.
The conflict became particularly dangerous after the Niger coup, when ECOWAS discussed possible military intervention.
Mali and Burkina Faso declared that an intervention against Niger would be regarded as a threat to them as well.
Eventually, all three announced their departure from ECOWAS.
Their withdrawal formally took effect on 29 January 2025. ECOWAS nevertheless maintained temporary arrangements covering free movement and trade while negotiations continued, reflecting how deeply interconnected the countries remain with the rest of West Africa.
For the AES governments, however, withdrawal carried powerful symbolism.
They were no longer simply rejecting France.
They were rejecting a regional political architecture they believed no longer represented their interests.
5. The AES Turned Sovereignty Into a Regional Project
This may ultimately prove to be the most significant development.
Sovereignty is usually associated with individual states.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are attempting something different:
collective sovereignty.
They established the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023 and subsequently transformed it into a confederation.
The project increasingly covers:
defence;
diplomacy;
economic development;
infrastructure;
communications;
finance;
energy;
and natural resources.
By December 2025, the AES had operationalized the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development, with initial capital of 500 billion CFA francs, designed to finance infrastructure, agriculture, energy and other strategic projects using what the governments describe as sovereign financing mechanisms.
In August 2026, AES ministers responsible for energy, mining and petroleum met specifically to discuss using their natural resources as instruments of economic sovereignty, industrialization and confederal development.
This demonstrates that sovereignty rhetoric is increasingly being translated into institutions.
That is an important distinction.
Political slogans come and go.
Banks, treaties, military commands and resource policies can last much longer.
6. Public Support Cannot Simply Be Dismissed as Propaganda
Military governments unquestionably use political messaging.
Foreign influence operations also exist.
Social media frequently spreads misinformation and exaggerated claims about France, Russia, ECOWAS and other actors.
But it would be a serious analytical mistake to conclude that Sahelian sovereignty politics exists only because citizens have been manipulated.
At least in Mali, representative survey evidence shows substantial support for the new geopolitical direction.
Afrobarometer found that among Malians aware of the country's withdrawal from ECOWAS, 91% approved of the decision. Among those aware of the AES, about 88% believed it was likely to improve regional security, while 87% said Mali's interests were adequately represented in AES decision-making.
The same survey found extremely strong support for monetary autonomy: 92% supported leaving the franc zone and creating a national currency, while 89% supported a common currency among Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
The evidence should not automatically be projected onto every citizen in Burkina Faso or Niger.
But it demonstrates that sovereignty politics cannot simply be reduced to government propaganda.
There is a real constituency for it.
7. Young Africans Are Asking a Different Question About Independence
Generational change is crucial.
The generation that negotiated independence from European colonial rule is disappearing.
For many younger Africans, colonialism is history—but its institutional consequences remain visible.
Young people can compare their countries with the rest of the world instantly through smartphones and social media.
They see African gold, uranium, oil and other resources exported.
They see multinational companies operating mines.
They see foreign troops stationed on African territory.
They see governments borrowing from international institutions.
They see migration toward Europe.
And they ask:
After more than sixty years of independence, why do these relationships still appear unequal?
This is different from the nationalism of the 1960s.
It is a twenty-first-century sovereignty movement shaped partly by digital communication, youth unemployment, geopolitical multipolarity and disappointment with post-independence elites.
Historical figures such as Thomas Sankara have consequently acquired renewed symbolic importance, particularly in Burkina Faso.
Sankara's emphasis on economic self-reliance, anti-imperialism, political dignity and African autonomy fits naturally into today's political vocabulary.
Whether contemporary leaders actually reproduce Sankara's policies is another question.
But his symbolism is powerful.
8. Language Has Become Part of Decolonization
Sovereignty politics is also cultural.
Mali's 2023 Constitution made the country's national languages official languages, while French became a working language rather than retaining its former position as the sole official language.
This does not mean French has disappeared.
It remains important in administration, education, diplomacy and international commerce.
But politically, the constitutional change matters.
Language determines:
who accesses government;
how education functions;
whose culture is publicly recognized;
and what historical identity the state projects.
Making African languages official therefore carries a message beyond linguistics:
Political independence should also have a cultural dimension.
The sovereignty movement is increasingly asking whether African states can genuinely consider themselves decolonized if colonial languages remain overwhelmingly dominant in institutions.
9. The CFA Franc Has Become One of the Strongest Symbols
Few subjects generate more sovereignty debate than the CFA franc.
The monetary system has changed considerably since the colonial era, and some popular claims about direct French control oversimplify the present arrangements.
Nevertheless, symbolism matters enormously.
For critics, the CFA franc represents a fundamental question:
Can a country possess complete political sovereignty without complete monetary sovereignty?
Supporters of the existing system emphasize:
price stability;
convertibility;
regional integration;
and reduced currency risk.
Critics emphasize:
historical origins;
constraints on monetary policy;
foreign institutional connections;
and the psychological meaning of retaining a monetary structure associated with colonial rule.
The fact that Afrobarometer found overwhelming Malian support for leaving the franc zone demonstrates how monetary policy has become inseparable from political identity.
A currency is no longer simply an economic instrument.
It has become a symbol of whether independence is considered complete.
10. Natural Resources Are Becoming the Material Test of Sovereignty
This may be where sovereignty politics becomes most consequential.
The Sahel is rich in strategic resources.
Mali has gold and lithium.
Burkina Faso possesses major gold production.
Niger has uranium, oil and gold.
Governments increasingly argue that foreign companies and earlier contractual systems captured too much of the economic value.
Burkina Faso has moved several gold assets into state ownership and created the state mining company SOPAMIB as part of a strategy to increase national control over mining revenues.
Mali revised its mining framework to increase government revenue and participation, leading to disputes with major international mining companies.
Niger went even further in uranium, announcing the nationalization of SOMAÏR, the long-standing joint venture involving French nuclear company Orano.
These policies reflect a fundamental evolution.
Earlier African politics often asked:
How much foreign investment can we attract?
The new sovereignty politics increasingly asks:
How much control should foreign investors be allowed over strategic national assets?
11. But Resource Sovereignty Can Succeed or Fail
National ownership does not automatically produce prosperity.
A government can nationalize a mine and still fail to operate it efficiently.
Foreign investors can leave.
Production can decline.
Capital can become more expensive.
Corruption can transfer wealth from foreign corporations to domestic elites rather than citizens.
The important question therefore is not simply:
Who owns the mine?
It is:
Who captures the value?
True economic sovereignty would require:
transparent contracts;
local technical expertise;
domestic processing;
competitive investment;
effective taxation;
infrastructure;
environmental safeguards;
and visible benefits for citizens.
Otherwise resource nationalism can become symbolic sovereignty without economic transformation.
12. Foreign Military Bases Became Politically Unsustainable
Nothing demonstrates the sovereignty shift more visibly than the removal of foreign troops.
France withdrew from Mali.
Burkina Faso terminated French military arrangements.
Niger demanded French withdrawal after its coup.
American forces subsequently withdrew from Niger as well.
From the perspective of AES governments, this represents restoration of control over national territory.
The political argument is powerful:
A sovereign country should determine which foreign soldiers operate within its borders.
But the harder question comes afterwards.
Can national and AES forces replace the intelligence, surveillance, logistics, aviation and training capabilities previously provided by foreign partners?
If they cannot, governments may simply seek a different external military partner.
Russia has already become increasingly important.
That raises a fundamental paradox.
13. Sovereignty Is Not Achieved by Replacing France With Russia
Anti-colonial politics frequently presents Russia as an alternative partner.
In Mali especially, Russia has developed substantial popular approval.
Afrobarometer's 2024/25 survey found 88% of Malians viewed Russian influence positively, compared with only 9% for France. But that pattern is unusually strong: across 38 African countries, only 36% on average rated Russian influence positively.
This comparison matters.
Russia's popularity in Mali reflects a specific political environment.
It should not be confused with a continental consensus.
More importantly, geopolitical sovereignty cannot logically mean dependence on Moscow instead of Paris.
If an African government cannot protect itself without Russian military personnel;
cannot operate weapons without Russian technicians;
cannot develop nuclear infrastructure without Russian financing;
or cannot survive diplomatically without Russian support,
then strategic dependence remains.
Only the partner has changed.
True sovereignty requires multiple options.
14. The Strongest Sovereignty Strategy Is Multipolar
This is where contemporary Sahel politics has an opportunity that earlier generations did not possess.
The international system is more competitive.
African governments can engage simultaneously with:
China;
Russia;
Turkey;
India;
the Gulf states;
Morocco;
Europe;
the United States;
and other African countries.
That gives them bargaining power.
The strongest foreign policy is therefore not necessarily anti-Western or pro-Russian.
It is pro-optionality.
A sovereign state should be capable of saying:
yes to China on infrastructure,
yes to Turkey on defence technology,
yes to Europe on trade,
yes to Russia where interests align,
yes to African regional cooperation,
and no to any partner when the terms are unacceptable.
That is strategic autonomy.
15. Anti-Colonial Politics Can Also Become a Tool of Domestic Power
This is the contradiction that cannot be ignored.
Governments demanding external sovereignty may simultaneously restrict internal political freedom.
Military governments can portray critics as:
agents of France;
foreign proxies;
enemies of national unity;
or opponents of sovereignty.
Media restrictions may then be justified in the name of national security.
Political competition can be postponed because of war.
Civil society can be constrained because foreign funding is viewed with suspicion.
This creates a profound question:
Can a government claim sovereignty for the nation while reducing the political sovereignty of its citizens?
Critics of the current sovereignist movement argue that anti-imperialism can become a mechanism through which military governments legitimize extended rule.
Even analysts sympathetic to the depth of the regional break have warned that the sovereignty movement combines genuine public aspirations with risks of authoritarian political capture.
This distinction is essential.
National sovereignty and democratic sovereignty are related—but they are not identical.
16. Sovereignty Must Ultimately Belong to Citizens
The strongest definition of sovereignty cannot simply mean:
France leaves.
Russia arrives.
ECOWAS leaves.
The military governs.
Foreign companies are nationalized.
A flag changes.
A language changes.
Or a new currency is created.
Sovereignty should ultimately mean that citizens possess meaningful control over the political and economic decisions shaping their lives.
That includes:
national independence;
territorial integrity;
resource control;
political participation;
accountable government;
economic opportunity;
legal equality;
and the ability to choose leaders.
Otherwise sovereignty can migrate from foreign capitals to domestic elites without ever reaching ordinary citizens.
17. ECOWAS Faces a Sovereignty Crisis of Its Own
The AES challenge also contains lessons for ECOWAS.
The regional organization was originally designed partly to promote economic integration.
It later became increasingly involved in:
constitutional order;
elections;
sanctions;
conflict management;
and military intervention.
The withdrawal of three member states demonstrates that regional integration cannot survive indefinitely without political legitimacy.
ECOWAS itself has acknowledged the sovereignty of the departing countries while seeking to preserve trade, movement and other regional connections.
The organization therefore faces a strategic question:
Can it protect constitutional government without appearing coercive?
And can the AES defend sovereignty without destroying the economic integration its landlocked members require?
Neither side can escape geography.
18. The AES Cannot Achieve Sovereignty Through Isolation
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are all landlocked.
Their sovereignty therefore depends partly upon cooperation with neighbours.
They require ports.
Transit corridors.
Regional electricity markets.
Telecommunications links.
Banking networks.
Food trade.
Fuel imports.
Cross-border commerce.
Millions of ordinary people also have family, commercial and cultural connections across West Africa.
This means one of the greatest misconceptions about sovereignty must be rejected:
Sovereignty does not mean isolation.
A country becomes stronger not by eliminating interdependence but by ensuring that interdependence is balanced and negotiable.
The AES will therefore have to reconcile political independence with economic integration.
That may be one of its hardest long-term challenges.
19. The New Politics Is Also About Dignity
Much geopolitical analysis focuses on material interests.
But political psychology matters.
Words such as:
respect,
dignity,
equality,
and humiliation
appear repeatedly in sovereignty debates.
Why?
Because international relations are not experienced only through GDP figures or military agreements.
They are also experienced through symbols.
A foreign president appearing to lecture African leaders can generate resentment.
A former colonial power asking to maintain military bases can evoke historical memories.
An African government being sanctioned can create feelings of unequal treatment.
A foreign corporation controlling a strategic mine can become symbolic even if the commercial arrangement is legally valid.
Sovereignty politics is therefore partly material and partly psychological.
People want not merely better contracts.
They want relationships that feel equal.
Any external power that ignores this dimension will struggle in the emerging Sahel.
20. Why the Message Travels Beyond the AES
The significance of this politics extends beyond Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Afrobarometer polling in Togo found that 64% of respondents considered the AES countries' withdrawal from ECOWAS justified, with perceptions of external influence over ECOWAS among the reasons respondents cited.
That does not mean neighbouring countries want military governments.
Nor does it mean they want to leave ECOWAS.
It demonstrates something subtler:
the underlying sovereignty critique resonates beyond the three AES states.
Questions about:
foreign bases;
resource ownership;
African representation in global institutions;
currency;
trade;
and political autonomy
are increasingly continental questions.
21. What Would Genuine Sahelian Sovereignty Look Like?
A mature sovereignty project would have to go beyond rhetoric.
Security sovereignty
National and regional forces should eventually be capable of defending territory without permanent dependency on foreign armies.
Economic sovereignty
Governments should capture greater value from uranium, gold, lithium, agriculture and energy without making investment impossible.
Financial sovereignty
The region should expand its own financing capacity while maintaining access to competitive international capital.
Food sovereignty
Countries vulnerable to international supply disruptions need stronger agricultural systems and regional food markets.
Energy sovereignty
Solar, oil, gas, uranium and regional electricity networks should reduce dependence on expensive external energy.
Technological sovereignty
Digital infrastructure, telecommunications, data systems and cybersecurity increasingly matter as much as traditional borders.
Diplomatic sovereignty
Governments must maintain multiple international relationships without becoming subordinate to a single geopolitical camp.
Democratic sovereignty
Citizens must retain the ability to influence governments claiming to act in their name.
This last point may ultimately be the most important.
Three Possible Futures
Scenario One: Sovereignty Becomes State-Building
The AES successfully turns political rhetoric into institutions.
Security improves.
Resources generate more domestic value.
Regional infrastructure expands.
Political institutions gradually become more representative.
Foreign relationships diversify.
Under this scenario, the sovereignty movement could become one of Africa's most important experiments in strategic autonomy.
Scenario Two: Sovereignty Becomes Permanent Geopolitical Realignment
France and Western influence continue declining, while Russia, China, Turkey and Gulf countries expand.
The AES survives, but the region remains dependent on external capital, military technology and markets.
The geopolitical orientation changes, but structural dependency largely remains.
This would represent realignment rather than independence.
Scenario Three: Sovereignty Becomes a Political Slogan
Security remains poor.
Economic conditions fail to improve.
Resource nationalism produces limited benefits.
Political freedoms decline.
Foreign dependency simply moves toward new partners.
Under this scenario, sovereignty rhetoric could eventually lose the popular appeal it currently possesses.
Citizens may begin asking the same question of today's governments that they previously asked of former political systems:
What has sovereignty actually delivered?
The Sahel Is Redefining What Independence Means
The new sovereignty politics of the Sahel cannot be understood simply as anti-French anger.
It is much larger.
It reflects accumulated frustration with:
colonial history;
foreign military presence;
security failures;
economic dependency;
resource extraction;
regional institutions perceived as distant;
political elites considered insufficiently autonomous;
and an international order in which African states often feel they possess too little influence.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have transformed those frustrations into a political project.
They have removed foreign troops.
Created the AES.
Left ECOWAS.
Changed resource policies.
Built new regional institutions.
Questioned established monetary arrangements.
Diversified foreign partnerships.
And placed sovereignty at the centre of national political identity.
That represents a genuine geopolitical transformation.
But the project is not yet complete.
The real test will not be whether these governments can criticize colonialism.
It will be whether they can build something stronger in its place.
Can sovereignty create safer communities?
Can it produce jobs?
Can it deliver electricity?
Can it improve education?
Can it convert gold and uranium into industrial development?
Can it preserve national independence without creating Russian, Chinese or other new dependencies?
And can it protect the political rights of the citizens in whose name sovereignty is being claimed?
Those questions will determine whether the Sahel's sovereignty movement becomes a durable African political transformation or another cycle of disappointment.
The deepest lesson is therefore simple:
Political independence is an event. Sovereignty is a capacity.
A flag can establish independence.
But genuine sovereignty requires the ability to:
defend territory,
control resources,
finance development,
choose partners,
govern effectively,
and allow citizens meaningful control over their political future.
That is the struggle now unfolding across the Sahel.
And if Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger can translate sovereignty from a language of resistance into a functioning system of governance and development, their experiment could influence political debates far beyond the desert belt itself.
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