THE SAHEL-
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: The Rise of a New Sahel Alliance.
Could the Sahel Develop Its Own Independent Geopolitical Bloc?
For decades, the political architecture of West Africa seemed relatively settled. The Economic Community of West African States—ECOWAS—was the region's principal political and economic organisation. France remained deeply influential in much of its former colonial sphere. The CFA franc connected several countries through a common monetary system. Western governments provided military assistance, development finance and counterterrorism support.
Then Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger began moving in a dramatically different direction.
Between 2020 and 2023, military takeovers transformed the governments of all three countries. Their disputes with ECOWAS intensified. Relations with France deteriorated. Western military deployments were reduced or terminated. The three governments increasingly embraced a political vocabulary built around sovereignty, strategic autonomy, resource control and resistance to external interference.
What began as political solidarity among three military-led governments has subsequently evolved into something much more ambitious: the Alliance of Sahel States, known by its French acronym AES.
The critical question is therefore no longer whether Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are cooperating.
They clearly are.
The much larger question is:
Can the AES become the foundation of an independent geopolitical bloc capable of shaping West African affairs rather than merely reacting to ECOWAS, France or other external powers?
The answer is increasingly: possibly—but only if political solidarity can be converted into durable institutions, economic integration and measurable security improvements.
From Three Coups to a Strategic Alliance
The origins of the AES lie directly in the political and security crises of the Central Sahel.
Mali experienced military takeovers in 2020 and 2021. Burkina Faso experienced two coups during 2022. Niger's elected government was overthrown in July 2023.
Although the circumstances differed, the new governments shared several arguments.
They claimed previous political systems had failed to defeat jihadist insurgencies.
They accused Western military interventions of failing to produce lasting security.
They criticised foreign influence over African political and economic decision-making.
And they increasingly rejected ECOWAS pressure for rapid returns to constitutional civilian government.
The Niger coup provided the decisive catalyst.
When ECOWAS threatened the possible use of force to restore Niger's deposed government in 2023, Mali and Burkina Faso declared that military intervention in Niger would effectively be regarded as an attack on them as well.
On 16 September 2023, the three governments signed the Liptako-Gourma Charter, formally establishing the Alliance of Sahel States. The agreement created a collective defence architecture under which an attack on the sovereignty or territorial integrity of one member could trigger assistance from the others.
The AES therefore began fundamentally as a mutual-security pact.
But it did not remain one.
From Military Alliance to Political Confederation
The decisive transformation occurred on 6 July 2024 in Niamey.
At their first summit, the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a treaty establishing the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States.
The confederation was built around three broad pillars:
defence and security,
diplomacy,
and economic development.
The summit also committed the countries to closer coordination of foreign policy and development strategy.
This distinction matters.
A military alliance responds primarily to threats.
A geopolitical bloc attempts to coordinate how its members interact with the international system.
By creating a confederation rather than merely maintaining a defence treaty, the AES governments signalled that they wanted something much broader: an alternative political centre of gravity in the Sahel.
1. Security Is the Foundation of the AES
Security is the most obvious reason Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger need one another.
The insurgencies confronting them operate across national borders. Jihadist organisations do not respect the territorial divisions inherited by modern states.
Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and Islamic State operate across borderlands connecting Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Individual national armies therefore face an inherently transnational enemy.
The AES response has been to move progressively toward integrated military structures.
Joint operations have already taken place, and the three countries have been developing a Unified Force of the AES—FU-AES.
In April 2026, the chiefs of defence staff met to advance the operationalisation of the unified force. In July 2026, AES defence ministers validated its legal status, providing a framework for cross-border military operations and describing the process as movement toward a more integrated common force.
This represents a significant geopolitical development.
If sustained, the three countries could eventually create something resembling a Sahelian collective-security system independent of ECOWAS military structures.
But there is an uncomfortable reality.
Security cooperation has not yet produced decisive security superiority.
Independent conflict monitoring continues to show exceptionally high levels of militant violence across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimated in August 2026 that approximately 9,928 fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups had occurred in the Sahel over the preceding year, making it Africa's deadliest militant-Islamist theatre.
This creates the first major test of the AES.
A security alliance ultimately derives legitimacy not from declarations but from results.
If the unified force improves border intelligence, rapid deployment, logistics and civilian security, the AES could become a powerful regional institution.
If insecurity continues expanding despite deeper integration, the alliance's central promise will face increasing pressure.
2. The Break with ECOWAS Changed West Africa
Perhaps the most consequential geopolitical decision was the joint withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS.
Their departure became effective on 29 January 2025.
That was not merely an administrative change.
It divided West Africa into two increasingly distinct political formations:
ECOWAS, dominated by coastal and constitutionally governed states;
and
the AES, centred on the military-led governments of the Central Sahel.
Yet complete separation has not occurred.
ECOWAS temporarily maintained important arrangements involving free movement, passports and trade while negotiations over the future relationship continued.
And in March 2026, ECOWAS appointed former Guinean prime minister Lansana Kouyaté as chief negotiator for discussions with the AES countries.
This illustrates something important.
Despite political confrontation, geography makes complete economic divorce extremely difficult.
All three AES states are landlocked.
Mali depends heavily on corridors through countries such as Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea.
Burkina Faso relies on connections through Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin.
Niger depends on transport corridors through neighbouring states, including the important oil connection with Benin.
The AES may withdraw politically from ECOWAS, but it cannot withdraw from West African geography.
3. The AES Is Building Its Own Institutions
One of the strongest arguments that the AES could become a genuine geopolitical bloc is that institution-building has moved beyond rhetoric.
A common passport
AES passports entered circulation from 29 January 2025, symbolising a new confederal identity and a commitment to movement within the three-country space.
A passport may appear symbolic, but symbols matter in state formation and regional integration.
ECOWAS itself became politically meaningful partly because West Africans gradually experienced regional citizenship through mobility.
The AES appears to understand this.
A development bank
A much more substantial development came in December 2025 with the operationalisation of the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development—BCID-AES.
The bank was launched with initial capital of 500 billion CFA francs and a mandate to support roads, agriculture, food security, energy interconnections and private-sector projects.
This could be one of the most important institutions the AES has created.
Why?
Because sovereignty requires financial capacity.
A political organisation dependent entirely on foreign lenders cannot exercise complete strategic autonomy.
If the BCID-AES can mobilise mining revenues, domestic capital, sovereign investment and external financing on terms chosen by the three governments, it could gradually give the confederation a stronger economic foundation.
4. The Economic Potential Is Larger Than It Appears
Individually, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are relatively small economies.
Together, however, they constitute a significant territorial and demographic space.
World Bank figures for 2025 put Mali's population at about 25.2 million, Burkina Faso's at about 24.1 million, and Niger's at approximately 27.9 million—roughly 77 million people combined.
Their combined nominal economic output is around $79 billion, using 2025 World Bank data.
More strategically, they possess valuable resources.
Mali
Gold, lithium, agriculture and enormous solar potential.
Burkina Faso
Gold, manganese potential, agriculture and a strategically located central West African position.
Niger
Uranium, oil, gold and major solar-energy potential.
If those resources continue to be exported largely as raw commodities, the AES will remain economically vulnerable.
But if the three countries jointly develop:
mineral refining,
energy generation,
agricultural processing,
transportation corridors,
regional electricity networks,
digital infrastructure,
logistics,
banking,
and manufacturing,
the confederation could acquire significantly greater bargaining power.
This may ultimately determine whether the AES becomes a geopolitical bloc or merely a political coalition.
5. The Russia Question: Independence or a New Dependency?
One of the most controversial aspects of the AES is its relationship with Russia.
As relations with France deteriorated and Western military forces departed, Russia expanded security cooperation with the Sahelian governments.
In July 2026, Russia and the three AES countries agreed to deepen military cooperation amid continuing insurgent violence.
From the perspective of AES leaders, diversification away from France and other Western powers increases strategic choice.
But there is a fundamental geopolitical test here.
Strategic autonomy is not achieved simply by changing patrons.
If dependence on Paris is replaced by dependence on Moscow, the geopolitical structure has changed—but independence has not necessarily increased.
A truly autonomous AES would need relationships with multiple centres of power:
Russia
China
Turkey
India
Gulf countries
Morocco
European states
the United States
other African powers
and international institutions.
Its strongest position would therefore not be becoming a "Russian bloc."
It would be becoming a Sahelian bloc capable of negotiating with everyone.
That distinction may determine its long-term sovereignty.
6. Economic Independence Will Be Harder Than Political Independence
Leaving ECOWAS was politically possible.
Creating economic independence will be much harder.
The three countries remain deeply connected to broader West African financial and commercial systems.
Indeed, Burkina Faso hosted a statutory UEMOA Council of Ministers meeting as recently as July 2026, while Mali and Niger remain represented within UEMOA structures.
They consequently remain connected to the West African CFA franc monetary system.
This produces an interesting geopolitical situation.
The AES has left ECOWAS but has not fully separated from every West African institution.
That may actually be advantageous.
Strategic autonomy does not necessarily require institutional isolation.
The challenge is whether the AES can create additional economic instruments without destroying useful existing connections.
7. Diplomacy Is Becoming a Collective Instrument
Another characteristic of an emerging geopolitical bloc is the ability to speak internationally with a coordinated voice.
The AES is explicitly attempting this.
In June 2026, senior officials from the three states met in Bamako under the confederation's diplomacy pillar to harmonise positions and coordinate relations with bilateral and multilateral partners.
If this continues, foreign governments may increasingly find themselves negotiating not simply with Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger individually but with an emerging Sahelian diplomatic caucus.
That would increase negotiating leverage.
Imagine negotiations involving:
uranium contracts,
gold mining,
oil pipelines,
military cooperation,
infrastructure investment,
migration,
counterterrorism,
or debt restructuring.
Three states negotiating together may possess substantially more bargaining power than each acting alone.
8. The Biggest Weakness: All Three Governments Face Similar Vulnerabilities
Similarity helped create the alliance.
It could also become a weakness.
All three governments face:
jihadist insurgencies,
fiscal constraints,
large youth populations,
infrastructure deficits,
poverty,
climate stress,
displacement,
dependence on commodity exports,
and landlocked geography.
An alliance becomes strongest when members possess complementary strengths.
The European Union, for example, combines industrial, agricultural, financial, technological and logistical economies.
The AES members have many overlapping vulnerabilities.
This means they cannot become fully self-sufficient simply by integrating with one another.
They will still require trade and investment relationships with coastal West Africa and the wider world.
9. Governance Could Become the Decisive Question
There is also a deeper political problem.
The AES has been constructed principally under military governments.
Supporters argue that these governments are reclaiming sovereignty and confronting security failures inherited from previous political systems.
Critics argue that restrictions on political competition, civil society and independent media could weaken accountability and make security policy less effective over time.
This debate matters because geopolitical blocs cannot survive on leadership chemistry alone.
Institutions must outlive individual leaders.
The real measure of the AES will therefore come when political leadership eventually changes.
Will cooperation survive?
Will treaties remain binding?
Will citizens continue supporting the confederation?
Will future civilian governments preserve it?
If the answer is yes, the AES will have evolved from an alliance among governments into an alliance among states.
That would be a major milestone.
Three Possible Futures for the AES
Scenario One: A Genuine Sahelian Power Bloc
The three governments deepen integration.
The unified military force becomes operationally effective.
The BCID-AES finances major cross-border infrastructure.
Trade barriers fall.
Energy networks are integrated.
Minerals are increasingly processed locally.
Diplomacy becomes coordinated.
Relationships diversify across Russia, China, India, Turkey, Gulf states, Europe and other African countries.
Additional states eventually seek closer association.
Under this scenario, the AES could become a durable geopolitical pole between North Africa and coastal West Africa.
Scenario Two: A Strong Security Alliance but Weak Economic Confederation
Military and diplomatic cooperation survives, but economic integration progresses slowly.
The states continue depending heavily on neighbouring ECOWAS ports, UEMOA financial institutions and external investors.
In that situation, the AES would matter geopolitically but remain closer to a security coalition than a genuinely independent regional system.
This is probably the most plausible medium-term scenario unless economic institution-building accelerates dramatically.
Scenario Three: Political Fragmentation
Security deteriorates.
Economic pressures increase.
Leadership changes occur.
One country attempts rapprochement with ECOWAS or Western partners.
Different governments develop different foreign-policy preferences.
The alliance gradually weakens.
History contains many regional organisations that appeared powerful during moments of shared crisis but became weaker once the original threat disappeared or leadership changed.
The AES is not immune from this possibility.
Could Other Sahel States Eventually Join?
That question may become increasingly important.
If the AES demonstrates military effectiveness, economic growth and political stability, neighbouring countries could seek association or specialised partnerships.
The long-term geopolitical significance of the confederation would increase dramatically if it eventually developed structured relationships extending toward countries such as Chad, Mauritania, Guinea or other neighbouring states.
But expansion before consolidation would be risky.
The AES first needs to prove that integration among its three founding members actually works.
The Deeper Question: What Does Independence Mean?
The most important lesson is that independence cannot simply mean rejecting France, ECOWAS or the West.
True geopolitical independence means possessing options.
A strategically autonomous Sahel would be able to tell:
France yes or no,
Russia yes or no,
China yes or no,
America yes or no,
depending on its own interests.
It would negotiate mining contracts because it controls processing alternatives.
It would choose security partners because it possesses its own capable armed forces.
It would negotiate trade corridors because multiple routes are available.
It would borrow internationally because domestic and regional institutions give it alternatives.
That is geopolitical sovereignty.
A New Bloc Is Emerging—but Its Success Is Not Yet Guaranteed
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have already moved beyond temporary diplomatic cooperation.
They have created:
a defence pact,
a confederation,
a common passport,
a developing unified military force,
a confederal development bank,
and mechanisms for coordinated diplomacy.
Those are the foundations of a geopolitical bloc, not merely the symbols of one.
The AES therefore deserves to be taken seriously as one of the most consequential experiments in African regional politics in decades.
But the greatest challenge now begins.
Breaking with the old system is easier than constructing a superior replacement.
The alliance must demonstrate that sovereignty produces better security, stronger economies, functioning institutions, infrastructure, employment and improved living conditions.
Otherwise political independence may remain largely symbolic.
So, could the Sahel develop its own independent geopolitical bloc?
Yes. And the institutional foundations are already being constructed.
But its ultimate strength will depend on whether Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger can transform a coalition born from coups, sanctions and insecurity into something much harder to build:
a durable economic, political and security community capable of surviving individual governments and negotiating with the world from a position of collective strength.
If that happens, the AES will not simply represent a rebellion against the existing West African order.
It could become the beginning of a new one.
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