THE SAHEL-
The Sahel in 2035:
Stabilization, Fragmentation or New Regional Power?
Future Scenarios for Security, Political Systems and Regional Alliances.
By 2035, the Sahel could look dramatically different from the region we know today.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger could emerge from their current crises with stronger states, functioning regional institutions and increasingly capable security forces.
They could develop the Alliance of Sahel States—AES—into a durable political, military and economic bloc capable of bargaining with global powers on its own terms.
Or the opposite could happen.
Jihadist insurgencies could expand.
Governments could lose control of additional territory.
Separatist movements could strengthen.
Economic pressures could worsen.
Political transitions could fail.
And the Sahel could become increasingly fragmented between governments, insurgent-controlled territories, local militias and competing foreign interests.
A third possibility lies somewhere between these extremes: the Sahel remains politically turbulent but gradually becomes an increasingly important geopolitical power centre because of its population, minerals, energy resources and strategic location.
No one can know with certainty which future will emerge.
But scenario analysis allows us to ask a more useful question:
What developments between now and 2035 would push the Sahel toward stabilization, fragmentation or regional power?
The answer will depend primarily on six variables:
security, governance, demographics, economic transformation, regional integration and foreign alliances.
The Sahel's future will not be determined by terrorism alone.
It will be determined by whether governments can convert sovereignty politics into functioning states.
The Starting Point: The Sahel in 2026
Any projection toward 2035 must begin with the conditions that exist today.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have undergone military takeovers and broken significantly with the regional political order that existed a decade ago.
They have withdrawn from ECOWAS and consolidated their cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States.
But complete separation from West Africa has not occurred. ECOWAS appointed former Guinean prime minister Lansana Kouyaté in March 2026 to lead negotiations with the AES, demonstrating that both sides still recognize the importance of maintaining some form of regional relationship.
At the same time, the AES is becoming more institutionalized.
In December 2025, the three governments formally launched the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development of the AES, capitalized initially at 500 billion CFA francs, with priorities including roads, agriculture, food security, energy interconnections and private-sector development.
Security cooperation is also expanding.
In July 2026, Russia and the three AES governments agreed to deepen military and military-technical cooperation, including Russian support for the AES's emerging Unified Force.
Yet the security environment remains extremely dangerous.
In April 2026, coordinated jihadist and separatist attacks in Mali exposed serious weaknesses in the government's security system and demonstrated that armed groups could still threaten strategically important territory.
The humanitarian pressure is equally significant. Across the broader Sahel crisis area, UNHCR reported more than 5 million people of concern by July 2026, reflecting conflict, displacement and continuing regional instability.
This is therefore the paradox from which the journey toward 2035 begins:
The Sahel is becoming more politically organized at precisely the same time that its security environment remains extremely fragile.
That contradiction creates several radically different futures.
SCENARIO ONE
2035: The Stabilized Sahel
Under the first scenario, the next decade marks a gradual transition from permanent emergency to cautious stabilization.
This does not mean terrorism disappears.
Insurgent organizations would probably still exist.
Instead, governments gradually prevent militants from expanding, restore administration to contested areas and reduce the ability of jihadist organizations to function as alternative governments.
What would have to happen?
The first major change would involve security strategy.
Instead of judging success primarily by how many militants are killed, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger would increasingly focus on protecting civilian communities and restoring state institutions.
Military units retaking territory would be followed by:
teachers,
police,
courts,
health workers,
agricultural services,
local administrators
and infrastructure investment.
This would represent a shift from counterterrorism toward state-building.
Political Negotiation Returns
Military action alone is unlikely to resolve every conflict.
Mali in particular faces not only jihadist insurgencies but long-standing disputes involving northern populations and Tuareg political movements.
A stabilization scenario would probably require some form of political negotiation.
Governments would distinguish between:
irreconcilable transnational jihadist movements,
local insurgents,
communal armed groups,
political separatists,
and communities that joined rebellions primarily because of local grievances.
That distinction would allow governments to isolate the most committed extremist organizations while negotiating with other actors.
This would be politically controversial.
But most durable insurgencies eventually involve some combination of military pressure and political accommodation.
The AES Unified Force Becomes Effective
The AES's emerging joint force could become one of the most consequential security institutions in Africa by 2035.
Today, militants exploit borders.
A group attacked in Mali can move toward Burkina Faso.
Pressure in Burkina Faso can redirect fighters into Niger.
National military systems therefore face a regional insurgency using largely national responses.
An effective AES force could change this.
By 2035 it might possess:
joint intelligence centres;
common communications systems;
shared drone surveillance;
cross-border pursuit agreements;
integrated air support;
specialized counter-IED units;
and coordinated logistics.
Foreign partners could provide equipment and training while African officers retain operational command.
If successful, the security relationship would gradually shift from:
Foreign forces fighting African wars
toward:
African forces using foreign partnerships selectively.
That would represent genuine strategic autonomy.
Civilian Government Gradually Returns
The political question would be equally important.
The AES was constructed under military governments.
But regional organizations survive only if their institutions become stronger than the leaders who created them.
By 2035, stabilization could involve transitions toward civilian or hybrid political systems.
This does not necessarily mean a return to exactly the political structures that existed before the coups.
New constitutions might produce stronger presidencies, more sovereignty-focused foreign policies and different relationships with regional institutions.
But competitive elections, stronger judicial institutions and some restoration of political pluralism would increase long-term legitimacy.
The critical test would come when leadership changes.
If a future civilian government in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger preserves the AES, then the alliance will have transformed from an agreement among military rulers into a genuine interstate institution.
Economic Recovery Reinforces Security
Security and economics would begin reinforcing one another.
Roads reopen.
Agricultural production expands.
Mines operate more securely.
Electricity networks improve.
Cross-border commerce grows.
Investment returns.
Governments collect more taxes.
Higher revenues allow them to finance police, schools and infrastructure.
The cycle that once connected poverty and insecurity could begin moving in the opposite direction:
Greater security → greater investment → more employment → stronger government revenue → stronger institutions → greater security.
This is the virtuous circle the Sahel desperately needs.
SCENARIO TWO
2035: The Fragmented Sahel
The second scenario is considerably darker.
Under this future, governments fail to contain militant expansion.
Political repression increases.
Economic development stalls.
Regional relations deteriorate.
Different armed actors gradually consolidate influence over different territories.
The result would not necessarily be the complete collapse of Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.
Instead, governments might formally control their countries while possessing increasingly uneven authority outside major cities.
Mali Could Become the Critical Weak Point
Mali would be especially important.
The coordinated jihadist and separatist attacks of 2026 demonstrated the possibility that different armed movements could simultaneously challenge state authority. Reuters reported that April attacks placed the Malian government under severe pressure and raised the possibility of deeper territorial fragmentation.
Imagine that trend continuing for another decade.
Bamako retains control of the capital and parts of southern Mali.
Northern regions are contested by separatist movements.
JNIM dominates rural corridors across parts of central Mali.
Government forces control major towns but struggle between them.
Smuggling economies flourish.
Local communities negotiate separately with whichever armed actor is strongest.
Mali remains one country internationally.
But internally it increasingly functions as several overlapping political spaces.
That would represent de facto fragmentation without formal partition.
Burkina Faso Faces Territorial Pressure
Burkina Faso could experience similar problems.
If the government continues losing access to rural territory while concentrating security resources around cities and strategic corridors, militants may establish increasingly durable zones of influence.
The danger would not necessarily be insurgents capturing Ouagadougou.
The greater danger would be the gradual development of two systems:
official government authority in major population centres
and
insurgent authority across peripheral rural districts.
Once armed organizations collect taxes, regulate markets and settle disputes over extended periods, removing them becomes substantially more difficult.
Niger Faces Multiple Fronts
Niger possesses another vulnerability.
Its enormous territory forces the state to address different security theatres simultaneously.
Western Niger faces violence associated with the Central Sahel insurgency.
Southeastern Niger remains connected to the Lake Chad security environment.
The country must also protect oil infrastructure, uranium regions, international borders and major population centres.
If state capacity deteriorates, Niger could become stretched across several security fronts.
Competition between JNIM and Islamic State in the Sahel Province had already expanded into Niger by 2026, demonstrating how armed organizations can exploit weakly governed border areas.
By 2035, an uncontrolled expansion could transform the borderlands into a patchwork of rival militant zones.
Organized Crime Becomes an Alternative Economy
Fragmentation would also have an economic dimension.
Where governments lose territorial control, criminal markets expand.
Gold smuggling.
Fuel trafficking.
Kidnapping.
Weapons trading.
Livestock theft.
Drug transit.
Migrant smuggling.
Illegal taxation.
These activities could provide financing for armed groups.
The scale of such financing can be enormous. A UN assessment reported by Reuters in August 2026 concluded that a ransom payment of around $50 million in late 2025 helped finance a major JNIM offensive.
By 2035, sophisticated criminal-financial networks could make insurgencies increasingly self-financing.
That would reduce the effectiveness of international attempts to cut foreign funding.
Climate and Population Pressure Intensify the Crisis
Demographics will also shape the future.
The Sahel has one of the youngest and fastest-growing populations in the world.
This could become an enormous economic advantage.
But without employment, education and infrastructure, it could instead intensify instability.
Millions more young people will enter labour markets during the next decade.
Governments must create opportunities at an extraordinary pace.
At the same time, climate shocks will continue affecting:
agriculture,
pastoralism,
food security,
water,
and migration.
The problem is not simply population growth.
It is population growth occurring faster than the expansion of state capacity.
If governments cannot build schools, jobs, electricity systems and cities quickly enough, frustration may rise.
Fragmentation Could Spread Southward
The consequences would not remain inside AES borders.
JNIM already operates beyond the Central Sahel.
An increasingly fragmented Sahel could place greater pressure on:
Benin,
Togo,
Ghana,
Côte d'Ivoire
and potentially other coastal states.
Trade routes could become insecure.
Military spending would rise.
Investment in northern border regions would become more difficult.
Refugee flows could increase.
What began as a Central Sahel crisis could evolve into a wider West African security system crisis.
ECOWAS itself recognizes the danger, and in 2026 continued developing regional counterterrorism and border-management mechanisms while maintaining dialogue with the AES.
By 2035, cooperation between the AES and coastal West African governments may therefore become a strategic necessity regardless of political disagreements.
SCENARIO THREE
2035: The Sahel Emerges as a New Regional Power
The third scenario is the most ambitious.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger transform the AES from a defensive political coalition into a functioning geopolitical bloc.
This would not make the Sahel comparable in economic size to the European Union, China or the United States.
Regional power is relative.
The AES could become powerful within West Africa because it combines:
territory;
population;
strategic minerals;
energy resources;
military integration;
and a distinctive political identity.
From Alliance to Confederation
By 2035, the AES could possess institutions resembling those of a serious regional organization.
A functioning confederal development bank already exists in embryonic form.
The BCID-AES began operations with 500 billion CFA francs in capital and a mandate covering infrastructure, agriculture and energy.
Imagine that by 2035 it has financed:
trans-Sahel highways;
solar power plants;
irrigation systems;
industrial zones;
rail connections;
mineral-processing facilities;
and cross-border electricity grids.
The AES would no longer be defined primarily by what it rejected.
It would increasingly be defined by what it built.
That distinction would be transformational.
Strategic Minerals Become Instruments of Power
The region possesses considerable natural-resource leverage.
Mali has gold and lithium.
Burkina Faso possesses major gold resources.
Niger has uranium and growing oil production.
Niger's economic outlook already demonstrates the transformative potential of hydrocarbons. World Bank projections have identified oil exports as an important driver of Nigerien growth while also warning that agriculture remains highly climate-sensitive.
If the AES simply exports raw materials, its political influence will remain limited.
But imagine a different 2035.
Gold is increasingly refined regionally.
Lithium processing begins developing.
Nigerien oil supports petrochemical activity.
Mining revenues finance infrastructure.
Local engineers and technicians increasingly operate industrial facilities.
Resource policy changes from:
extract and export
to:
extract, process and industrialize.
That could radically increase the economic significance of the bloc.
Energy Could Become the Sahel's Hidden Advantage
Few regions possess greater solar potential.
Vast territories across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger receive intense sunlight.
By 2035, declining solar and battery costs could make distributed energy systems strategically transformative.
Solar power could support:
cities;
irrigation;
mines;
telecommunications;
data infrastructure;
industrial zones;
and rural communities.
Regional electricity interconnections could allow excess power generated in one country to support demand elsewhere.
Niger's uranium creates an additional long-term strategic option around nuclear technology, although nuclear power would require very significant investment, regulatory capacity and technical expertise.
Energy independence would dramatically strengthen the AES.
A state that cannot reliably power factories cannot industrialize.
Geography Changes From Weakness to Leverage
The AES is landlocked.
Today that is primarily a vulnerability.
By 2035 it could partly become an advantage if infrastructure transforms the region into a continental transit zone.
Imagine corridors connecting:
Atlantic ports,
the Gulf of Guinea,
North Africa,
and the interior Sahel.
Mali could strengthen access toward Senegal and Guinea.
Burkina Faso could deepen corridors toward Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo.
Niger could use connections through Benin and other routes.
Atlantic initiatives through Morocco could offer additional options.
The objective would not be replacing one corridor.
It would be having several.
A landlocked country becomes strategically vulnerable when it depends on one port.
A landlocked bloc connected to six or seven competing transport corridors gains negotiating power.
The AES Could Become a Diplomatic Swing Bloc
Perhaps the most important change would concern foreign policy.
The AES could refuse to become permanently aligned with either Russia or the West.
Today Russia is an increasingly important security partner. In July 2026, Moscow committed to strengthening military cooperation with the AES and supporting its Unified Force.
But by 2035 the stronger strategy would be diversification.
The AES could cooperate simultaneously with:
Russia on selected defence matters;
China on infrastructure;
Turkey on drones and manufacturing;
India on pharmaceuticals and technology;
Gulf states on finance and agriculture;
Morocco on Atlantic connectivity;
Europe on trade and investment;
the United States on intelligence or technology;
and African institutions on regional integration.
No single partnership would become indispensable.
That is what genuine strategic autonomy would look like.
ECOWAS and AES Could Eventually Reconcile
A powerful AES does not necessarily require a permanently divided West Africa.
In fact, the opposite may be true.
The economic geography of the region makes long-term hostility irrational.
The AES needs coastal ports.
Coastal countries need security in the Sahel.
Traders need open borders.
Families cross regional boundaries.
Energy systems require interconnection.
ECOWAS's decision in 2026 to appoint a dedicated chief negotiator for discussions with AES states shows that channels for coexistence remain open.
By 2035, West Africa could therefore operate through two overlapping political systems:
ECOWAS
and
the AES.
They might remain institutionally separate while cooperating on:
trade,
terrorism,
migration,
electricity,
transport,
food security
and border management.
This could eventually produce something resembling a two-bloc West African order.
Could Other Countries Join the AES?
This would be one of the clearest signs that the project had become successful.
If by 2035 the AES produces:
better security,
visible infrastructure,
economic growth,
resource sovereignty,
and functioning institutions,
other governments could seek membership or association.
But expansion would have to be approached carefully.
A weak institution that expands too quickly can collapse.
The AES first needs to prove that cooperation among its three founding members produces measurable benefits.
If it does, its political model could influence debates elsewhere in Africa even without formal enlargement.
The Political System Question
All three scenarios ultimately depend on governance.
This may be more decisive than military technology.
A 2035 Sahel dominated by governments that suppress criticism but fail to provide services could remain unstable even if armies become stronger.
Conversely, governments that combine national sovereignty with accountability may create far stronger legitimacy.
The crucial distinction is between:
state sovereignty
and
citizen sovereignty.
A government can remove foreign soldiers and still govern badly.
It can nationalize mines and still allow corruption.
It can reject foreign political pressure while silencing domestic opponents.
Therefore the Sahel's long-term political transformation will remain incomplete until sovereignty produces accountable institutions.
Five Indicators to Watch Between Now and 2030
We do not need to wait until 2035 to know which scenario is emerging.
Several indicators will become visible much earlier.
1. Territorial control
Are jihadist organizations gaining or losing the ability to control roads, villages and rural economies?
2. Civilian security
Can ordinary people return home, travel safely and reopen schools and markets?
3. Political succession
Can Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger transfer leadership without coups, internal military conflict or state breakdown?
4. AES institution-building
Does the BCID-AES actually finance projects? Does the Unified Force operate effectively? Does internal trade increase?
5. Economic diversification
Are mining and oil revenues being converted into energy, agriculture, infrastructure and industry?
These indicators will reveal far more than political speeches.
Which Scenario Is Most Likely?
The most plausible future may not be any single scenario.
It may be a hybrid.
By 2035, parts of the Sahel could become significantly more stable while other areas remain contested.
The AES could grow institutionally even while insurgencies continue.
Resource revenues could expand without eliminating poverty.
Military governments could gradually evolve into new political systems rather than simply returning to the pre-coup order.
Russia could remain influential while China, Turkey, Gulf states, European countries and others simultaneously deepen their involvement.
ECOWAS and the AES could remain politically separate while cooperating economically.
In other words, the future may combine:
partial stabilization, persistent insecurity and growing geopolitical importance.
That may actually be the most realistic path.
The Greatest Opportunity: A Young Population
The most important resource of the Sahel may ultimately not be gold, uranium or oil.
It may be people.
A rapidly growing young population can become either:
a demographic burden
or
a demographic engine.
The difference will depend on education, productivity and employment.
If millions of young Sahelians enter 2035 with:
technical skills,
digital connectivity,
reliable electricity,
access to finance,
and functioning markets,
the region could experience enormous economic expansion.
If they enter 2035 facing unemployment, insecurity, political exclusion and weak education systems, the pressure on states will become much greater.
The demographic race may therefore become one of the decisive geopolitical contests of the next decade.
2035 Will Be Decided by What the Sahel Builds
The Sahel stands at an extraordinary historical crossroads.
One future leads toward stabilization.
Governments rebuild institutions.
Security forces regain control.
Political negotiations reduce insurgencies.
Regional economic integration advances.
Citizens gradually experience greater safety.
A second future leads toward fragmentation.
Militant organizations expand.
States lose rural territory.
Criminal economies strengthen.
Political repression increases.
Displacement spreads.
West Africa becomes increasingly divided.
A third future produces something more ambitious.
The AES develops into a new regional power.
Its armies cooperate.
Its infrastructure connects the three economies.
Mining and energy resources support industrialization.
Its foreign policy becomes genuinely multipolar.
And Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger begin negotiating internationally as a collective geopolitical actor.
None of these futures is predetermined.
The Sahel possesses serious weaknesses.
But it also possesses significant strategic assets.
It has enormous territory.
A rapidly growing population.
Gold.
Uranium.
Lithium.
Oil.
Solar energy.
A strategic location linking North and West Africa.
And a powerful political movement demanding greater sovereignty.
The decisive question is whether those assets can be transformed into state capacity.
Military victories alone will not determine 2035.
Nor will anti-colonial speeches.
Nor will Russian partnerships.
Nor will nationalization of mines.
The future will depend on whether governments can build institutions capable of delivering:
security, justice, education, infrastructure, electricity, employment and political legitimacy.
That produces a simple way to understand the three possible futures.
If security improves but institutions remain weak, the Sahel may stabilize temporarily.
If both security and institutions deteriorate, fragmentation becomes increasingly possible.
If security improves while institutions, economic integration and productive capacity strengthen together, the Sahel could emerge as a genuinely new regional power.
The most important geopolitical battle between now and 2035 will therefore not simply be fought between the AES and jihadist organizations, between Russia and France, or between the AES and ECOWAS.
It will be fought between institution-building and state erosion.
That struggle will determine whether the Sahel becomes remembered as one of the great crisis zones of the early twenty-first century—
or as the birthplace of one of Africa's most consequential new regional power systems.
The balance among these three scenarios can change substantially over the next few years as security, AES institutions and regional alliances evolve.
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