HORN OF AFRICA & RED SEA— Gulf States in the Horn of Africa: Ports, Agriculture, Security and Political Influence

 

HORN OF AFRICA & RED SEA.

Gulf States in the Horn of Africa: Ports, Agriculture, Security and Political Influence.

The relationship between the Gulf states and the Horn of Africa is one of the most important geopolitical developments around the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are separated from the Horn by only a relatively narrow body of water. Their interests therefore extend naturally across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

But this is not simply a story about Gulf countries "investing in Africa."

It is about the intersection of:

ports

food security

maritime security

energy

agriculture

trade corridors

military partnerships

diplomacy

and political influence.

A 2026 Cambridge study describes the Horn as part of the Gulf states' "near abroad," with maritime security, Bab el-Mandeb, food security and counterterrorism among the strategic interests connecting the two regions. 

1. Why the Gulf is looking across the Red Sea

Start with geography.

The Arabian Peninsula faces:

Sudan
Eritrea
Djibouti
Somalia

across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

That gives Gulf governments a direct strategic interest in what happens on the African side.

The geography creates several overlapping concerns.

Maritime security

Ships leaving Gulf ports toward Europe often travel through the Red Sea.

Food security

Gulf states have limited arable land and water resources but large populations and significant food-import requirements.

Investment

The Horn offers land, ports, logistics infrastructure and emerging consumer markets.

Security

Instability on the African side of the Red Sea can affect shipping and Gulf security.

Competition

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar do not always share the same regional alliances or foreign-policy priorities.

The Horn has consequently become an arena in which Gulf states pursue both cooperation and competition.

2. The UAE: ports as strategic infrastructure

Of the Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates has developed one of the most visible commercial footprints in the Horn.

Its approach has been heavily connected to:

ports + logistics + trade corridors + agriculture + security.

The most prominent commercial instrument is DP World, the Dubai-based port and logistics company.

Its involvement in Berbera, Somaliland illustrates the strategy particularly well.

DP World operates Berbera Port and has developed the associated Berbera Economic Zone. The company describes the facility as an integrated maritime, logistics and industrial hub serving the Horn and surrounding markets. 

3. Berbera: more than a port

Berbera is strategically located on the Gulf of Aden.

That puts it close to:

Yemen

Bab el-Mandeb

Red Sea shipping

and Ethiopia.

DP World's Berbera project includes the port and a large economic zone connected to the Berbera Corridor toward Ethiopia.

This is important because ports become much more valuable when they are connected to inland markets.

Think of the system as:

Berbera Port

Berbera Corridor

Ethiopia

Large inland consumer and industrial market

This gives the UAE-linked investment a commercial rationale beyond simply controlling a coastal facility.

4. Why Ethiopia matters to Gulf investors

Ethiopia is one of Africa's largest markets.

But it is landlocked.

That creates a strategic opportunity for competing maritime gateways.

The traditional route is:

Ethiopia → Djibouti → Red Sea

But Ethiopia has expressed interest in diversifying its access to the sea.

That creates potential roles for:

Berbera

Port Sudan

Assab

and potentially other corridors.

The commercial competition among ports is therefore connected directly to the economic future of Ethiopia.

5. UAE agriculture strategy

Ports are only one part of the UAE's African strategy.

Food security is another.

The UAE imports a large share of its food and has therefore invested in agricultural land and food-production projects abroad.

The Horn and surrounding East African region offer:

• agricultural land
• livestock
• proximity to Gulf markets
• access to Red Sea shipping
• opportunities for food-processing infrastructure.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies estimates that Saudi Arabia has approximately $15.6 billion invested across East Africa, particularly in energy, infrastructure and agriculture, while UAE commitments in Sudan alone have been estimated at roughly $22 billion in non-security sectors. These figures include projects and commitments whose status can change, particularly because of conflict. 

The strategic logic is straightforward:

African land + Gulf capital + Red Sea logistics = potential food-security system.

6. Sudan is particularly important

Sudan may be the clearest example of the intersection between:

agriculture + ports + security + political influence.

Sudan has:

• enormous agricultural potential
• Nile water resources
• Red Sea coastline
• Port Sudan
• proximity to Saudi Arabia
• proximity to Egypt
• proximity to Ethiopia.

The Africa Center estimates that Gulf-state financial interests in Sudan amount to roughly $24 billion, although many projects have been suspended or disrupted by the war. It identifies the UAE as the largest Gulf participant, with major agricultural and port-related commitments. 

This makes Sudan strategically important far beyond its domestic market.

7. The Abu Amama example

One proposed UAE-backed project illustrates the ambition.

In 2022, Sudan and a consortium of Emirati companies announced a preliminary agreement worth approximately $6 billion involving the development of Abu Amama port and an associated economic zone on the Red Sea.

The project was later dissolved amid the Sudanese conflict and political controversy surrounding the UAE's alleged role in the war. The UAE has rejected allegations that it supports the Rapid Support Forces. 

This is an important distinction:

Investment

Can create infrastructure, jobs and trade.

Political alignment

Can create influence.

Conflict involvement

Can turn economic relationships into geopolitical liabilities.

The Sudan case demonstrates how closely the three can become intertwined.

8. Saudi Arabia: a somewhat different model

Saudi Arabia's Horn strategy overlaps with the UAE's but is not identical.

Saudi interests are strongly connected to:

Red Sea security

food security

agriculture

infrastructure

trade

and regional stability.

Saudi Arabia faces the Horn directly across the Red Sea.

Its western coastline contains major cities and economic projects, including the broader development associated with Vision 2030.

Consequently, Riyadh has an interest in maintaining a stable Red Sea environment on both sides.

A 2025 Africa Center assessment estimated Saudi investment across East Africa at approximately $15.6 billion, concentrated particularly in energy, infrastructure and agriculture. 

9. Saudi Arabia and Djibouti

Djibouti is especially important to Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia and Djibouti have discussed military cooperation and Red Sea security for years.

A Middle East Council analysis notes that discussions about a Saudi military base in Djibouti began after 2017, although such a base did not ultimately materialize. It also reports a 2024 Saudi-Djibouti agreement concerning a logistics base intended to facilitate exports across Africa. 

This illustrates Saudi Arabia's broader approach:

Red Sea security

commercial logistics

African market access.

Djibouti's location beside Bab el-Mandeb makes it particularly valuable.

10. Saudi food security and African agriculture

Saudi Arabia has limited domestic agricultural potential relative to its food requirements.

The country has therefore pursued agricultural investments and partnerships abroad.

East Africa is geographically attractive because it is:

• close to Saudi Arabia
• agriculturally productive in selected regions
• connected by Red Sea shipping
• home to major livestock-producing economies.

Livestock is particularly important.

Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia have substantial livestock sectors and longstanding commercial relationships with Gulf markets.

This produces a potential supply chain:

African livestock

Red Sea shipping

Saudi/Gulf markets

That is an example of how geography can connect African agricultural production directly to Gulf food-security strategies.

11. Qatar: influence through diplomacy and investment

Qatar's approach has often been more heavily associated with:

diplomacy

mediation

financial investment

political relationships

and selective economic projects.

Its involvement has been particularly visible in Somalia and Sudan.

Qatar's role became especially controversial during the 2017 Gulf crisis, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt broke diplomatic relations with Doha.

The dispute spilled into the Horn.

A 2026 Cambridge study documents how Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia were affected by competing Gulf alignments during that period. 

The Horn therefore became part of a much larger Gulf diplomatic competition.

12. The 2017 Gulf crisis changed the Horn

Before 2017, Gulf engagement in the Horn was already increasing.

After 2017, competition became much more visible.

The basic alignment looked approximately like:

Saudi Arabia + UAE

versus

Qatar + Türkiye

with Horn governments attempting to avoid becoming trapped in the rivalry.

Different countries adopted different positions.

The resulting competition involved:

• diplomatic relationships
• military cooperation
• infrastructure
• development finance
• political mediation
• port projects.

The important lesson is that African governments were not merely passive recipients.

They could also negotiate between competing external powers.

13. African governments have agency

This point deserves emphasis.

It would be inaccurate to portray the Gulf states as simply imposing their will on Africa.

Horn governments have their own interests.

They seek:

investment

security assistance

infrastructure

market access

diplomatic support

budgetary resources

technology

jobs.

Consequently, African governments may deliberately cultivate relationships with multiple Gulf powers.

For example:

UAE investment

Saudi financing

Qatar diplomacy

Türkiye security cooperation

Chinese infrastructure

Western development finance

can coexist.

This is a form of multi-alignment.

14. The port competition

The Horn is increasingly becoming a network of competing maritime gateways.

Consider:

Djibouti

Major gateway for Ethiopia.

Berbera

UAE-linked DP World investment and Ethiopia corridor.

Port Sudan

Sudan's principal Red Sea gateway.

Massawa

Eritrean Red Sea port.

Assab

Eritrean port near Bab el-Mandeb.

Mogadishu

Somalia's principal political and commercial center.

Bosaso

Important Gulf of Aden port.

Kismayo

Southern Somali port with regional significance.

The competition is not necessarily zero-sum.

A growing Horn economy could support multiple ports.

But whoever controls or operates strategic infrastructure can gain substantial commercial and political influence.

15. Why ports create political influence

A port is more than a place where ships load and unload.

It can connect:

shipping

customs

warehousing

railways

roads

industrial zones

banks

telecommunications

security services

government revenue.

A port investor can therefore become embedded in a country's economic infrastructure.

That produces long-term relationships.

This is why Gulf port investments deserve to be studied as geopolitical infrastructure, not simply real-estate or logistics investments.

16. Security is inseparable from commerce

The Gulf states' commercial interests require a secure Red Sea.

Imagine investing billions in a port.

If:

• piracy rises
• maritime attacks increase
• civil war disrupts the hinterland
• insurance costs surge
• shipping companies avoid the route

the commercial value of the investment can decline sharply.

This is why Gulf commercial strategies increasingly overlap with:

naval security

coast guards

military partnerships

intelligence

and counterterrorism.

The Gulf states' proximity to Yemen makes this especially important.

17. Yemen changed everything

The war in Yemen transformed the strategic importance of the western Arabian side of the Red Sea.

The Houthis' attacks on shipping demonstrated that a conflict in Yemen can affect:

• international shipping
• Saudi security
• Egyptian Suez revenues
• African ports
• European supply chains
• global freight rates.

The current 2026 escalation around the Bab el-Mandeb has again highlighted the vulnerability of Red Sea shipping and Saudi maritime interests. 

For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this makes the African side of the Red Sea strategically important.

18. The UAE's military footprint

The UAE has historically maintained a particularly active security presence around the Red Sea and Horn.

Its involvement in Yemen included operations and partnerships with local forces.

It also developed military infrastructure in Assab, Eritrea, during the Yemen war.

The UAE subsequently reduced its direct military role in Yemen, and its Assab facility was dismantled after the withdrawal. 

But the episode demonstrated something important:

Ports can become military logistics platforms as well as commercial facilities.

That dual-use character is central to Red Sea geopolitics.

19. Agriculture can be strategic infrastructure too

A major agricultural investment can appear purely commercial.

But consider the strategic chain:

Land

Agricultural production

Food processing

Storage

Port

Shipping

Gulf market

This creates an integrated food-supply chain.

For Gulf states concerned about food security, that can be strategically valuable.

For African countries, it can generate:

capital + infrastructure + jobs + export markets.

But there are also important policy questions:

• Who owns the land?
• How much production remains in the country?
• How much is exported?
• How many local jobs are created?
• Who receives the revenue?
• What happens to water resources?
• What happens to local farmers?
• Are contracts transparent?

The economic benefits therefore depend heavily on contract design and governance.

20. The sovereignty question

Foreign investment is not automatically a loss of sovereignty.

A well-designed investment agreement can provide:

capital

technology

infrastructure

employment

market access

while leaving strategic control with the host state.

But poorly structured agreements can produce concerns about:

• excessive dependence
• opaque contracts
• land concentration
• revenue leakage
• strategic infrastructure control
• political conditionality.

Therefore, the relevant question is not simply:

"Is Gulf investment good or bad?"

It is:

Under what terms does Gulf investment produce durable benefits for the host country?

21. The bargaining opportunity for African states

The competition among Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Türkiye, China, Europe and the United States gives African governments more potential partners.

That creates bargaining space.

For example:

Country A

could seek:

UAE → port investment

Saudi Arabia → agricultural investment

Qatar → development finance

Türkiye → military training

China → infrastructure

EU → trade finance

World Bank → institutional development

No single external power necessarily needs to dominate the entire relationship.

This is one of the most important geopolitical opportunities available to African governments.

22. But fragmentation is the danger

Multi-alignment can become complicated.

Suppose:

Power A supports one political faction.

Power B supports another.

Power C controls a port.

Power D provides military training.

Power E finances agriculture.

Then external competition can become embedded within domestic politics.

This can turn:

foreign investment

into

political competition

and potentially into

proxy competition.

The Gulf rivalry demonstrated this danger particularly clearly during the 2017 crisis. 

23. Sudan illustrates the risks

Sudan is perhaps the clearest example.

The country has attracted enormous Gulf interest because of:

agriculture

gold

livestock

ports

geography

and Red Sea access.

But the ongoing war has transformed many economic relationships into geopolitical controversies.

The UAE has denied allegations of supporting the RSF, while Sudanese authorities have made such allegations. These remain contested claims and should be distinguished from documented investment relationships. 

The Sudan case therefore demonstrates why economic influence and political influence can become difficult to separate during civil conflict.

24. The strategic triangle: Gulf–Horn–Red Sea

The region can be visualized as a triangle.

Gulf

Saudi Arabia
UAE
Qatar
Oman

↓

Red Sea

Shipping
Energy
Ports
Military access

↓

Horn

Sudan
Eritrea
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Somalia

Each side depends on the others.

The Gulf needs:

security + food + trade routes.

The Horn needs:

capital + infrastructure + markets + security partnerships.

The Red Sea provides:

the geographic connection.

25. Oman deserves attention too

Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar receive most of the attention, but Oman is strategically relevant.

Oman sits outside the Horn but directly overlooks the Arabian Sea and approaches to the Gulf of Aden.

Its foreign policy has traditionally emphasized:

• maritime security
• mediation
• regional diplomacy
• relationships across rival political blocs.

Oman's geographic position means it is part of the wider maritime system connecting the Gulf, Arabian Sea and East Africa.

26. Kuwait and Bahrain

Kuwait and Bahrain have smaller direct footprints in the Horn than Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.

But they participate in the wider Gulf diplomatic and financial ecosystem.

The important distinction is:

Not every Gulf state needs a large physical presence in the Horn to have interests there.

Financial relationships, diplomatic cooperation and participation in regional security arrangements can also generate influence.

27. What Gulf investment means for Africa

The impact can be divided into four categories.

1. Capital

African governments and companies receive access to financing and investment.

2. Infrastructure

Ports, roads, logistics zones and agricultural infrastructure can be developed.

3. Markets

African producers gain potential access to wealthy Gulf consumers.

4. Strategic relationships

Governments gain additional diplomatic and security partners.

But there is a fifth category:

5. Bargaining power

African governments can potentially use competition among external partners to negotiate better terms.

That may ultimately be the most important opportunity.

28. What Africa should negotiate for

If African states want to maximize the benefits of Gulf involvement, investment agreements can be structured around measurable outcomes.

Local employment

How many jobs are created?

Local ownership

Do African firms participate?

Technology transfer

Are technical capabilities transferred?

Processing

Are raw materials processed locally?

Infrastructure

Does the investment improve roads, rail and electricity?

Export earnings

How much foreign exchange remains in the country?

Tax revenue

What does the government receive?

Environmental protection

Are water, land and coastal ecosystems protected?

Contract transparency

Can the public understand the basic terms?

This changes the conversation from:

"How much money is being invested?"

to:

"What development value is being created?"

29. The deeper geopolitical shift

The Gulf states' increasing engagement means the Horn of Africa is no longer primarily an arena between:

Africa + Europe + America.

The geopolitical system has become much more complex.

It now involves:

Africa

Arab Gulf

Türkiye

China

United States

Europe

India

Russia

Iran

all interacting around the same maritime geography.

That creates competition.

But it also creates options for African states.

30. The central African question

The critical issue is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Qatar should be involved in the Horn.

They already are.

The question is:

Can African governments ensure that external competition produces African development rather than African dependency?

That requires strong negotiating institutions.

It requires governments capable of evaluating:

port concessions

agricultural leases

military agreements

infrastructure contracts

debt arrangements

tax incentives

resource agreements.

Without institutional capacity, even large investments can produce limited national benefits.

31. The opportunity hidden in competition

There is a potentially powerful strategy available to African states:

Don't choose one external partner for everything.

Instead:

Compete investors against each other.

Diversify financing.

Separate commercial agreements from political alignment where possible.

Require local economic benefits.

Build African ownership into infrastructure.

Use regional institutions to negotiate where appropriate.

Protect strategic assets from excessive concentration.

This turns geopolitical competition into potential bargaining leverage.

Central Lesson

The Gulf is no longer looking at the Horn simply as a neighboring region. It increasingly sees it as part of its own strategic, economic and food-security environment.

The main drivers are clear:

UAE

Ports + logistics + agriculture + security + trade corridors

Saudi Arabia

Red Sea security + food security + infrastructure + investment + regional diplomacy

Qatar

Diplomacy + investment + political relationships + mediation

And the wider Gulf engagement includes:

Oman + Kuwait + Bahrain

alongside increasingly important relationships with Türkiye and other external powers.

The Horn's strategic assets are precisely what Gulf states need:

ports

farmland

livestock

trade corridors

maritime access

proximity to Europe

proximity to the Arabian Peninsula.

But Africa possesses something equally important:

The geography itself.

The key strategic question for African states is therefore:

Can African countries turn Gulf competition for access, ports, food, security and influence into African capital, African jobs, African industries and stronger African bargaining power?

If they can, Gulf investment could become one component of a broader African development strategy.

If they cannot, the region risks becoming primarily a strategic arena for outside powers competing over African geography.

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