AI as a Geopolitical Weapon: Can the United States or China Use AI Dependence to Influence Other Countries?
Geopolitics • Technological sovereignty • Economic power • Africa's strategic future
Yes. Both the United States and China can potentially use dependence on artificial intelligence to gain strategic influence over other countries. They do not need to occupy territory, impose military rule or openly threaten another government. Influence can arise when a country's banks, public services, businesses, universities, security agencies and industries depend on technological systems controlled by foreign companies or governments.
However, technological dependence does not automatically mean political control. Countries can negotiate, diversify suppliers, develop domestic capabilities and refuse particular conditions. The degree of leverage depends on how difficult it is to replace a supplier, what access that supplier possesses, and whether the government behind it can influence its operations.
The central geopolitical question is this:
If a country cannot operate its economy, administer its institutions or compete internationally without foreign AI infrastructure, how independent is its decision-making?
This is the next frontier of the global power struggle. The contest is no longer only about who has the strongest AI model. It is also about who controls the infrastructure on which other countries may come to depend.
1. How AI becomes an instrument of geopolitical power
There are at least six mechanisms through which technological dependence can become political leverage.
1. Control over computing power
Advanced AI requires chips, data centres, electricity, networking and specialized engineering. Countries that control critical components can influence who obtains access, at what cost and under what conditions.
The US semiconductor export-control regime illustrates how access to advanced computing technology can become a national-security policy instrument. The details and licensing rules change over time.
2. Dependence on foreign AI and cloud services
If a government builds essential systems around a foreign provider's AI APIs or cloud infrastructure, losing access could disrupt public administration, research, banking or business operations.
A provider may be subject to the laws of its home country. Contractual commitments, local hosting and technical architecture affect how much leverage that creates.
3. Access to data and intelligence
AI systems may process sensitive commercial, medical, financial, industrial or government information. Access to that information can create economic and security risks if governance is weak.
Data access does not automatically mean a foreign government can read everything. Encryption, system design, legal jurisdiction, access controls and provider practices determine the actual exposure.
4. Influence over information
AI assistants increasingly explain history, politics, international conflicts and economic policy. Their training data, retrieval systems, safety policies and product rules influence which perspectives users encounter.
At scale, persistent distortions or systematic omissions could shape public understanding. This is a risk to investigate, not proof that every AI provider is conducting a coordinated propaganda operation.
5. Industrial and commercial lock-in
An economy may build factories, logistics networks, robotics, financial systems and enterprise software around one AI ecosystem. Switching later can require retraining workers, migrating data and replacing hardware.
This creates bargaining power for suppliers, even without any explicit political threat. China's combination of open-weight models and manufacturing capabilities is one important dimension of this competition.
6. Security and military dependence
AI can support intelligence analysis, cyber defence, logistics, surveillance and military planning. Dependence on foreign components or services can raise questions about continuity of supply, update control, security vulnerabilities and crisis-time access.
The strategic implications are especially serious when civilian and defence systems share infrastructure.
2. How the United States could exercise AI leverage
The infrastructure advantage
US companies occupy important positions in AI chips, cloud computing, enterprise software and frontier-model services. US export controls can also affect some foreign-produced products made using American technology.
Washington can therefore influence parts of the global AI supply chain through export licensing, sanctions, procurement rules and diplomatic agreements. These measures are generally justified by US authorities in terms of national security and strategic competition, but they can also impose costs on third countries.
A hypothetical example illustrates the mechanism.
Suppose an African country builds its national research infrastructure around American cloud services and advanced computing hardware. During a diplomatic dispute, Washington introduces a new restriction that affects a particular supplier or class of technology.
The country might then face delayed access, higher compliance costs or difficulty expanding its AI capacity.
That is a potential source of leverage. It does not mean the United States can automatically shut down any country's AI systems: the outcome would depend on the exact rules, licences, contracts, alternative suppliers and technical dependencies.
The distinction between a legitimate national-security restriction and coercive political pressure depends on the circumstances, legal basis, proportionality and treatment of affected states.
3. How China could exercise AI leverage
The deployment and industrial advantage
China has major manufacturing capabilities and a growing ecosystem of AI developers. Some Chinese developers distribute affordable models with downloadable weights, while Chinese firms also supply hardware, telecommunications equipment, cloud services and industrial automation.
Low-cost access can help countries develop useful AI applications without paying exclusively for expensive proprietary services. But widespread adoption can also create reliance on particular software ecosystems, suppliers and technical standards.
Imagine a developing country adopts Chinese AI systems across its factories, port operations, telecommunications networks and public services.
The initial benefits might be substantial: lower implementation costs, faster deployment and easier integration with Chinese-made industrial equipment.
Over time, however, the country may become dependent on Chinese vendors for upgrades, maintenance, technical expertise or compatible equipment. If political relations deteriorate, the costs of replacing that ecosystem could become significant.
This is a plausible dependency risk, not evidence that China will necessarily exploit every commercial relationship for political purposes.
China's model is not simply one of selling technology and demanding obedience. Commercial competition, industrial development, international market expansion and genuine customer demand are all relevant explanations for adoption. Geopolitical leverage is a possible consequence, not the only motive.
4. The real competition: Two different pathways to influence
The following comparison identifies potential mechanisms of leverage, not a ranking of the two countries or a claim that either always uses these mechanisms coercively.
Strategic instrument | United States | China |
|---|---|---|
Computing infrastructure | Advanced chips, cloud platforms and AI services | Domestic chip development, cloud services and AI deployment |
Market influence | Access to major software, cloud and enterprise ecosystems | Access to manufacturing, industrial equipment and competitively priced AI |
Technology restrictions | Export controls, sanctions and licensing requirements | Export policies, procurement choices and control over particular supply chains |
Standards and ecosystems | Developer tools, enterprise platforms and international partnerships | Telecommunications, industrial integration and expanding model ecosystems |
Potential dependency | Cloud access, proprietary software, chips and APIs | Hardware compatibility, industrial platforms, vendor support and software ecosystems |
Main vulnerability for the supplier | Customers may diversify or adopt competing models | Customers may diversify or adopt competing models |
The United States and China are also interdependent. American firms depend on global supply chains, manufacturing networks and international customers. Chinese firms depend on international markets and, in some sectors, access to foreign technology.
That interdependence limits the freedom of both countries to apply pressure without incurring costs themselves.
5. Africa: Could AI dependence become a new form of external influence?
This is one of the most consequential questions for Africa's long-term development.
A 2026 analysis by the Institute for Security Studies identifies infrastructure, electricity, computing hardware, connectivity and domestic data control as essential components of African AI sovereignty. A separate 2026 analysis of national AI initiatives reports continued dependence on foreign technology providers for computing, funding and expertise.
Consider four possible scenarios.
Scenario A — Administrative dependence
A government relies on a foreign AI provider for citizen services, document processing, tax administration and public-sector analysis.
Strategic risk: A sudden loss of service, contractual dispute or regulatory change could disrupt important government functions.
Scenario B — Industrial dependence
Ports, transport companies, mines and factories adopt a single foreign AI ecosystem.
Strategic risk: Switching providers could become expensive, reducing the country's negotiating power and increasing exposure to external supply disruptions.
Scenario C — Knowledge dependence
Students, civil servants, journalists and researchers rely on a small number of foreign AI assistants for explanations, research and decision support.
Strategic risk: Weak local-language support, systematic omissions or errors could influence what people learn and how institutions interpret the world.
Scenario D — Strategic autonomy
African institutions use several international providers while developing local talent, domestic data infrastructure, regional computing capacity and locally relevant models.
Strategic benefit: Greater choice improves resilience and strengthens bargaining power without requiring complete technological isolation.
The danger is not foreign technology itself. Foreign investment and partnerships can accelerate development. The danger is dependence without alternatives, contractual protection, technical expertise or meaningful local control.
6. What should African countries do?
The objective should be strategic autonomy, not technological autarky. No country needs to manufacture every chip, train every frontier model or build every cloud platform independently to exercise meaningful sovereignty.
Here is a practical framework.
Diversify critical suppliers. Avoid making essential public or industrial services dependent on a single foreign AI provider where practical alternatives exist.
Retain control of sensitive data. Establish enforceable rules for government, financial, health, biometric and defence-related information. Assess where data is stored, who can access it and which laws apply.
Build regional computing infrastructure. Invest in reliable electricity, connectivity, data centres and shared research facilities. Regional cooperation may be more economical than every country building a complete AI stack alone.
Use portable and open technologies where appropriate. Downloadable model weights, open standards and interoperable software can reduce dependence on individual APIs, although they do not eliminate hardware, licensing or expertise constraints.
Negotiate strong contracts. Require clear service-continuity commitments, data-export rights, security audits, exit plans and reasonable transition assistance for critical systems.
Develop African AI talent and datasets. Support research institutions, startups, local-language datasets and industry-specific applications that reflect African economic and social needs.
Maintain independent oversight. Governments should be able to test AI systems, challenge errors, investigate security incidents and audit consequential decisions rather than relying entirely on vendor assurances.
These measures can be applied whether a country purchases American AI, Chinese AI, European AI or locally developed systems.
7. How could a country detect AI becoming a geopolitical vulnerability?
Governments can conduct a strategic dependency audit before a crisis occurs.
AI dependency audit
Use this preliminary checklist to assess a government department, company or national AI strategy.
This is a review-progress indicator, not a security certification. An unchecked item means it still needs assessment, not necessarily that the system has failed.
8. The final geopolitical question: Can AI dependence become a weapon without a single shot being fired?
Yes, in principle. A country could face pressure through restrictions on technology access, disruption of critical services, supply-chain constraints or conditions attached to essential infrastructure. AI could amplify the effects because it is becoming embedded in more economic and administrative functions.
But three distinctions are essential:
Dependence is not the same as coercion. A supplier can possess leverage without ever using it politically.
Influence is not the same as control. Governments retain diplomatic, legal and economic tools to resist pressure.
A foreign supplier is not automatically a hostile actor. The relevant questions concern evidence, access, incentives, governance and the availability of alternatives.
The same analytical standards should be applied to Washington and Beijing. Otherwise, an examination of technological power becomes a political narrative rather than a credible assessment.
The long-term contest will concern not only the intelligence of AI models, but also the infrastructure, industrial systems, information channels and institutional relationships built around them.
The decisive strategic asset may be the ability to choose among competing AI systems without allowing any single supplier to dictate the conditions under which a country operates.
For Africa, that means turning competition between the United States and China into negotiating power, investment, knowledge transfer and domestic capability—rather than simply changing the identity of the country's technological patron.
By Jugo Ikeji-Uju.
admin@ubuntusafa.com
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